

SECRET

30 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**SUBJECT:** Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1 and Martin Ferrer**DATE :** 30 June at 1100 hours

1. Upon Erneido Oliva's request, AMBIDY-1 went to meet with him last night. At the meeting Oliva mentioned to A-1 that he (Oliva) was receiving the backing of KUBARK and the Pentagon and implied A-1 was also receiving aid. Oliva stated that he has met with Alfredo Rodemeyer, the same Rodemeyer that both of them had met early last year. A-1 replied this was all before the death of Kennedy and he no longer had contact with any of ODYOKE's officials. According to Oliva, Mr. Rodemeyer spoke badly of some of the personnel in A-1's organization, e.g., Antonio Iglesias. Oliva mentioned that he had talked with Thomas Mann recently and expected to see Mr. Mann within the coming week to receive support for his conventional warfare program. A-1 told Oliva he had no objection to the conventional warfare plan and that he would morally support Oliva in liberating Cuba. However, he would continue in his own little way with his unconventional war. According to A-1, he made it clear to Oliva that he was not receiving ODYOKE backing.

2. A-1 expects to leave on 1 July for Costa Rica tomorrow. He again mentioned that Adelaida will soon be leaving the United States. A-1 commented he does not expect to visit the United States as often as he has done in the past. A-1 asked that Enrique and Mr. Archer clearly understand that he does intend to keep his word concerning the changes he has mentioned to us at the last two meetings.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

-2-


3. A-1 expressed a desire to meet with Mr. Archer sometime after the August operations.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
Oliva - 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

29 June 1964

AMWORLD'S MEETING IN NEW ORLEANS, 24 June 1964


SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Image and Philosophy

1. AMBIDDY-1's preoccupation with his political image shone thru, when he inquired whether we suspected him of dictatorial leanings. We replied, in effect, that we entertained such suspicions and inclined toward taking his protestations of liberalism and laissez faire with a heavy dose of salt. Once in power, he would treat the 1940 as a scrap of paper and run the country along authoritarian lines. Flattered by his implied inclusion in the line of succession, A-1 only voiced mild dissent.

2. Comment: Considering the exigencies of autonomy which deny us much opportunity, let alone leverage in shaping AMBIDDY-1's political philosophy, we have conveyed to him in a variety of ways that we do not particularly care one way or the other, that we do not fancy him as a chosen instrument outside the periphery of AMWORLD and - that by extension - we have no intention of promoting any political aspirations he may harbor. We have also left no doubt in his mind that we view his performance in the AMWORLD driver's seat rather than any philosophical streams of consciousness, as a dependable gauge of how he would be performing in a position of political responsibility.

3. We pointed out to AMBIDDY-1 that Liberation Day would find a prostrate, bankrupt and exhausted people, weary to death of politics and propaganda, craving to be left alone for a while to collect its thoughts. There would be no political infrastructure on which to build and prematurely called general elections would merely serve to debauch the currency of parliamentary democracy even more. For a while at least, a benign and just executive would have to restore Cuba's equilibrium and permit her to rebuild the institutions without which a democracy cannot properly function.

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SECRET

-2-

In this context, we mentioned sentiments expressed by AMBIDBY-1 on Venezuela TV deprecating largescale revenge during the reconstruction phase and voiced hope that he would do his share to see these noble ideas put into effect.

Henry D. Hocksher

cc: Policy
Artima's 201 file ✓

SECRET

29 June 1964

AMWORLD MEETING IN NEW ORLEANS, 24 June 1964

SUBJECT: [] - Decision to Move Her to []

1. Drawing liberally upon data supplied in UFGA 16312, we reminded AMBIDDY-1 about our misgivings regarding his association with []. He conceded awareness of some of the rumors circulating about her past private life and stated that he had satisfied himself that they were unfounded. We injected that we knew that [] had been asked to do some investigating and had given [] a clean bill of health. We also happened to know that [] was aware of the true story and for reasons of his own had decided to withhold it from AMBIDDY-1. We inquired what he knew about Senora [] and he commented that she had been a "bad woman". We observed that the "had been" was open to question.

2. AMBIDDY-1 averred that he had listened to a telephone conversation between [] and her former husband, [] in which the latter had admitted that the story about his having acted under higher orders when marrying [] were unfounded. AMBIDDY-1 also charged the ex-husband of having tried to entice his wife to participate in orgies, but that [] had refused to do so.

3. As regards [] alleged illicit relationship with ex-President BATISTA, AMBIDDY-1 simply declared the charge to be unfounded. [] did know Carlos CANTILLO Gonzalez who was an old friend of the family. She also had met ex-President JIMENEZ, but nothing of a compromising nature had ensued.

4. When asked whether it was true that [] had introduced him to several prominent Venezuelans, he denied this and stated that introductions had been made by [] a trusted childhood friend of AMBIDDY-1.

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5. Our query why Adelaide, if she had AMBIDDY-1's interests at heart, appeared to have qualms about owning up in respect to past events, was parried by AMBIDDY-1 by claiming that Adelaide was of course aware of all these rumors and had warned him of possible political embarrassment.

6. Evaluating UFGA 16512 on the basis of our talk with AMBIDDY-1, we conclude that its main source has a high batting average. At least there appears to be a hard core of truth to practically all allegations made, to the extent we were able to check them out. We would venture the guess that, despite his protestations to the contrary, AMBIDDY-1 is quite conversant with [] past history, but can see no practical gain in so telling us. He may reason that an avowal of intent to marry a woman whose antecedents are in fact as described, would seriously blamish his image and that by pleading ignorance now he can, if things should get out of control, always strike a pose of injured innocence and elicit a "here but for the Grace of God go I" reaction from his PEPRIME associates.

7. Agreement that all interested parties would benefit by moving [] abode from the WAVE area to [] was reached on the basis of AMBIDDY-1's acceptance of our flat statement that we view [] as a potential hazard to AMWORLD's and KUBARK's security. We based this reasoning upon numerous indications that [] had become all but completely privy to everything that was going on in AMWORLD and that her discretion left a great deal to be desired. We drew no denial from AMBIDDY-1 when stating that Adelaide had become witting of the WAVE training course for AMBIDDY-1 and that she presumably knew about KUBARK support for AMWORLD. We referred to [] lesbian associates, without stating that we suspected her of holding charter membership in that society. We mentioned by name [] and [] When the latter was labelled by us a lesbian believed to be in [] complete confidence, AMBIDDY-1 evinced surprise and for reasons difficult to fathom almost dismay. We concluded by stressing the importance of breaking up [] circle of associates and confidants as an indispensable prerequisite for containing the threat her access to information we consider classified represents and asked AMBIDDY-1 to make sure that no member of this group would follow her to []

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-3-

8. We made no attempt, which in any case would have been vain, to break up the relationship between AMBIDDY-1 and [redacted]. We apologized to him for involving ourselves in matters of a private and intimate nature which unfortunately were beginning to impinge upon ODYOKK security interests. AMBIDDY-1 in turn made it clear that he thinks he is in love and that separation is not in the cards. We dropped the issue by assuring AMBIDDY-1 that the day would come when things could be seen in better perspective and that he could depend on us not to gloat or remind him that we had told him so.

9. We mentioned offhand that we assumed that [redacted] had all the papers necessary to effect her departure from PEPRINK. AMBIDDY-1 replied that she had not been able yet to get the necessary papers. We simply commented that she should ask for them.

Henry D. Mocksher

cc - WAVE

[redacted] 201
AMTDA's 201 ✓
Counterintelligence

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XX

Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

TYPIC/AMWORLD--Identity

REFS: A. UFGA 16512, 15 June 1964
B. DIR 31528

1. Chief, WH requests that an investigation of the truth of some of the allegations made in Ref A report be held in abeyance pending determination whether Subject in fact has decided to leave PEPRIME for [redacted].

2. Headquarters continues to be interested in additional data regarding the house in the WAVE area which AMBIDDY-1 intends to purchase in the name of [redacted].

3. If it should turn out that the conditions described in Ref report are not drastically remedied and continue to pose a festering threat to the security of AMWORLD, your Station may have to be requested to investigate. In the meanwhile, we are hopeful that Subject's removal from the WAVE area will serve to attenuate this bad situation.

4. Thanks to Ref A report, we were able (without going into too much sordid detail) to put AMBIDDY-1 on notice that we view his association with Subject in the WAVE area as a potential threat to AMWORLD's and KUBARK's security and that the political scandal potential of the existing situation is equally formidable. We consequently fell in with AMBIDDY-1's suggestion, made during the latest meeting in Panama City, that he move the center of his illicit affair to Managua where it would be easier to contain unpleasant repercussions than in the WAVE area. We urged AMBIDDY-1, and he promised to heed our advice, that he not permit Subject to take along to Nicaragua members of her present entourage, singling out Identity C of Ref A as a particular case in point.

5. It should be stressed that AMBIDDY-1 is unwavering in his (real or feigned) conviction that Subject is pure as driven snow and badly maligned and that he has a ready explanation for every "rumor." It would have been unwise to attempt coercing him into discontinuing his affair with Subject, and most likely he would not have yielded to any pressures. Hence, we had no choice but to settle for the proposed move to Nicaragua which represents a palliative at best.

Kenneth H. Philbrook

Distribution:
4 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGW 2963

22 June 1964

SECRET/RYBAT

10-124-27/3

1 - WH/EA/Esco
1 - WH/EA/BO/HH

WH/EA/BO/HH HDHecksher bh

4215

File: [redacted] 201
AMBIDDY-1 201
[redacted] 201

DC/WH/EA

14-00000
SECRET/RYBAT **DESENSITIZED**

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFGV 3063, dated 19 June 64

Identity -

SECRET/RYBAT **DESENSITIZED**

SECRET

29 June 1964

Debriefing of Russell H. Sambora in Wash., D.C. 18 June 1964


SUBJECT: DMJM Engineers

Sambora reported he met with AMBIDDY/1 at the Miami airport on 5 June 1964 for a brief discussion of organizational changes. After their talk, A/1 requested Sambora accompany him to the airport hotel to act as interpreter with an American engineer (possibly DMJM). Sambora did not recall the name of the engineer but that the engineer had stated the airstrip in Nicaragua would cost somewhere in the vicinity of a million dollars. According to Sambora, A/1 simply listened to the proposal and said he would take the matter under advisement.

Raul J. Hernandez
WM/BA/BO/HN

File: DMJM
Sambora
AMBIDDY/1 ✓

SECRET



SECRET

A-1

AMTORLD Meeting in Miami, 25 June 1964

SUBJECT: Photographs of [redacted]

1. During a lull in the meeting I took AMBIDDY-1 aside (as instructed) and told him it would be best for all concerned to take [redacted] out of PERPINE as he had suggested. I mentioned to him there is a growing number of reports on [redacted] finding their way to Washington, making it increasingly difficult for us to protect his rear.


2. I then casually mentioned to him that we had received some obscene photographs which have caused us to do some fast talking with "some people in Washington" that are beginning to have some misgivings about AMBIDDY-1 (actually this story is notional).

3. I noticed the remark concerning the photographs upset AMBIDDY-1. "Do you mean immoral pictures, Martin?" AMBIDDY-1 inquired. I nodded and to avoid his asking further questions about the pictures, I reminded him of his promise that [redacted] (AMBIDDY-1 denied knowing her) and [redacted] would not follow [redacted] to Nicaragua.

4. During the rest of the meeting AMBIDDY-1 appeared to be somewhat dejected and preoccupied. It is the opinion of the CC's attending the meeting that this was attributed to the remarks made concerning the existence of these photographs.

5. As the meeting was about to end, AMBIDDY-1 asked me again, "Do you really have some immoral pictures of her [redacted], Martin?" Again I said "Yes." These photographs had come into our possession plus much more.

SECRET



information that we had not divulged to him. AMBIDDY-1 then inquired if he could see the photographs. I replied that it was our feeling that it would serve no useful purpose other than to satisfy his own curiosity. Inasmuch as he had promised to take [] out of the country, there was no sense in rubbing salt into the wound. Furthermore, we did not wish to reveal our sources to AMBIDDY-1. Lastly, both he and I know that photographs could be fabricated and we did not want to be falsely accused of doing just this. AMBIDDY-1 again asked that I inform BECKHOFF that he is interested in seeing the pictures. In order to drop the entire subject, I promised AMBIDDY-1 I would pass the message to BECKHOFF.

6. BECKHOFF believes that this (notional) intervention jarred AMBIDDY-1 out of his complacent assumption that we lack substantial information to back up our claim that [] immoralities are more than unprovable rumors. Also, hopefully, he may now have been put on guard and may take adequate precautions against blackmail of himself or Adelaida which we consider a major threat to the security of AMWORLD. If in future meetings AMBIDDY-1 should revert to the existence of these photographs, it may be best to state that they were promptly destroyed but that their also being in the possession of potential blackmailers can never be ruled out. AMBIDDY-1 should be reminded of his assurance to alert us immediately if such blackmail attempts are made since he may need our help in warding them off. He has our assurance that we would not use the cropping up of such difficulties to remind him of his failure to heed our warnings.

Raul J. Hernandez
WM/HA/20/HH

File:

AMBIDDY-1

[]
[]
[]

SECRET

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AMWORLD Meeting in Miami, 28 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Dream House and Personal Finances

1. Without impugning AMBIDDY-1's right to purchase a home we advised him that many derogatory reports have reached our ears concerning his purchase of a home and for this reason only we wanted to set the record straight and thereby be in a better position to combat malicious rumors. A-1 said he understood and it was evident A-1 did not take it (the inquiry) as a personal affront. During a break in the meeting A-1 went home to obtain the necessary data on the house. Within a few hours A-1 returned with the information plus a blueprint of the house.

2. A-1 stated the only house he owns is the one in which he and [] are now residing. This house is located at [] Florida. The original downpayment was \$8,500. The monthly payment on the house is \$230. The funds for the downpayment were obtained from:


a. His own personal bank account (\$4,000).

b. Adelaida contributed money she had received from an automobile accident (\$1,000).

c. The balance was borrowed from Sixto Mesa (\$1,500).

A-1 added that the money borrowed from [] and Mesa was paid back to them. According to A-1 the house is valued at \$35,000. A-1 was asked why the house was not registered in his name. A-1 replied this was done to prevent rumors from starting as to where he had gotten the money. For this reason the house is registered in the name of [] (A-1's bodyguard). As soon as [] departs for Nicaragua, A-1 intends to lease the house to Sam for \$130 a month.

SECRET



SEC 7

-2-

3. Without being asked A-1 stated he wanted to clarify his financial situation since his return from prison. A-1 reported he has earned \$4,500 from the sale of Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio; from the sale of the book Bay of Pigs he has so far earned \$4,300 in royalties of which \$1,000 has been sent to the underground in Cuba. His personal bank account at present totals \$1,700. A-1 also maintains he has no other bank account in any other country.

4. We again mentioned to A-1 that our sole purpose was to hear the facts from him to prevent the wagging of idle tongues.

Raul J. Hernandez
WM/SA/SC/HR


File:

AMRIDDY-1 - 201

- 201

- 201


SECRET





Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2812 N. E. 3 COURT
MIAMI, 37, FLORIDA

PLAN OF THE HOUSE



SECRET

TRANSLATION

1. Address: [redacted] Florida.
The downpayment for the house was \$6,500. Monthly payments which have to be made per month, \$230.

2. Where did I get the money?

a. From the book Bay of Pigs I have earned \$4,300 of which I have to deduct \$1,000 I sent to the underground; thereby leaving a balance of \$3,300.

b. From the sale of Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio, \$4,500.


c. This gave me the sum of \$4,500 plus \$4,300 giving me a total of \$8,800.

d. At the time of buying the house: \$4,000 from my own bank account, \$1,000 from [redacted] an automobile accident from which she received \$1,400 and \$1,800 loaned to me by Sixto Mesa. Tito Mesa and Adelaida's money I have paid back to them.

e. I have remaining in the bank \$2,300 minus \$400 which I have spent on other things leaving me a total of \$1,700. The house is not under my name but in [redacted] name.

f. The house is valued at \$5,000.

SECRET



26 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 26 June at 1130 hours

I telephoned AMBIDDY-1 at his home and informed him that we (Carl, Dick and I) would be meeting with him on Sunday. We would need the following things at this meeting:

a. A complete up-to-date roster of the personnel in the organization as they are reshuffled.

b. Return of all insurance forms which are no longer applicable.


c. To at least have a formulated idea as to what their operational plans will be for July and any requests for data which Carl will have to obtain.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/BO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201✓
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in presence of frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



MESSAGE FORM

ROUTING

SECRET

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO : JMWAVE
 FROM: DIRECTOR
 DATE: 26 JUN 64
 FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

Wally
AMBIDY-1 201

26 JUN 64 16 37z

COMP: DC/WH/SA3
 INFO: DIP, VR

SIG CEN

TO: WAVE
 INFO: CTR DIR

31258

TYPIC YOBITE ANWORLD

REF: WAVE 0176 (IN 04619)*

ON 24 JUNE AT NEW ORLEANS MEETING AMBIDY-1 AGREED IT BEST
 IN INTEREST ALL CONCERNED (I.E. ANWORLD, KUBARK, AMBIDY-1 AND
 SUBJECT REF) IF SUBJECT MOVES RESIDENCE TO SINCE THIS
 IDEA ORIGINALLY BROACHED IN PANAMA BY AMBIDY-1 HIMSELF, HQS
 REF SIMPLY APPLAUDED IT. IN THIS LIGHT REQUEST WAVE ADVISE
 ODURGE TO GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO SUBJECT'S RENEWED APPLI-
 CATION FOR FORM I 512. SINCE ODURGE PLAYED MAJOR ROLE ASSISTING
 KUBARK IN VERIFICATION OF RUMORS ABOUT SUBJECT'S PAST, WAVE SHOULD
 FEEL FREE ADVISE APPROPRIATE LEVEL ODURGE WHY IT NOW CONSIDERED
 BEST INTERPOSE NO OBSTACLES IF SUBJECT DESIRES LEAVE PEPRIME.
 OF COURSE WE CANNOT PROVIDE ASSURANCE SUBJECT DEPARTING FOR GOOD.

END OF MESSAGE

WAVE will request ODURGE delay issuance I-512.

DeLoren
 BRUCE G. CHEEVER
 DC/WH (SA)

WH/SECURITY

M.K. Holbik

WAVE
 HENRY D. HECKENBERG
 WH/SA/BO/HI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassificationAUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

9 SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR
 FROM : JMWAVE
 ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3
 INFO : DDP, VR

ROUTING			
1	IN	41	GB
2	IN	53	AR
3	IN	101	AR
EOB	RIT3	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	NS

SECRET 241548Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8396

RYP TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

24 JUN 64 IN 18641

1. 22 JUNE AMYUM/19 HAD MEETING WITH AMJAVA/4 AND AMBIDDY/1 AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO RESOLVE LEADERSHIP CRISIS WITHIN AMYUM WHICH HAD POTENTIALLY SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR AMWORLD. A/1 ADMITTED HAVING CONTROL PROBLEMS IN CAMPS AND SAID HE FINALLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT A/19 HAD BEEN COMPLAINING ABOUT. AS RESULT DISCUSSION A/19 BELIEVES A/1 CONVINCED A/19 NOT ATTEMPTING USURP HIS POSITION IN AMYUM AND WILL PERMIT A/19 ASSUME REAL CONTROL OVER ACTIVITIES IN PBPRIE (INCLUDING AUTHORITY OVER INTE AND PROP ACTIVITIES), IN RETURN A/19 TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES RESOLVE PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN CAMPS.

2. ACCORDING A/19 RECENT ANALYSIS, WHICH BEING FORWARDED HQS, BASIC PROBLEM IS GROWING BELIEF AMONG AMYUM ACTIVISTS AND INTELLIGENCIA THAT A/1 USING THEM FOR PERSONAL AMBITIONS AND THAT A/1 EXHIBITING TOTALITARIAN LEANINGS WHICH UNACCEPTABLE AMYUM.

3. WHILE ACCEPTING NECESSITY MILITARY DISCIPLINE OPS MATTERS, AMYUM LEADERSHIP, WHICH MORE CONCERNED FURTHERING IDEALS THAN

TERVING AS MACHINE TO SUBSTITUTE ONE PERSON LEADER FOR OTHER, EXPLAIN A/1, IN EFFORT CAPTURE CONTROL OF ORGANIZATION FOR SELF

SECRET

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HAS DONE FOLLOWING:

A. IGNORED BEST QUALIFIED MEN HEAD UP MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN FAVOR THOSE WHO LACK CONFIDENCE ANYUM RANK AND FILE BUT WHO SUPPORT HIM WITHOUT QUESTION TO KEEP JOB.

B. PERMITTED MILITARY AND PROPAGANDA FIELD BE DOMINATED BY BATISTIANO ELEMENTS WHICH CANNOT EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH PBRUMEN ARMY OR MILITIA.

C. ALLOWED SECURITY SECTION BECOME GESTAPO WHICH INTIMIDATES LOYAL ANYUMS WHO NOT UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS A/1, CONTRIBUTING TO AIR INTRIGUE AND INTERNAL CONSPIRACY WHICH SAPS STRENGTH OF MILITARY PHASE, AND PLAYED PERSONAL ENTOURAGE AGAINST PARTY CADRE IN ORDER KEEP CONTROL.

4. ACCORDING⁶ A/19 ANYUM LEADERSHIP WANTS A/1 AGREE TO SHARING POLITICAL DECISION MAKING AND SELECTION KEY PERSONNEL WITH ANYUM DIRECTORATE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OPS PLANNING NOT INCLUDED IN THIS AND ONCE DECISION MADE ORGANIZATION TO BACK A/1 DECISION WITHOUT QUESTION. IF THIS NOT DONE A/19 SAYS IT POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP MAY ATTEMPT DISASSOCIATE SELF FROM ANVORLD IN ORDER PRESERVE IDEOLOGICAL PURITY REGARDLESS EFFECT ON ANVORLD.

5. DIRECTORATE IDEA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO A/1 ACCORDING A/19. WAVE C/O SUGGESTED THAT BRINGING OTHER ELEMENTS INTO DECISION MAKING MACHINERY WOULD ONLY RESULT MORE PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED THAT PERMITTING A/4 AND A/19 EFFECTIVELY EXERCISE RESPECTIVE OFFICES SHOULD PROVIDE ANVORLD WITH SATISFACTORY BALANCE CENTRALIZED CONTROL FOR EFFICIENCY, AND DIVERSITY AS GUARD AGAINST FEARS CREATING ONE MAN DICTATORSHIP.

SECRET

6. IT GUERTLER OPINION A/1 SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED ATTEMPT
TO IT ALONE. FROM LONG RANGE VIEWPOINT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY
RECOGNIZE REAL POLITICAL MOTIVATION MANY AMWORLDERS AND FACT
THEY WITH PROJECT AS ANYUMS, NOT AS FOLLOWERS A/1. WHILE A/1
PROBABLY ABLE ATTRACT ENOUGH POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CONTINUE COMMANDO
AND SAB OPS SEVERAL KEY AMWORLDERS INCLUDING AMSALON/1, ANYUM/29,
AMHINT/27 AS WELL AS REBEL ARMY TYPES WOULD LEAVE IF A/1 BROKE
WITH ANYUM FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

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AMWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 24 June 1964

SUBJECT: ANYUM-19 or Nice Guys Finish Last


1. HQS conclusion that AMWORLD interests would best be served by not opposing the termination of liaison contacts with ANYUM-19 was prompted by some of the following considerations:

a. AMBIDDY-1's obvious displeasure with the existing relationship, as evidenced by his rather pointed observations about the corrupting effects of such contacts on subordinate levels. The fact that such contacts provide KUBARK with a certain insight into those AMWORLD affairs which AMBIDDY-1 prefers to keep secret is obviously a factor, but not an overriding one. What really worries AMBIDDY-1 is--he claims--that factionalism draws sustenance from working level liaison between Cubans and Americans except in those rare instances where the loyalty of the Cuban representative is beyond cavil.

b. AMBIDDY-1's lack of confidence in ANYUM-19's loyalty. HQS position has been all along that AMBIDDY-1 is the sole judge of who among his co-workers merit trust and who doesn't. To dispute his judgment would entangle KUBARK into intra-AMWORLD power politics with no adequate basis for intelligent judgment. Either we reserve ourselves the right of co-determination on all personnel action or on none. AMWORLD groundrules are unambiguous on that score. We do not become involved except in those instances where our opinions are specifically elicited, as in the field of background checks which only by inference bear upon the issue of loyalty to AMBIDDY-1. In sum, once AMBIDDY-1 withdraws his confidence from a co-worker we have no leg to stand on in persisting that we have the right to consider that particular individual our chosen instrument in the field of liaison.

c. ANYUM-19's dual role as a ranking functionary of AMWORLD and the Number Two Man in ANYUM. Since we have reason for believing that a dichotomy has been opening up between AMWORLD and ANYUM's old guard (to

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-2-


which ANYUM-19 belongs), liaison with ANWORLD conducted through ANYUM-19 ipso facto involves KUBARK in factional strife. We recall that some of the major troubles besetting the action mechanism prior Playa Giron stemmed from the interference of political commissars. Without derogating from the importance of the ideological component in the struggle against ANTHUO, in any showdown between the military command and the political functionary corps, it behooves us to range KUBARK alongside the former unless the points at issue manifestly implicate PEPRIE security. Under ANWORLD groundrules KUBARK supports AMBIDDY-1 as the commander of an unconventional warfare instrument, not an exile organization, let alone the ideology and aspirations which animate it.

d. The ANYUM opposition group represented by ANTHU-12 clearly desires a share in the decision-making processes which KUBARK has entrusted to AMBIDDY-1. While they pay lip service to the principle of non-interference in purely military affairs, in the final analysis it would be impossible to keep the two aspects apart. Any concessions on KUBARK's part to the pretensions of the ANYUM opposition would confront KUBARK with intangibles in the form of occult pressures brought to bear upon AMBIDDY-1 whose impact we could not possibly gauge or control.

e. ANYUM dissidence flourishes in the WAVE area, whereas ANWORLD's center of gravity rests in Central America. Unless AMBIDDY-1's stewardship is unimpeded by ANYUM factionalism, ANWORLD's performance is bound to suffer since AMBIDDY-1's preoccupations will always retain a focus on his WAVE area backyard.

f. The impression that ANWORLD may be disintegrating is fed by intel which essentially reflects WAVE area backstage maneuverings in the political sphere, not the situation in the camps about which we are, as a matter of fact, relatively uninformed. By striving to insulate ANWORLD against the vagaries of WAVE area bickering and strife, the ANWORLD picture is bound to move into clearer focus and any shortcomings for which AMBIDDY-1 should be called to account can no longer be blamed upon the debilitating effects of ANYUM intrigue and--most important--cannot possibly be blamed upon KUBARK once its links with ANTHU-12 have been severed.

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-3-

g. An emasculated political apparatus in the WAVE area will deprive AMBIDDY-1 of all excuse to divide his time between Central America (where he belongs) and the WAVE area.

h. The tawdry aftermath of the ZENON II raid can justly be blamed if not on ANYUM, at least on AMBIDDY-1's political representation in the WAVE area. With that representation effectively eliminated, one of the main sources of ODYOKE discomfiture will have been effectively dislocated. Impending changes should at least eliminate the ANYUM press and intel sections.


i. Should there be further unpleasantness in the WAVE area, KUBARK will, once contacts with ANYUM-19 have ceased, have a base for plausible denial of responsibility for not preventing it.

j. If we are to believe certain not altogether unbiased reports, AMBIDDY-1, through his mistress [redacted] has become linked with the exile demimonde which moves on the fringes of common crime and which is closely intertwined with the remnants of Batista's regime. While ANYUM, and particularly ANYUM-19, may to some extent serve to counteract and slow down these trends, they are obviously unable to halt them entirely. Hence, what little benefit we could have derived from a tie-in between ANYUM and ANWORLD has not been forthcoming. Short of an enduring political compromise between conflicting viewpoints, which we don't consider within the realm of practical politics, any solution which keeps AMBIDDY-1 out of the WAVE area and close to his command post, serves ANWORLD and hence KUBARK interests.

k. ANWORLD in WAVE area had become a breeding ground for rumors and beyond reasonable doubt a valuable source of classified information for ANTHUG's agents. By placing AMBIDDY-1 and his pals out of reach, PERUMEN's l. 8. may be forced to base a major collection effort on [redacted] which won't be easy.

l. ANYUM-19 is a "nice guy," personally prepossessing and basically honorable. He evidently and in full measure shares PERUMEN's propensity for political intrigue and fractionalization. He is intensely preoccupied with ideological issues and is unwilling to accept the absolute primacy of overthrowing ANTHUG to which, at least at this rather hopeless stage of the

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
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-4-

struggle, most ideological reservations ought be subordinated. Regarding this fundamental issue he and KUBARK may be at odds. In serving as our principal working level liaison contact, he has not resisted the temptation to try parlaying it into political power vis-a-vis AMBIDDY-1, a fact that has obviously not escaped AMBIDDY-1's notice. Without impugning ANYUM-19's good faith, we have reason for believing that on occasion he has conveyed our views in the garb of KUBARK criticism of AMBIDDY-1's capabilities, e.g., as a paramilitary planner and, it appears, has left AMBIDDY-1 with the completely erroneous impression that we were taking sides in the factional dispute involving ANYUM, in essence backing ANYUM-19 against AMBIDDY-1. In advising AMBIDDY-1 on the pros and cons of dismissing SAMBORA (P), ANYUM-19 told AMBIDDY-1 that dismissal would in all probability spell a break with KUBARK which he must have known and of which he was subsequently reminded, ran completely counter to KUBARK's oft stated position that personnel matters are in AMBIDDY-1's hands. By implication, at least, he may have reinforced AMBIDDY-1's suspicions that [] was linked with KUBARK. Apparently AMBIDDY-1 has not been unduly influenced by ANYUM-19's continuous harping on the threat posed by AMBANG-1 (ANYUM-19 was never shaken in his conviction that AMBANG-1 receives KUBARK support). Another bete noire has now reared its ugly head in the person of []

3. ANYUM-19's ideological preoccupations have seriously detracted from his performance as a liaison contact. As a de facto penetration of ANYUM and as a source of personality information he has done well by KUBARK. Thanks to him KUBARK undoubtedly now has a much clearer understanding of the interlock between AMBANG-1 and ANYUM, although we shall have to observe the course of events before accepting ANYUM-19's premise that they are Siamese twins who if surgically separated will hemorrhage to death. We owe him a debt of gratitude to have alerted us to the impending rift and to have enabled us to arrive at the only possible decision, i.e., to throw the full weight of KUBARK's support behind AMBIDDY-1. Through him we have also learned a great deal about AMBIDDY-1's salient characteristics as a leader, of course making due allowance for a subtle injection of ANYUM-19's venom. In fairness to AMBIDDY-1 it should be stated that some of the characteristics to which ANYUM-19 takes most violent exception, even if they are ingrained, have been inculcated into AMBIDDY-1 by KUBARK. Since the inception of the program, we have urged AMBIDDY-1 to place himself in unchallengeable control of the paramilitary apparatus and not allow political considerations to intrude upon the conduct of AMBANG-1 affairs. Any mismanagement

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therefore ought not be blamed upon authoritarianism (without which AMWORLD cannot conceivably prosper) but upon a leadership gap in AMBIDY-1's personality makeup which even "democratic centralism" couldn't correct or cure.

4. In assessing the prospective consequences of a cessation of contact between ANYUM-19 and KUBARK, we shall have to take into account that he is fully cognizant of the fact that KUBARK supports AMWORLD. The relationship that has existed heretofore is known to him in all its facets.

a. Under assumed names, the following KUBARK reps are known to him:

Bobbie Hernandez
Raul Hernandez
Carl Jenkins
Earl Rohrer

Desmond Fitzgerald
Henry Hecksher
Richard Beal
James Smith

b. ANYUM-19 has intimate knowledge of AMWORLD funding arrangements, i.e., amounts, identity of bank accounts [redacted] and related information. Unless we receive unmistakable indications that ANYUM-19 is on the warpath against AMWORLD and KUBARK, a change in these arrangements does not appear indicated. Nor can we see any merit in dismantling AMWORLD's logistic infrastructure of which ANYUM-19 has full knowledge.

c. He knows the following individuals and may suspect that they are somehow linked with KUBARK:

Russell H. SAMBORA (P)
Peter C. KNITTEL (P)


d. Telephone numbers which were issued to ANYUM-19 are in the process of being discontinued.

e. ANYUM-19 knows the location of the following KUBARK installations and accommodation addresses (which will be given up or changed):

[redacted]

f. Whether or not ANYUM-19 is an attempt to avenge imagined slights by KUBARK (such as the abrupt termination of the existing relationship without farewell) by divulging

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what he knows to unauthorized persons, is difficult to assay. Should he in honest conviction reach the conclusion that he was shunted aside because KUBARK considered him an obstacle to establishing full sway over AMWORLD, he could easily rationalize a betrayal. Other "ideological" considerations could be adduced by him to justify actively opposing KUBARK. Whatever he may do along those lines would not be through inadvertence but by design. We have weighed and discarded the possibility of neutralizing him through recruitment. This would not work if our reading of his personality is correct. We can think of a number of deterrents, out of KUBARK's reach, which will probably make him think twice before throwing down the gauntlet. To provoke the enmity of both AMBIDDY-1 and KUBARK would be an act of defiance of which we consider ANYUM-19 incapable. Besides, ANYUM-19 strikes us as an individual imbued with a sense of basic decency and of Christian morality.


6. In balance we doubt whether ANYUM-19 is going to pose a major threat to the security of AMWORLD. In any case, HQS decision to accede to AMBIDDY-1's desires on working level liaison, even if it entails a rupture in relations with ANYUM-19, was made in full awareness of the fact that he could cause trouble and inflict damage if this be his intent. Should this come to pass, however, it would be unfair to shift the entire blame onto AMBIDDY-1. While we can hardly applaud the glaring lack of political acumen AMBIDDY-1 has displayed in this whole affair, while his motives in dispensing with ANYUM-19's services may not be entirely honorable, and while [] his main source on the ANYUM cabal, is self serving and questionable to put it mildly, the fact remains that the final decision was KUBARK's as much as it was AMBIDDY-1's.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/BA/DO/HR

cc: CDR, JMWAVE

File:
AMBIDDY-1 301
ANYUM-19 301
Policy

SECRET



SECRET

23 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 22 June 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1, sounding somewhat tired and with a bad cold, mentioned that he would like to advance the date of the meeting to 23 June 1964. A-1 advised there are some administrative matters which have to be resolved in Managua and other problems in Miami that he would like to discuss with "Enrique". A-1 then intends to return to Miami.

2. In that case A-1 was notified that we (Henry and Martin) would hold the meeting with him on 23 June 1964 and that Carl could talk with him and AMJAVA-4 on the morning of 24 June. A-1 was advised that this is a routine meeting in which many items would be discussed, e.g., the Miami reorganization that A-1 had mentioned. There was nothing of a critical nature.

3. The [] arrived in [] as they were leaving for the States (21 June).


4. A-1 inquired if there were any outstanding problems. Martin evasively replied that he preferred not to discuss it over the phone. A-1 then asked if we intended to discuss A-19 and "his friends". The undersigned mentioned we would be disposed to talking about anything which A-1 feels is important.

5. A-1 stated he expects to leave for Central America by the end of next week.

Above conversation conducted
in presence of frequently
changed privacy code

File: AMBIDDY-1 - 201 -
Conversations

SECRET



Return 201

DISPATCH		RYBAT SECRET DESCRIBED	PROCESSING		
TO	FROM	SUBJECT	PRO- POSED	ACTION	ACCOM- PLISHED
Deputy Chief, WH/SA				MARKED FOR INDEXING	
			XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
				ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
				ABSTRACT	
				ENCLOSURE	
Chief of Station, JMWAVE					
RYBAT/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD AMOT Report					
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
ACTION REQUIRED: None					
REFERENCE: UFGA-16512 of 15 June 64					
<p>Transmitted herewith is additional information concerning AMBIDY/1's home life which may be of interest to BECKHOFF. It would be interesting to learn the origin of the recurrent rumor that the date of the PILON raid was advanced at the instigation of ODYOKE and that AMBIDY/1 feels himself betrayed.</p>					
<p>W. K. Reuteman ANDREW K. REUTEMAN</p>					
Attachment: AMOT Report DD-880 1 Copy herewith Identities, Under Separate Cover					
Distribution: 3 - DC/WH/SA, w/att/h/w & u/s/c					
CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-267437			DATE TYPED 17 Jun 64		
CLASSIFIED AND SENSITIZED SECRET RYBAT			DATE DISPATCHED JUN 23 1964		
UFGA-16525 HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER			DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		
16-6-3/4 16-124-27/3					

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RYBAT

SECRET

Report # ED-950.

11 Jun 64

REF: DD-920.

TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: AMRIDDY-1 and IDEN A

SOURCE: IDEN B
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Source had a conversation with IDEN A, an SNE [REDACTED] told source [REDACTED] would marry her in spite of everything, even if the marriage was opposed by the Catholics, by the Americans, and by everyone. According to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] has made this promise to her.

IDEN A said the following to source regarding the attack against Pilon: "Tell [REDACTED] (pet name by which [REDACTED] calls [REDACTED]) and I spent four days in the room locked up planning the Pilon attack, but then the Americans changed the date because they suspected I was [REDACTED] by."

IDEN A told source [REDACTED] was willing to give up everything and [REDACTED] from everything to marry her.

Source further reports that an article was published in IDEN A Rolando 195: Juan Rojas' newspaper in New York announcing [REDACTED]'s marriage to [REDACTED] although her name was mistakenly given as [REDACTED] RODRIGUEZ (see attached photostatic copy of this clipping). That this article caused [REDACTED] in the house and greatly scared [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] told source that [REDACTED] had sent for a copy of the newspaper from New York to see what the article said. Then source told [REDACTED] over the phone that she (source) had the newspaper and [REDACTED] then asked source to read the article to her over the phone. Source did this while [REDACTED] was listening in silence through an extension phone.

After hearing what the article said, [REDACTED] asked source whether she thought that harmed him, and source replied that it did. [REDACTED] complained to source about all that had happened, and admitted buying the house and the high cost of decorating the house by Madonnage.

SECRET

DISSEMINATION

SECRET

Report # DD-950, CE, 11 Jun 64 (cont.)

Source's impression is that A-1 and IDEN A have closed their house to all visitors, because both are concerned about the way in which all the information about them has been leaked. One time A-1 exclaimed with fear: "We have the G-2 in our house!"

After source's telephone conversation with A-1, IDEN A called source and said: "Last night 'Tuti' could not sleep. All this gossip is going to ruin him."

IDEN A told source that one time A-1 had called her from Caracas, Venezuela, telling her that he could barely speak because he was hoarse from talking to all wealthy Venezuelans asking them to give money for the Cuban cause.

SECRET

RYBAT

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: UFGA-16325 dated JUN 23 1964

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Iden A. -

B. -



SECRET

RYBAT

DISPATCH

HYBAT/SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM

Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT

AMWORLD--Possible Basis for Entente between AMBIDDY-1 and SAMBORA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We advised SAMBORA at a Washington meeting with him, 16 June 1964, that from the way things look to us he had painted himself into a corner from which he could not extricate himself. Another error was to have permitted someone like [] to block his path to the AMWORLD hierarchy. This in retrospect, however, is all water over the dam.

2. If SAMBORA is to perform his functions as we first conceived them he should go to AMBIDDY-1 and arrive at a new understanding. SAMBORA was informed that we intend to meet AMBIDDY-1 before SAMBORA returns to Miami. At this meeting we intend to state in no uncertain terms that the security of the organization is in a deplorable condition. This perhaps may have the effect of placing SAMBORA in a more favorable bargaining position.

3. We counseled SAMBORA to negotiate a hard contract which would encompass at least the following terms:

a. He would not work under nor be responsible to [] but only to the highest echelons of AMWORLD hierarchy.

b. Full access to all files, bases, information needed to perform a professional job.

c. The complete and unhesitating support of AMBIDDY-1 in all security matters.

If Am1 is unwilling to accept these terms or offers any restrictions or conditions SAMBORA has our permission to turn in his badge and bid AMBIDDY-1 a fond adieu.

KENNETH PHILBROOK

Distribution:

3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-267457

CROSS REFERENCE IN

DISPATCHES IN THIS FILE

DATE

UPGW 3918

23 June 1964

INDEXING NUMBER

DESENSITIZED

10-124-27/3

HYBAT/SECRET

1 - WH/BA/EA

1 - WH/BA/NO III

A-1-201

WH/BA/NO III

RE

INT.

4477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	MOB	INT	SS SB
2		LOS	SPRS AR
3			
	EOB	EFTS	LOG CA
	CI	SI	BF HH
			SEC HS

DIRECTOR

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO: DOR, VR

*Policy
Mesa-201
Finances
Artins-201
Anyam-19*

SECRET 2018312

DIR CITE VOLT 4196

TYPIC YOBITE ANWORLD

REF DIR 28914

20 JUN 64 IN 11209

REF DISCUSSED WITH ANYUM-19. DISPATCH BEING FORWARDED HQS.
RE PARA 12 A-19 ADMITS ANWORLD FINANCES LEAVE SOMETHING TO BE
DESIRED, CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL EXPENSES CHARGED TO ANWORLD. ADMITS
HE HIMSELF GUILTY OCCASIONALLY ALTHO SALARY ADEQUATE. A-19 MADE
FOLL OBSERVATIONS. ANWORLD 2 PROBABLY RELATIVELY FREE FROM GUILT
DUE FEAR EVENTUALLY BEING CALLED TO ACCOUNT. HOWEVER A-2 KNOW-
LEDGEABLE SITUATION AND DISPENSES MONEY WITHOUT CALLING FOR RECEIPTS.
A-19 HAS NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO SEE BOOKS OR PAYROLL, THIS FOR AMBIDDY-1
EYES ONLY. LARGE PART MISAPPROPRIATIONS FALL UNDER "TRAVEL EXPENSES".
IT A-19 VIEW AMOUNT NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO EFFECT ANWORLD OPS
CAPABILITY BUT HAS CAUSED MORALE PROBLEM WITHIN ANYUM BECAUSE AMBIDDY-1
MISAPPROPRIATES ANWORLD FUNDS FOR PERSONAL USE, AND THIS KNOWN TO
OTHERS. THUS IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR A-1 ENFORCE FINANCIAL PROBITY.

SECRET

SECRET



☐ UNCLASSIFIED
 ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY
 ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
 ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: AD/AN		EXTENSION		NO. UFGA 16512									
				DATE 22 June 1964									
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)									
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED											
1. AD/MIS			GP	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>AN/</td> <td>FI</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>AD</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">ABSTRACT</td> <td>X</td> </tr> </table>	AN/	FI		AD			ABSTRACT		X
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FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
 ☐ SECRET
 ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
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 ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED
SECRET

PROCESSING

TO	Deputy Chief, WH/SA	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	ACCOMPLISHED
INFO			NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	RYBAT/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD The Private Life of AMWORLD's First Family		ABSTRACT	
			EXCERPTS	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE: UF-W-3514 of 6 April 1964

1. The following AMOT report concerning the not-so-private affairs of AMBIDY/1 and his fiancée may be of interest to BECKHOFF. According to ANYUM/19, AMBIDY/1 intends to formalize his relationship with Iden B sometime within the next few months. The marriage will probably take place in Latin America and Iden B will make her home there to avoid a public scandal which would have a harmful effect on the ANYUM organization. Attention is called to paragraphs 14, 17, and 26 which answer, in part, some of the questions raised in ref dispatch concerning ODYONE involvement in AMWORLD. The Station has forwarded reports of this nature which concern claims by members of the Cuban exile community of KUBARK sponsorship of AMBIDY/1. Of the specifics cited by the Cuban, intelligent or otherwise, to support their allegations those statements attributed to the AMWORLD principals themselves appear to be the only ones which can make a claim to "knowledge" as opposed to conviction based on AMWORLD's affluence. To date no tangible evidence of KUBARK involvement with AMWORLD has come to our attention.

2. Source: Iden A.

Source states that she has known AMBIDY/1 since they were children in Esmeralda municipal term, Camaguey province, from where both of them come originally. Source further states she is also a close friend of Iden B, who is now AMBIDY/1's mistress and a homosexual like source (according to source's statements).

Attachment:
Identities, Under
Separate Cover

(Continued)

Distribution:
✓3 - DC/WH/SA

CS COPY

201-267437

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
15 Jun 64	May 24 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFGA-10512	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
19-5-3/5	
19-124-27/3	

CASES REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED
SECRET

3. Iden B was Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldivar's mistress in Cuba for about 8 years, and she claims her 5 year old son is BATISTA's son. Iden B met BATISTA through Carlos CANTILLO Gonzalez. When Iden B was BATISTA's mistress she was married to Iden C, who is now in Miami also and has a very bad moral reputation. On various occasions Iden B has received money from BATISTA, always through Orlando PIEDRA Negueruela. The last money which she received, \$200.00, was when she was already living with AMBIDDY/1. Iden B has many friends among MASFERRER's people and is a very close friend of the wife of Enrique MASFERRER Rojas. According to source, AMBIDDY/1 has had various meetings with Orlando PIEDRA Negueruela. Quite some time ago (source doesn't remember exact date). AMWORLD/2 raised \$10,000 for AMBIDDY/1 from among "batistianos." AMWORLD/2 and Orlando PIEDRA owned a gasoline firm called "Reca", and at present AMWORLD/2 is still on very good terms with PIEDRA Negueruela.

4. Iden B used to "pose" with her sister, Iden D, to please BATISTA and in the presence and with the approval of her husband, Iden C. Iden B is a very close friend of "Flor de Loto", Tete *MACHADO, [redacted], a woman called Pat (La Americana) and [redacted], all known homosexuals who hold "posing" parties now in Miami like they used to in Cuba. One time when AMBIDDY/1 went to "Flor de Loto's" house he met Iden A.

5. According to source, Iden B was also the mistress of Marcos PEREZ Jimenez, former dictator of Venezuela. Iden B met PEREZ Jimenez through Colonel Pulido*BARRETO who was a friend of PEREZ Jimenez. Pulido BARRETO put Iden B in contact with an individual named PELAEZ, a narcotics trafficker according to source, who introduced her to PEREZ Jimenez. Since then Iden B lived with PEREZ Jimenez for about a year, and every time PEREZ Jimenez visited her he gave her \$100.00 for the "visit".

6. Iden B was also the mistress of Pedro*SUAREZ (mat. unk.), former Councilman of Marianao municipal term, Havana province. According to source, Pedro SUAREZ was Iden B's lover here in Miami. One time Pedro SUAREZ took Iden B to see a "witch" mulatto who lives in Miami, who is also Rolando MASFERRER's "witch", according to source. Pedro SUAREZ wanted to control Iden B through this "witch", but she came to an agreement with the "witch" so that the "witch" would write a letter to BATISTA to make him send a large sum of money to her. When Pedro SUAREZ learned about this, he beat up the "witch" and denounced her to the Cuban Refugee Center. According to source, Iden B has another lover named [redacted], who is now [redacted].

7. AMBIDDY/1 talked to Iden C and asked his help in organizing the ANYUM Intelligence Section. For this objective he gave Iden C a sum of money to begin working. In the month of March or April 1963, Iden B filed a divorce suit against her husband.

8. In the same month of March or April 1963, source received a check for \$300.00 from Raul GRANDA Hernandez in behalf of AMBIDDY/1, so that Iden B could pay for her divorce. Raul GRANDA lives with Iden B's sister. Iden C was tried for having a stolen knife from a grocery store in his possession, and he was sentenced to pay a \$150.00 fine.

9. Source further states that in view of the fact she (source) has many friends who like "poses", she was able to introduce to AMBIDY/1 some important Venezuelans including Colonel Pulido BARRETO, Carlos SISO (mat. unk.) and Osvaldo BAJARES (Venezuelan economist). Source states that, at AMBIDY/1's request, three meetings were held with those individuals in source's house. According to AMBIDY/1 the objective of the meetings was to get support for his plans, and the objective of the Venezuelans was to overthrow Romulo BETANCOURT, and they were allied to the National Liberation Armed Forces (FALN). The conversations revolved around CASTRO Leon. The Venezuelans believed they could make a pact with the Communists and later eliminate them. At that time various members of FALN came to Miami (source doesn't remember when). AMBIDY/1 assured the Venezuelans he could influence GPFOCUS and KUBARK to get support for their cause.

Carlos SISO told source he distrusted AMBIDY/1 and believed he was a KUBARK penetration to learn all their plans. SISO also told source that when Osvaldo BAJARES returned to Venezuela he had been arrested, and SISO believed AMBIDY/1 had denounced BAJARES. In the last meeting, SISO told source that he was going to put AMBIDY/1 to a test. SISO asked him "whether it was true he had gone to Haiti on an official mission as an ODYOKE envoy." AMBIDY/1 was very surprised and said he had, but insisted in SISO telling him how he had learned that. The meetings with the groups of Venezuelans stopped since that time.

After these happenings, AMBIDY/1 informed source he had written a report to the Americans about the Venezuelan problem, and that he had treated Rafael CALDERAS very well in this report because CALDERAS had given him financial assistance.

10. AMBIDY/1 showed source an unbound book and told her this was the most important book ODYOKE had because it contained military secrets which were known to a very few people. AMBIDY/1 boasted of being one of the few men in the U. S., who had that document. Source leafed through the book and saw some weapons, noticing that some of those weapons were marked. AMBIDY/1 explained that those marked weapons are the ones which ANTHUG/1 has in his possession.

11. Source further reports that on various occasions, in private conversation which AMBIDY/1 had with Iden B, Iden C and source, he said that when he seizes power in Cuba he is going to organize guerrillas to invade Mexico and other countries which have denied help to Cuba. According to source, AMBIDY/1 is convinced he will be President and Iden B, First Lady.

When AMBIDY/1 talks of the 1940 Constitution he says it must be defended publicly and respected as something sacred, but in private he has said that when he seizes power he is going to use every page of the Constitution as toilet paper.

12. Source heard AMBIDY/1 talk about a book which had been published which strongly accused KUBARK, and say that he, Iden B, and Iden F had furnished all the data for this book and would receive about \$8,000.00 as their share of the sale profits.

13. One time AMBIDDY/1, Iden B and source had a meeting and discussed who should be the pilot of his private aircraft. Iden B proposed a pilot named ALEXANDER (according to source, ALEXANDER had relations with Iden B,) but AMBIDDY/1 opposed this and complained thrt the PBPRIMERS forced him to select the personnel.

14. About 7 months ago (on or about Nov. 63), AMBIDDY/1 told Iden B and source that he was going to receive a secret training course under PBPRIME direction. AMBIDDY/1 used to leave every day at 6 AM and come back at night. According to source, the course lasted 6 weeks and most of the times Iden B used to drive AMBIDDY/1 in an automobile to a place in Coral Gables where the course was being given. Every time AMBIDDY/1 returned from the classes he talked about the things he had learned and talked about secret writing, codes, of some pens with a substance which could kill instantaneously, about sabotage methods, etc., etc.

15. AMBIDDY/1 frequently spends long hours at night in his house making up accounts to justify expenses.

16. After Iden B's divorce, AMBIDDY/1 moved with her to 881 NE 71st Street. AMBIDDY/1 talks constantly in the house where he lives with her about his future plans, about the single party, about the dictatorship which has to be imposed in Cuba, etc. AMBIDDY/1 often puts on a uniform, poses in front of the mirror and talks about invasion.

WAVE Comment: This is one of several recent reports concerning statements attributed to AMBIDDY/1 in which he has spoken of the need for a strongman to run Cuba. AMSHADY/1 reports that on 10 June Aurelio MARIN Naredo (one of approximately 30 AMWORLDERS recently arrived from the camps) states that AMBIDDY/1 appeared at the training camps, took a dictatorial position on a number of issues terminating with the statements to the effect that he was the only one to liberate Cuba, he was the only one to run it later, and that there would be no voting and no elections. MARIN objected, stating that he had joined a revolutionary group, not a dictatorship, and along with other trainees requested to return to the WAVE area. According to AMSHADY/1 when the trainees arrived and went to the AMYUM offices to receive their final check AMJAVA/4 refused, a fight ensued and AMYUM/19 had to intervene. MARIN characterized AMBIDDY/1 as deceitful, liar, coward, demagogu, dictator, power mad, a flagrant opportunist who cannot be trusted, etc. Realizing that AMSHADY/1 is strongly prejudiced against AMBIDDY/1 this comment is forwarded for what it is worth. AMYUM/1 has confirmed the incident at the AMYUM office and states that, whether or not it is justified, there is a considerable number of AMWORLDERS who hold similar views now and who attribute statements to AMBIDDY/1 which are inconsistent with his previous public statements.

17. At the time of President KENNEDY's death, source asked AMBIDDY/1 whether this would harm him and he replied smiling that it did not, that now he was receiving more aid than before. AMBIDDY/1 told source that he had received a card from Mrs. Jacqueline KENNEDY in reply to the condolences which he had sent her, and a card written by Bob KENNEDY with greetings.

18. According to source, AMBIDDY/1 has just given Iden B a fabulous residence in Miami. According to Iden B, the residence is in the name of AMWORLD/2, but they wrote another document specifying that the house belongs to her. Iden B told source that AMBIDDY/1 had made a down payment of \$8,000.00 and paid \$300.00 a month. Source also reports that AMBIDDY/1 has given to AMWORLD/2

documents, valuables and jewelry which ANWORLD/2 keeps in a safety deposit box.

WAVE Comment: The Station is investigating these rumors of an alleged love nest being built for Iden B. AMYUM/19 claims that he is unaware of any validity to the rumor.

19. At present, Iden B lives with her two sons, AMBIDDY/1 and a maid named Iden G who is also a homosexual. This Iden G has brothers in Cuba who are militiamen and she corresponds with them. Iden G's husband is known as "El Gallego", and he is now in the training camps. Iden G has been a friend of Iden B for many years, and is the one who used to accompany her to her dates with BATISTA. According to source, Iden G knows too much about Iden B and is the one who really directs her.

20. Source further reports that the current AMYUM Chief of Intelligence, Iden H, is married to a woman named Iden I, who practices prostitution. AMBIDDY/1 has ordered the Intelligence Chief to collect information on Iden B, but all the reports he submits on her are good because the AMYUM Intelligence Chief is an unconditional supporter of Iden B. One time the AMYUM Intelligence Chief hit an AMYUM member because he made unfavorable comments about Iden B.

21. Source learned from Iden B that Juan AMADOR Rodriguez is one of the newspapermen in exile who receive money from AMBIDDY/1. Iden B also told source that the articles and declarations made by Iden J are written by Iden K.

22. Source further reports she learned AMBIDDY/1 had difficulties with the ERACORN brothers because Hugo ELIAS Martinez, stationed in one of the encampments, brought contraband whiskey into Nicaragua and this angered the ERACORN brothers. Source also learned that an individual named Raul LEAL Garcia deserted from the encampments together with 21 men. This Raul LEAL is now living in marital relations with Martha BRAVO, a very close friend of Iden D.

23. Source 2: Iden L

Both Iden B and her sister Iden D are homosexuals. Iden C works at the Eden Rock in Miami Beach and lives with a Miami Beach gangster in addition to practicing prostitution. Iden M is an accountant, is registered in the Association of Cuban Accountants in Exile and works on Miami Beach.

24. According to source, Iden B was Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldivar's mistress and had a son by him. In order to avoid trouble in this affair, BATISTA married her off to Iden C, a member of the Constitutional Army with a terrible moral reputation.

Iden B used to "pose" with her sister to please her lover BATISTA and her husband. Afterwards, Iden C continued to exploit Iden B with this "posing".

When Iden B arrived in the U. S., (source does not remember date) she became the mistress of former Venezuelan President Marcos PEREZ Jimenez, and later the mistress of Pedro SUAREZ, a former Mariacao Councilman. SUAREZ gave Iden B an automobile for which he made the down payment and paid some installments until he quarreled with her. AMBIDDY/1 finished paying for this automobile.

25. Source further reports that Iden B had homosexual relations with Iden A (source #1). In turn, this Iden A also has homosexual relations with a known homosexual named Iden G, aka "Campeona", who lives with Iden B and AMBIDY/1.

According to source, this group of "ladies" used to meet with Olga*GUILLOT Vidal both in Cuba and here in Miami to hold "parties". One of Iden B's friends is Aida PEREZ Pozo, aka "La Gorda", who together with Pat (aka "La Americana") are partners of a man called "Chucho" who is in jail on charges of narcotics trafficking in which he was recently surprised.

Source states that she is well acquainted with Iden B's intimate affairs because she knew her in Cuba and lived in her house here in Miami for one year.

26. Source 3: AMCRAG/1

On 17 May 1964, [redacted] talked to AMWORM/1 and told him KUBARK was investigating the private lives of AMBIDY/1 and Iden B, because it seems it is feared AMBIDY/1 is being infiltrated by "batistiano" elements.

The investigation that is being made of AMBIDY/1 is quite publicly known in Miami.

[redacted]
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECRET~~

JUN 22 1964

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: UFGA-16512 dated _____

TO : Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Iden. A - [REDACTED]

Iden B - [REDACTED]

Iden C - [REDACTED]

Iden D - Victoria*PADRON

Iden E - Eneido OLIVA

Iden F - Jose SAN ROMAN

Iden G - [REDACTED]

Iden H - [REDACTED]

Iden I - Olga*GOMEZ Mens

Iden J - Edgar SOPO Granda

Iden K - Roland MERUELOS Baldarrain

Iden L - Milagros*LEIROS Filgueira, friend of Idens A and B.

Iden M - Oneida*PADRON, sister of Iden B.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~RESTRICTED~~ ~~SECRET~~

201-267437

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WH/BA 64-540
19 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)
SUBJECT : ANWORLD--Review of Deficiencies

1. A meeting with AMBIDUY-1 has been called for weekend of 27 June in order to review certain deficiencies in ANWORLD management and, in this context, convey to AMBIDUY-1 expressions of Chief, WH's serious concern over manifestations of insufficient leadership in giving direction to and exercising supervision over the ANWORLD effort and the personnel assigned to it.


2. In reviewing events of the preceding twelve months, it will be possible to balance praise and stricture. What has happened, it appears, is that after a flying start, the project is beginning to feel the effects of a devolution of CIA controls and that deficiencies in the quality of AMBIDUY-1's leadership now appear in more striking relief.

3. In relating to AMBIDUY-1 our views regarding the state of ANWORLD affairs, we propose to dwell on following aspects:

a. Management Slippages, carrying over into the field of finances. Still no capable administrator. No indications disbursement of funds subjected to controls other than requiring receipts. Doubts whether any kind of budgeting still being enforced since we converted to straight and fixed subsidizing. Faint odor of corruption.

b. Quality of Personnel. Leadership bracket poorly staffed. Since program's inception, recruitment drive

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-2-

above field grade level either at standstill or unavailing. Why is it good people do not flock to ANWORLD's colors, especially after Pilon? Among reasons most frequently mentioned, AMBIDY-1's alleged unwillingness to delegate authority and tendency to surround himself with dross of exile community which repels good elements. Sierra and Cantillo, who above average, have already quit.

c. Political Action. Other than what taken in hand by AMBIDY-1 personally, media output of deplorably low quality. AMBIDY-1 himself goofed after Pilon.

d. Operational Planning. June performance below par despite WAVE training and Jenkins' consultation. Last-minute choice of target in Pinar del Rio ill-conceived and slipshod.

e. Operational Security. Virtually non-existent. Twin-strike against Cabo Cruz and Punta Maisi, originally scheduled for June 1964, prematurely blown and Cuban reception committees presumably lying in wait. Preliminary survey indicates likelihood proposes operation widely known in ANWORLD Miami circles. Leakage, therefore, not necessarily attributable to high-level penetration, but hypothesis such penetration exists is quite supportable.


Remedy: Headquarters will cease discussing operational plans inside U. S. and insist on passing intel abroad.

AMBIDY-1 has consistently ignored our advice to batten down hatches and prepare for major CIA onslaught, especially post-Pilon. His so-called intel section staffed with camp-followers and headed by a thug. Only professional (Major Gomez) about to be ditched.

f. Morale Situation. Poor, except maybe among combat cadres. ANWORLD-18 toying with idea to quit. Others may follow suit. Charisma no substitute for managerial ability. AMBIDY-1's dissoluteness setting poor example.

g. "Adelsida." Clear indications she henpecks him and possibility that after one year of cohabitation he treats her unreservedly, withholding nothing. Either

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-3-

refuses to comprehend or does not realize the high scandal potential of this relationship. Has proven impervious to low-key advice that scandal could ensue and that its full exploitation by Castro would be foregone conclusion.

4. Above inventory of major defects in AMWORLD probably incomplete and partly based on hearsay and derived from patently prejudiced sources. Some manifestations of disarray may merely be concomitant of organizational shake-down and elimination of marginal personnel. Others may be presumed endemic ills of most resistance organisms left to own devices plus Cuban propensity to fractionalize. In final analysis we could probably justify the Agency input as long as AMBIDEX-1 produces an occasional Pilon. Reconstruction of viable resistance movements inside Cuba, however, is remote prospect, especially if we conclude that target area now virtually denied to all but singleton, short-term operators. Commando raids may continue to prosper as long as we are permitted to render intel support on its present level.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/DO/HH

cc: DC/WH/SA


HDM/bh

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - WH/SA/Laec (blind)
- 1 - WH/SA/DO/HH - Policy File

AMBIDEX-1 29 ✓

SECRET



18 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between ANYUM-19
and Raul Hernandez

DATE : 18 June 1964 at 0930 hours

1. ANYUM-19 called to say that he had passed the message to AMBIDDY-1 that [] had given him stating that the [] is interested in meeting A-1. A-19 was advised to tell A-1 the meeting would be preferable at the end of next week, 26 or 27 June in New Orleans, whichever date suits A-1. A-19 also mentioned that he had informed A-1 that there was too much loose talk in the organization.


2. A-19 has forwarded to the [] the letter requesting the July budget. Also accompanying this letter is a request for funds to purchase uniforms, tools, bedding, etc. for the camps which according to A-19 has been previously discussed.

3. A-4 has asked A-19 to send the DMJM plans to Nicaragua. A-19 inquired if we knew where these plans are. Also A-19 added he was promised the blueprints for the landing field. The undersigned mentioned that Dick was not in the office and if A-19 would call back later we would have the answers for him.

4. A-19, when asked if the charter fee for the [] had been paid for this month, stated he did not know if it had been sent but would check with Mesa.

W
Above conversation conducted
in accordance with
channel policy, p. 12

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SECRET

-2-

A-19 promised to have the answer when he calls back this afternoon.

5. A-19 stated that Jorge RODRIGUEZ Quesada is not the AMWORLD representative in Costa Rica.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
RODRIGUEZ - 201
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
DMJM

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

SECRET

ORIG H.D.HECKSHER/gt
UNIT WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT 4477
DATE 17 June 1964

MESSAGE FORM

3 SECRET

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

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17 JUN 64 10 10z

SIG GEN

TO JMWAVE

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF. DC/WM/SA3 DDO DDP, VR

TO WAVE

INFO

CTR DR

28814

DECLASSIFIED

REPEAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. TELL ANYUM-19 HQS REPS HAD FRANK TALK WITH AMBIDY-1 ABOUT RELATIONS WITH ANYUM-19. FOR WHATEVER WORTH, AMBIDY-1 ASSURED HQS REPS HE CONSIDERS ANYUM-19 PLENIPOTENTIARY PEPRIME WITH FULL AUTHORITY ACT ON ALL MATTERS CONCERNING AMWORLD THIS AREA (INCLUDING MOLE).

2. AMBIDY-1 COMPLAINED ABOUT ANYUM-19'S RELUCTANCE THE EXERCISE FULL RANGE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, ATTRIBUTES RELUCTANCE TO FEAR OF AMBIDY-1, EXCESSIVE PREOCCUPATION WITH ANTICIPATED KUBARK VIEWS AND REACTIONS, AND IN THIS CONTEXT CONCERN THAT BY SOME INADVERTENT MOVE HE MIGHT CAUSE RUPTURE BETWEEN AMWORLD AND KUBARK.

3. AMBIDY-1 ALSO COMPLAINED ANYUM-19 SURROUNDS SELF WITH PEOPLE WHOSE ORIENTATION STRONGLY (EVEN FANATICALLY) CATHOLIC AND THAT ANYUM-19 UPBRAIDED AMBIDY-1 UPON LATTER'S RETURN FROM [REDACTED] FOR SEEKING CULTIVATE PROTESTANT MINISTER.

4. ALSO ANYUM-19 IMPARTED TO AMBIDY-1 RATHER SWEEPING CRITICISM OF PILON RAID PLAN BY "COMPANY" NOT CONFINED TO ALLEGEDLY OVERLOOKED PRESENCE OF MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT IN TARGET AREA.

5. UNDERLYING ALL COMPLAINTS, AMBIDY-1'S FEELING ANYUM-19 MAY HEAD SOME KIND OF CABAL MASTERMINDED BY KUBARK. (BELIEVE FLAT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM

ROUTING

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FROM: DIRECTOR

TO:

BFO

PAGE 2

TO:

INFO:

CITE OR

DISAVOWALS OF ANY INTENT UNSEAT OR WEAKEN AUTHORITY AMBIDY-1.
MADE SOME IMPRESSION).

6. AMBIDY-1'S MOST CONVINCING STRICTURE OF ANYUM-12'S LEADERSHIP, IS TENDENCY TO AVOID CLEARCUT DECISIONS (OR AT LEAST FAILURE TO ARTICULATE THEM). OUR OWN IMPRESSION, ANYUM-19 NOT VERY SKILLFUL IN HANDLING AMBIDY-1, FAILING PANDER TO HIS VANITIES AND TENDING SATIATE HIM WITH BAD NEWS INSTEAD OF MIXING DOSAGES.

7. DO NOT WISH ADJUDICATE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WHICH MOSTLY TRIVIAL. ASSURE ANYUM-19 HQS AWARE THERE TWO SIDES TO EVERYTHING AND OUR SOLE CONCERN RESTORE TRANQUILITY AND ASSURE PROPER FUNCTIONING ANWORLD.

8. HQS REPS OBTAINED AMBIDY-1'S PERMISSION DRAW FREELY ON ABOVE EXCHANGE IN ATTEMPTING AMELIORATE SITUATION. SUGGEST GUERTLER DO SO, POINT OUT TO ANYUM-19, KUBARK SUPPORT TO ANWORLD IN PRESENT FORM WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS IT DELIVERS GOODS.

9. WE FEEL ANYUM-19 LOSE NOTHING BY ASSUMING FIRM COMMAND AND TESTING AMBIDY-1'S PURPORTED WILLINGNESS BACK HIM UP, AS LONG AS HE RESCHEWS BACK STAIR MANEUVERINGS. OUR ADVICE HE QUIT LOOKING OVER SHOULDER WHEN MAKING NECESSARY DECISIONS, TRY DISARM AMBIDY-1'S SUSPICIONS, KEEP KUBARK'S NAME OUT OF INTRAMURAL SKIRMISHES.

CLASSIFICATION OFFICER

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AUTHORITY: 671612

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TO
 FROM DIRECTOR

INFO

PAGE 3

TO INFO CTR OR

10. ASSURE AMYUM-19 HE ENJOYS OUR FULL CONFIDENCE AS LONG AS HE ACTS IN BEST INTEREST AMWORLD. SHOULD HE BE FORCED OUT "IN LINE OF DUTY" KUBARK WOULD NOT BE UNMINDFUL HIS SERVICES IN CAUSE CUBAN FREEDOM. HOWEVER KUBARK WOULD FAIL UNDERSTAND IF HE QUIT UNDER FIRE OR SULKS INTENT OR WASTES VALUABLE TIME ON ECCLESIASTICAL PURSUITS.

11. ADVISE AMYUM-19 WE CRITICIZED AMBYDDY-1⁴'S OWN SHORTCOMINGS AND LEFT NO DOUBT WHERE KUBARK STANDS SHOULD MAJOR SCANDAL (PERSONAL OR OTHERWISE) ROCK BOAT.

12. REQUEST GUERTLER ELICIT AMYUM-19'S FRANK VIEWS RE AMWORLD PROBITT IN MANAGING FINANCES. OUR IMPRESSION FISCAL CONTROLS INADEQUATE AND SOME FUNDS SYPHONED OFF. WE RECEIVE DISQUIETING REPORTS ON HIGH LIVING IN MANAGUA, SAN JOSE AND MIAMI (LATTER HIS BAILIWICK AND WE HOLD HIM ACCOUNTABLE).

END OF MESSAGE

[Signature]
 BRUCE H. CHEEVER
 DC/WH (SA)

[Signature]
 HENRY D. HECKSHER
 WH/SA/SC/HH

RELEASING OFFICER

SECURITY SERVICES

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DEBRIEFING of Russell H. SAMBORA in Washington, D.C., 16 June 1964

SUBJECT: Embezzlement of Funds by [REDACTED]


1. Sambora reported that [REDACTED], who is the head of [REDACTED] A/1 conducted a personal investigation of the case. The final outcome of the case: He was asked to make restitution out of his salary until the entire amount had been repaid.

2. This case in point was brought up by Sambora to illustrate that A/1 spends a great deal of his time on relatively minor tasks which could easily be delegated to someone else.

**Raul J. Hernandez
VR/BA/SC/HR**

File: Sambora

A/1 ✓



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
DEBRIEFING of Russell H. SANBORA in Washington, D.C., 16 June 1964

SUBJECT: Loose Talk on Telephone

As an illustration of poor security of AMBIDDY/1
Sanbora cited the example of how A/1 had telephoned
Sixto Mesa on 14 June 1964 from [] to notify him
that the operation had been called off due to bad weather.

**Raul J. Hernandez
VR/BA/SQ/HR**

**File: Sanbora
A/1
Mesa
ops. Bolivar**



SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 11 JUNE 1964
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN

MANUEL ARTIME

ALL INFORMATION ON THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

Mr. Manuel Artine Bussa
Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
221 1/2 Northeast 2nd Court
Miami 37, Florida

This is to acknowledge and to thank you for your thoughtfulness in writing to me.

It was very gratifying for me to mention your daring raid on the part of Pilon in my speech of May 20th. Felicitades. I wish you the very best in your future actions against Castro who poses a grave menace to all of the Americas.

I am very pleased that through the Referendum the Cuban exile community now enjoys a central voice which can serve to co-ordinate effective anti-Castro activity. Hopefully, my Government will turn away from its ill-advised policy of restricting the Cuban exiles, and aid people like yourself to liberate the Cuban people from the Castro-Communist dictatorship. To that end let me assure you of my continued support.

Please do not hesitate to write me again.

With every best wish, I am

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

GEORGE A. BUELL
United States Senator

043: 1033

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
1	Shawwood		S		
2					
3	Inter 201 File				
4					
5	H H		H		
6	SA/50/Bobbie				
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
<p>1-5 how you come to any decision in regard to an internal meeting to pass through Mama via the British? could be done 9/13 July.</p> <p><i>[Signature]</i></p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	

FORM 237

Use previous editions

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O-521228

SECRET

The following is a letter from AMBIDY-1's father to his son.

8 June 1964

My dear son Manolin,

It has been a while since we have received a letter from you. We are writing this to find out how you are and we suppose you are well. Here everyone is well, thank God.

Your mother is not writing you because I am writing it quickly so that it can leave today.


We have presented everything since 20 March as well as depositing the price of the fares and we are only waiting for permission to leave which we will soon have. When it happens we will send you a cable.

Your Godmother Rosa is sick and when I saw her today she told me she hoped you would come to liberate her. Therefore we know you are doing your duty. I support your position. Don Jaime is well, thank God.

I saw Emilita and she sends her love. She also told me to tell you to write Lino and his brother a letter and to send it via this channel. Emilita is not going there until you send it (the letter) and it should be done through this channel if it is possible.

That letter which is addressed to Consejero de la Campa de B. put a stamp on it immediately and mail it so it arrives at its destination. I am staying in her father's home and I am very anxious to help her.

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-2-


Well, Manolin, there is nothing else for the time being; in reality, so much has been said about the situation that there is no _____ to resist the atmosphere.

Your mother and I send our blessing and will never forget you.

M. Artime and Otilla Buesa

I congratulate you on Pilon. Emilita also asked me to congratulate you.

SECRET



Let. written by A-1's father
to A-1. Given to HES by A-1 at New Orleans on 24 June 64

June 8/9 64

41
Mi querido hijo Manuel:-

Hace tiempo que nos escri-
bimos carta tuya y te hacemos esta para
saber de tu salud que suponemos sea
buena, por aqui estamos bien B & D.

Tu mamá no te escri-
be porque está, te la estoy haciendo
de momento para que salga chora-

Tenemos presentados todos
desde el día 20 de Mayo del presente año
asi como depositado el importe de los dos
pasajes y solo esperamos el permiso de
la salida que nos lo danon proxi-
mamente, cuando esto sea te pararemos
un cable —

A tu madre Rosa M.S.
esta enferma y cuando la vi hoy me dijo
que esperaba que tu la vinieras a libe-
rar asi pues, ya sabes que estas comen-
do a cumplir con tu deber, y apoyas su
actitud. Don Jaime esta bien B & D.
al # 2

ayer si a Emilite y le mande un abrazo
carinoso, tambien me dijo que le escribieras
a Lino una carta para el y las hermanas
y que se la mandaras a ella por esta
via. Emilite no va a ir alli hasta que
se la mandes y debes hacerlo a vuelta
de esta via si te es posible.

Esa carta que va di-
rigida a Correos de la Campa de B.
inmediatamente le pones franques y la
pones en el correo para que llegue a
su destino - yo estoy parando en la casa
de mi Padre y estoy interesantísimo en
verla. — Buenos Manos. — nada
mas por el momento, en realidad, ya
tanto se ha dicho de la situación que
no hay termómetro que registre la tempera-
tura. Te bendicen tus padres que no
te olvidan. M. L. H. y Otilia
Te felicito por lo de Pilon. Emilite tambien
me dijo que te felicitará.

Janis 8/96N

Manolin:

Esa carta que va para
la Sra. Concella de la Campa
Guatemalas. le pones franques
y le mandas enseguida -

Se abra, en Padre

M. Estime

Panama
AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, 7-8 June 1964


SUBJECT:

1. AMBIDEX/1 himself raised this matter with me while neither James nor Ferrer were within earshot. Quoting ANYUM/19, he inquired whether marriage with Subject would be one of the causes for KUBARK to terminate the existing AMWORLD relationship. I emphatically answered in the negative, going over by now well-trodden ground once more and, hopefully, making myself understood.

2. In summary, I stated we held no views one way or the other about his intent to contract marriage. Our concern was strictly political since we could visualize a number of unpleasant consequences flowing from the event. True or false, certain allegations had been made about Subject's past and there were a goodly number of people prepared to testify to the accuracy of those allegations, among them (I presumed) Subject's ex-husband. The political implications of the proposed union could not possibly escape him, especially if ANTHUS should get hold of it.

3. AMBIDEX/1 opined that he had lived in open sin with Subject for over a year. This was what was bothering him and evidently some of his closest associates, not Subject's alleged past. He needed this relationship with Subject to maintain (literal quote) his emotional balance. He was working under considerable strain and the rare moments with Subject alone were his sole relaxation. The issue of sin was deeply disturbing to him, and marriage, he felt, would resolve this situation of conflict. In order to avoid certain political repercussions, he was now giving thought to taking Subject with him to Nicaragua and contract a "secret" marriage. I did not point out to him the evident flaws in his reasoning and merely adverted to the great political responsibility he carries. I made it very clear to him that a major scandal could

SECRET



conceivably crystalline opposition to his person and sink the ship. Since I did not interpose an outright veto (of dubious efficacy at best), he will undoubtedly profess to have convinced me of the soundness of his headlong rush toward matrimony and all that could entail for our program. Short of making a mockery of autonomy, I could not tell him any more than I did.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/BA/GO/HH

File:
AMBIROV/1 201 ✓
Pearson 201

SECRET

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ANVORLD Meeting in 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1's Political Reporting


1. I reminded Subject that in the past we had frequently pressed him to keep us abreast of his political activities with particular emphasis upon relations with the host governments in Central America. The response to our urgings had been increasingly disappointing and of late reached the vanishing point. Since it was not curiosity that had prompted us to ask for timely reporting but a desire to be of service in protecting the rear, we were now wondering whether it would not be best to leave the determination whether or not to submit political reports to him rather than continue importuning him which was beginning to place us in a slightly ridiculous position. AMBIDDY/1 pleaded over-work in excuse of his failure to provide timely reporting and we resisted the temptation to point to other more likely causes of mental and physical fatigue.

2. As of now we believe to have reached a clear understanding with AMBIDDY/1 that as always we stand ready to come to his succor if a political crisis or problem arises and is timely signalled to us. Silence will be construed by us as an indication that "all is well."

Henry D. Hecksher
WM/BA/SO/HR

File:
Policy
201✓

SECRET



27
AMWORLD Meeting in [] 7-8 June 1944

SUBJECT: Purchase of House


1. I asked AMBIDDY-1 about rumors that he has brought a house in Miami and he admitted the fact without any show of embarrassment.

2. He claimed to have sunk his savings from the "Bay of Pigs" bonorarium into the acquisition, i.e., \$3,000, to have borrowed money from AMWORLD. Senora Padron y Cruz had also chipped in to the tune of \$1,500. I did not delve into the financial aspects of the transaction. AMBIDDY-1 claims that the home where he now lives with subject has been registered in the name of []. He mentioned in passing that a house might come in handy if his parents should be permitted to emigrate to the United States.

Henry D. Hecksher
WM/BA/BO/HR

File:
PADRON
AMBIDDY-1 301

SECRET



SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in [redacted] 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Father


1. AMBIDDY-1 claims to have learned via QUANTUM 50 that his father is hiding in the home of a friend in the Havana area.

2. AMBIDDY-1 senior sent word that he is in touch with some old CP buddies who have offered to help him get out of PERUEN. AMBIDDY-1 is anxious to pass a message to his father but not via QUANTUM 50 because of his distrust in the political orientation of SO's government. In this message, AMBIDDY-1 wants to suggest to his father that he induce an "old CP" emissary to meet with AMBIDDY-1 outside of PERUEN, e.g. in Mexico. AMBIDDY-1 believes that the rift between ANTHUG's regime and the old CP offers unprecedented opportunities to cause mischief.

Henry D. Hecksher
WM/BA/BO/HS

cc: JMWAVE
C/WE/BA/BOB

File: Artins 201 ✓
Spain



SECRET

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AMWORLD Meeting in [redacted] 7-8 June 1964


SUBJECT: AMWORLD Venezuela - Radio Facility

AMBIDDY/1 claims that he was promised time, free of charge, by a Venezuelan broadcasting station under Army control which is an ODYORE gift and which is considered secret.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/BA/BO/HH

File: ✓
201
Publicity

SECRET



THE TROOPS THAT WILL OVERTHROW CASTRO ARE ALREADY IN CUBA

THEY ARE THE PEOPLE WHO CHEERED HIM
WHEN THEY BELIEVED HIM A HERO OF
OUR LIBERTIES

Following is a translation of an interview of Manuel Artine by Agustin Camargo, as reported in the Spanish language magazine Bohemia Internacional, Caracas, Venezuela, 7 June 1964.7

Q. - Your group has initiated a new offensive against the Castro regime during the last few days in cooperation with one carried out by other revolutionary units. Do you expect victory soon?

A. - Everyone knows when wars begin, but never when they end.

I would like to say that it will be soon, but my duty as a leader is to prepare the people of Cuba and the Cubans in exile for the kind of war we expect: a long, hard war, but one that we shall win if all Cubans pull together in accordance with their ability.

There may be imponderable factors, "surprises" which could bring about the fall of the tyrant; but we must never count on "miraculous" solutions, on invasions that do not exist or on organizations that will pull our chestnuts out of the fire.

Q. - Are you considering the possibility of eventually uniting your men and resources with those of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta or the Alpha 66 - II Front - MRP or any other unit that may be currently carrying on the struggle inside Cuba?

A. - The frontiers of our movement have never been closed to anyone who wants to fight for Cuba, with the exception of totalitarian movements either of the right or of the left.

What we do think wise to explain is that we do not believe in political action units in exile. We believe only in

unity of martyrdom, of sacrifice, of combat. We want the greatest success for our sister revolutionary organizations, which will never be objects of attack on our part because our only enemy is communism.

Q. - You personally and the M.R.R. in general have always been cited as "favorites" of certain North American groups or governmental agencies. Is that correct?

A. - I would like to have those who speak of this favoritism answer me this question:

Do they call the Bay of Pigs episode favoritism?

Do they call the two years I spent in jail waiting to put my back to the wall and be shot favoritism?

Do they call the state of abandonment in which the clandestine M.R.R. was left in Cuba after the battle of Giron Beach favoritism?

Do they call favoritism the fact that on my leaving jail I had to break with the Revolutionary Committee because it had been converted into an instrument for not carrying the war to Cuba?

Do they call favoritism the fact that we have had to leave American territory to be able to continue the struggle against Castro?

Do they call favoritism the fact that we have to fight a long war because we get no help from those who could make it short?

But these campaigns of "favoritism" do not surprise me.

I know that International Communism cannot admit publicly that it is being defeated by the people of little Cuba who are only getting help from their brothers in Latin America, from God and from their indomitable desire to be Free.

Q. - Today you talk of bringing about uprisings in the forces of the Castro regime, and you seem to trust in this as the best way to liberate the island from Soviet and Communist domination. Why didn't you take that position three years ago, since it was just as valid then as now?

A. - Three years ago we took the same position as today. Just remember that the M.R.R. was the first revolutionary organization to rise up against the tyrant Castro to try to overthrow him by internal action at a time when many were convinced that Fidel was a Communist but said "that it was not yet time to say so to the people".

Remember that the first weapons for internal rebellion were carried to Cuba by the M.R.R.

Remember that Francisco, the M.R.R. Coordinator in Cuba was not only the cheerful organizer of the resistance but also eventually the national coordinator of the whole clandestine movement.

Remember that the Bay of Pigs invasion was designed to be only the gold buckle to fasten up the stage of active resistance and guerrilla activities.

Remember the long list of over 150 martyrs of the clandestine war of the M.R.R. which shown clearly the priority we

assigned at that time to rebellion in the local forces.

Remember that before the Brigade camps were set up there were infiltration camps provided especially to assist this internal rebellion.

Q. - Some international circles claim that Russia is abandoning Castro, that it has agreed on this abandonment secretly with North America, and that this is visibly evident in the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops from the island. They add that confidence in this agreement has caused North America to "tolerate" this fresh outbreak of armed activities in the Caribbean. Do you share this view?

A. - Frankly I do not believe in international pacts that are not clear to me, and I believe much less in the willingness of Russia to carry out its agreements: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are historical witnesses of Russian treachery.

As for "tolerating our activities", I cannot speak, because we have not asked for "tolerance" for them. It never occurred to me to "ask permission" to die for my country.

Q. - Would you subordinate the possibilities of liberation of your country to any advantage of an international nature for the United States?

A. - My country's interests are greater than those of any other nation. Any Cuban who does not believe that does not deserve to be called a Cuban.

I do not believe the United States expects such a shocking attitude from the Cubans. They may have many faults but

they respect the dignity of man.

This is not the first time we say publicly that this war of liberation of our enslaved Cuba must be carried on "no matter whom it pleases, no matter whom it displeases", since it is true that powerful nations have international obligations to carry out and it is also true that we Cubans have our inescapable duties to our enslaved country.

Q. - If armed action within Cuba -- guerrilla war in the mountains and war of terror in the cities -- should, as expected produce a wave of popular uprisings both among students and workers and in the military units of the dictatorship, do you think that the democratic nations of the hemisphere would come to our help? Aren't you afraid of a repetition of what happened in Budapest?

A. - Although I am convinced that at some definite moment they would come to our help, we cannot base our war on collective assistance. We must plan our strategy as a purely Cuban struggle from beginning to end.

Many Latin American nations have already helped us in accordance with their ability and thanks to them we can do what we are doing.

As for the fear of a repetition of what happened in Budapest taking place in Cuba, we cannot forget that Cuba has no frontier with Russia.

Q. - Some foreign analysts and some governments have studied

the situation on the island and treat with Castro as if they believed that all hope of liberation had expired. Can you tell us something about the internal struggle against communism?

A. - To think that all hope of liberation has expired in Cuba is to show a complete lack of knowledge of the condition and character of the Cuban people. The history of Cuba is a history of repeated martyrdom in search of real liberty.

I can say very little about the internal struggle that does not affect its security. But let it be sufficient to say that today there are guerrillas in five of the six provinces of Cuba; that the tyrant knows about them and that he has not been able to wipe them out because of the peasants' support for them; that in the cities the sentiment of the workers has begun to be mobilized toward passive resistance, and that within the very ranks of the militia Cuban patriots are forming independent cells.

Q. - From the days of the Bay of Pigs you seemed to trust blindly in North American material backing for your struggle. But lately we see you shifting your interest toward Latin American countries. Why?

A. - Actually my first glance was toward Latin America. I took residence in Mexico where I published my book Traición (Treachery) and I traveled around Latin America carrying the shout of alarm against communism. Afterward I went to North America in constant search of resources for the war, and although I have

never had blind confidence in anything human, because everything that is done blindly is done badly, it is true that I had confidence in North American material help. Reason: because we were seeing it. (I do not think it was a secret to anyone where the weapons we used in the invasion came from.) I had no scruples in accepting American weapons to offset those from Russia which Fidel Castro was receiving in gigantic shipments.

After leaving prison I lost confidence in that assistance because since then not only have I seen none, but also I have not seen the possibility even of getting any.

Not only has my interest switched toward Latin America, but also my gratitude toward these people who have opened their arms to offer us help when all doors were being closed against us. Thanks to them we can continue the struggle.

Q. - What opinion do you think the conduct of nations like England and France deserve, who, turning their backs on principles they claim to hold and on moral and humane considerations, take part in propping up Castro's bloody regime by supplying him with credits and all kinds of financial backing?

A. - First I do not want to confuse countries with governments. Most peoples are innocent of the atrocities and treacheries of their governments.

That kind of behavior never surprised me in the case of the English government, as they did something even worse in Korea where their soldiers were dying under attacks from waves

of Chinese from red Manchuria while the government was selling steel to Peking.

In the case of the French government I was sorrowful because of the figure of Gen. DeGaulle. As a young Cuban I used to hold in my heart the image of DeGaulle, hero of the Second World War, leader of his country's resistance in the fight against the foreign invader.

It was hard for me to realize that this same man would turn his back on the principles which made him beloved by the free world. It is unfortunate that such a brilliant career should have been darkened at its ending.

In any case, some day Cuba will be free and those governments can be sure that, if they do not alter their conduct, they will then receive their payment in the same historical currency that they have passed out to our martyred people.

Q. - You and your party have been accused of being fascists, of being a bee-hive for the Central Intelligence Agency and a "cover" for the worst political and economic interests of our country. What do you have to say about that?

A. - Nothing. Let my actions and my history answer the question. Those who are going to go on saying this are the Communists and the foolish tools of communism.

I believe it would be well to recall that the M.R.R. was the only organization at this stage of the Cuban struggle that, before spending its first funds for weapons, spent them

for publishing a statement of its ideology precisely because we wanted everyone to know where we intended to go, how we were going and why we were going there. This background statement circulated throughout the underground and the exiles. It contains our complete ideology, and the same thing is contained in the political testament that I wrote before leaving for the Bay of Pigs, as it also appears in my book Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio (War Marches and Prison Songs), written while I awaited death, as is clearly explained in the recent pamphlet about my full statement to the members of the A.R.E.C.

If wishing to carry to Cuba a state of independence, liberty, justice, respect for the dignity of human beings; if wishing to have the constitution of 1940 effective as long as it is not revoked by the same people who approved it; if opposing all demagogic extremes and all totalitarian impositions; if all this is being a fascist; then I am a fascist.

But since fascism is totalitarianism established by an oligarchy in the name of supposed racial purity, I cannot be a fascist.

As for the other accusations of obeying or being a cover for unsavory interests, I challenge anyone to give me the name of a single individual among our revolutionary directors who has a blemish in this respect; I challenge anyone to analyze the statistics of our martyrs; I challenge anyone to analyze our history.

Q. - Can you sum up in a few words the ideological base of M.R.R.?

A. - Yes. We dream of independence with liberty, liberty with culture, culture with bread, bread for honest work, honest work with respect for the dignity of the human being; and all this in a democratic regime of Latin American character and Christian morality.

Q. - Would your group favor keeping some laws of the Revolution if it is proved that they correspond to some need, or do you think that the Fidel epoch should be swept out completely and a fresh start made?

A. - When Fidel's regime is overthrown, Cuban needs are going to be quite different from those of our country with the tyrant in power. I believe the laws he made which could answer real Cuban needs were badly conceived and ~~mis~~-directed even worse.

I believe that without fundamentally changing the 1940 constitution, which means for Cuba a return to the rule of law, it will be possible to make laws which will meet Cuban needs.

Q. - Are you opposed to the negroes?

A. - No; nor am I opposed to the whites, which means the same thing to me. What interests us is not the color of the skin but the color of the soul and of the ideals.

Perhaps that is why our movement is the one that has more black brothers in its ranks, including the highest civil and military positions.

Q. - Do you favor, as has been stated, establishment in Cuba of a semi-confessional state with open predominance of the most conservative elements of the Catholic Church?

A. - Neither of the most conservative nor of the most liberal; that would be "clericalism" and it is expressly condemned in Papal Encyclicals.

I personally am a Catholic and will never deny my faith, because I have no vocation to be an apostate.

But of course, the movement is full of men of all religions and creeds.

Certainly we shall reaffirm with the 1940 constitution our belief in God and the necessity for Christian morality.

We believe that every child has the right to receive preparation in whatever religion he chooses.

Q. - What will the M.R.R. do with the Rebel Army and the Militia once Cuba is liberated?

A. - Those who turn around and fight against the tyrant will be retained in the armed forces with the same rank as before. Those who do not will be discharged and returned to private life if they have committed no crime, but if they have, they will have to answer to the civil courts in normal fashion, which will again function in Cuba in accordance with the 1940 constitution.

The only ones who have anything to fear are foreign Communists and members of repressive agencies.

Q. - Will the death penalty be maintained in Cuba?

A. - I do not favor the death penalty, but of course since the 1940 constitution will be in force, this penalty is recognized only for treason. We must end the revolutionary tribu-

nals and return to the rule of law.

Q. - Do you believe Cuban national interests when freed from communism will be better served if the nation is placed in a position of international neutrality?

A. - We shall always be an aggressive forefront of the West against communism. We can never be neutral in a struggle in which the destiny of civilization is at stake.

Q. - Engineer Ray and you seem to be performing parallel activities as you approach almost five years of struggle against Castro and are apparently the two most important political figures of our future. Could you tell us what keeps you apart?

A. - Starting from the assumption that we are fighting for a democracy, any ideological difference between another group of Cubans and ourselves will be resolved in the future by the Cuban people in free elections. I do not think this is the historic moment to talk about differences. If the regime set up in Cuba after Fidel Castro is defeated is a totalitarianism or a dictatorship of left or right, we shall KEEP ON USING OUR GUNS.

Q. - Why don't you take the command of Brigade 2506 and why has it not been possible to consolidate around the brigade all the exile elements since it is the largest group of veterans of our war?

A. - A great many of our brothers of Brigade 2506 are already in our ranks. The brigade could not consolidate exiles around it because it was formed to be a military unit without political plans; recently arrived from Communist prisons, it went to North American army camps to continue its training. That is

why I left its ranks. I did not want anyone to say that I was trying to orient the brigade politically by trying to unite the exiles around it. Besides I thought that I was more useful to my country in trying to carry the war into Cuba than in receiving a training that I did not know whether I would put in practice some day. Time has proved I was right.

Q. - What would you do, or what are you doing with the followers of Batista? Do you think this way of naming some people who form closed blocs with persons of very dissimilar history and interests, is real and does any good for Cuba?

A. - For me there are no Batistianos nor Priistas nor any other discriminative "ista". I only believe in a moral classification of men, and there are good ones and bad ones in all the governments our country has had. The only salvation for Cuba is to bring together all worthy and honest Cubans of all epochs, of all social classes, of all colors, and of all ages, into a new historical generation to consolidate our nation after the traitor's regime has been overthrown. Poor Cuba if we continue to harbor sectarian hates and sterile discriminations!

Q. - It is said that you are an admirer of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, that you are familiar with his ideology, and that his assistants say in private that you are an Antillean version of him. Is this true?

A. - It is a fact that I am familiar with Primo Rivera's ideology, as I am also familiar with that of Mahatma Ghandi, Rousseau, Roosevelt, Lenin, Hitler and all the men who for mankind's

good or ill have left a political philosophy to history. A leader has a duty to understand them completely. But the ideologies that are most familiar to me are moulded in the unforgettable thoughts of Jesus Christ, Martí and Bolívar.

This is the first time I hear myself called an "Antillean version" of Primo de Rivera. If anyone says so, it must be in secret because I have never heard it. What I was called once was a "fascist" when I was in prison awaiting the death penalty; it was the traitor Fidel Castro in person. It is possible that he has friends in exile.

Q. - What do you consider the weakest of the Castro regime?

A. - The people, the people of Cuba, who would rather die on their feet than live on their knees; the people who now realize the total surrender to a foreign power and have seen the complete failure of Communist doctrine. The troops that will overthrow Fidel Castro are already in Cuba, the very people who cheered him when they thought him the hero of our liberty.

The presence of Russian occupation troops in Cuba has definitely revitalized the nationalist spirit of our country.

Q. - What will you do in case you come to govern Cuba, with private schools, with the press and with private initiative of an economic nature?

A. - In the first place, our fight is not for the purpose of putting me in the government; it is to make our country independent. But if you ask me what is my idea about what a govern-

ment ought to do in Cuba in respect to these matters, my answer is: Regarding private education: protect it in every possible way, and raise public education to the same level as private. Regarding the press: liberty of the press and assistance for the school for reporters to make Cuban newspaper men more efficient. The Cuban press will educate our peoples' background so as to definitively wash the wounds which communism has inflicted on the spirit of our children and young people.

Regarding private enterprise: protection for it, assistance for small business, and by means of modern tax laws make sure that business performs its social function. The United States, Western Germany and many other countries can give us an exact idea of what we want.

Q. - What is your final message to your exiled people in this grave moment of history?

A. - That we cannot and must not trust in international solutions nor in easy paths to our country's independence. That we must return to the romantic spirit of our war of independence, to that difficult, self-sacrificing, hard war of a Martí collecting pennies and a Maceo spending them on bullets; to that war of Cubans within and Cubans without against those who are no longer Cubans.

If every Cuban offers what he can; if we obtain, as was done in 1898, the fraternal embrace of our brother peoples; if we put the interests of a country that must be saved before our personal interests, Cuba will be independent. Because this bat-

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 May 1964 at 0130

1. After being informed by night Security that
"Mr. Ignacio" had called I returned A-1's call.

2. A-1 mentioned he would need four RB-12's
and two RB-9's for the next operation. A-1 asked if
they could be given to him directly to take to
I told him this would have to be checked out with Dick.


3. For security reasons A-1 felt it would be best
for AMJAVA-4 alone to meet with Carl. A-4 will be
staying at the same hotel he stayed the last time they
met. Meeting scheduled for 29 May 64. After 1430
Houston time, A-4 will use alias of Rafael Carela.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Logistics

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



tle has been won. The tyrant who accumulated guns, tanks and planes is beginning to realize that they only guarantee a government when the people who hold those guns and manage those tanks and planes are convinced that the government represents the purest interests of the nation and the highest destinies of the country. And those guns, those tanks and those planes are already being turned against the red beast. The little western David called Cuba has already let fly the stone which will knock down the ugly Goliath of communism.

5670

A CONTROVERSIAL PERSONALITY

It can be said of the Secretary General of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery, Manuel Artime, that there is much to say, but ~~never~~ that he has lacked spirit to fight for the liberty of Cuba.

Combative and polemical, Artime today occupies a singular position in the fight against Castro in which he collects furious insults and almost fanatical proselytism in equal quantities. His early struggle against Batista's dictatorship and his activity in Sierra Maestra in Column One commanded by Fidel Castro, made him an outstanding figure in the Revolution. His break with Castro and his denunciation of the olive green treachery to the great romance of the Cuban people made him the target for all attacks and insults. In the spring of 1960 Artime went into exile. In Mexico he wrote a book denouncing Castro's apostasy. With other eminent democratic leaders he helped found the Revolutionary Front (later Committee) and exerted intense propaganda and political activity throughout the continent which culminated in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. This was one of the most critical points in Manuel Artime's civic career. His activity in it -- personally heroic though it was -- helped throw on him the shadow of new attacks and suspicions. But it also converted him into a leader of the first rank which the maturity of a prison term and his conspiratorial and revolutionary activities afterward only enhanced.

Manuel Artima has become today, by virtue of the attack of his troops on Puerto Pilon, the principal figure of current Cuban activity. His group has been hammered into one of the most disciplined, one of the largest and most efficient in the heroic struggle of the people of Cuba for their liberty. Consequently everything he does and says is of passionate interest for this people in exile, a people which wants to know closely -- and they should -- the thoughts and activities of the men who will probably lead them in the future.

This is why Manuel Artima is brought to these Cuban pages of BOHEMIA, which have been, are now and will continue to be the ideal civic rostrum for the people of Cuba.

Artima has the floor. . .

A. T.

(A. T. is Agustin Tamargo, assistant director of Bohemia)

5670


Bohemia

LIBRE

INTERNACIONAL

25c.

Junio 7, 1964



Reportaje Sensacional sobre la Catástrofe en el Stadium Nacional de Lima
EL DIA QUE TITO DERROTO A STALIN

MANUEL ARTIME EN LA TRIBUNA DE BOHEMIA

LA TROPA QUE DERROCARA A CASTRO YA ESTA EN CUBA

Es el pueblo que lo aplaudió cuando veía en él a un héroe de nuestras libertades.

Preguntas de AGUSTIN TAMARGO fotos de Guayo

P.—Su grupo ha iniciado en los últimos días una nueva ofensiva contra el régimen castroista, al unísono con la que desarrollan otras entidades revolucionarias. ¿Considera Ud. que la victoria será pronta?

R.—Las guerras se sabe cuando empiezan pero nunca cuando terminan.

No gustaría decir que será breve, pero mi deber como dirigente es orientar al pueblo de Cuba y al exilio cubano hacia el tipo de guerra que nos espera: una guerra dura y larga, pero que ganaremos si todos los cubanos colaboran en la medida de sus fuerzas.

Puede haber factores imponderables, "sorpresas", que precipiten la caída del Tirano; pero nunca debemos descansar en soluciones "milagrosas" de invenciones que no existen ni en organizaciones que no saquen las castañas del fuego.

P.—¿Contempla Ud. la posibilidad de una unión eventual de sus hombres y recursos con los de la Junta Revolucionaria Cubana, los del grupo Alpha 66-II, Frente-MRP, o cualquier otro que esté luchando actualmente dentro de Cuba?

R.—Las fronteras de nuestro Movimiento jamás han estado cerradas para nadie que tenga el deseo de combatir por Cuba, excepto para los movimientos totalitarios, sean de izquierda o de derecha.

Lo que sí es conveniente aclarar es que no creamos en unidades políticas del exilio. Creemos solamente en la unidad del martirio, del sacrificio, del combate. Nosotros deseamos el mayor éxito a las organizaciones revolucionarias hermanas, que jamás recibirán ataques de parte nuestra pues nuestro único enemigo es el Comunismo.

P.—A Ud. personalmente y al M.R.R. en general se les ha señalado siempre como "favoritos" de ciertos sectores o agenci-

as gubernamentales norteamericanas. ¿Es eso cierto?

R.—Yo quisiera que los que hablan de este favoritismo me respondieran:

¿Consideran favoritismo el episodio de BAHIA DE CHINOST?

¿Consideran favoritismo los dos años que me pasó en la cárcel esperando el paredón de fusilamiento?

¿Consideran favoritismo el estado de abandono en que quedó el M.R.R. clandestino en Cuba después de Playa Giron?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que a mi regreso de la cárcel tuviera que romper con el Consejo Revolucionario porque se había convertido en un instrumento para no llevar la guerra a Cuba?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que hayamos tenido que abandonar el territorio norteamericano para poder seguir luchando contra Castro?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que tengamos que realizar una guerra larga por no recibir ayuda de quienes podían hacerla breve?

Pero no me extrañan esas campañas de "favoritismo". Yo sé que el Comunismo Internacional no puede reconocer públicamente que está siendo derrotado por el pequeño pueblo cubano que no recibe más ayuda que la de los hermanos de Latinoamérica, la de Díaz y el inderrrotable deseo de ver libre.

P.—Ud. habla hoy de provocar levantamientos en las fuerzas internas del régimen castroista y parece confiar en ello como la mayor vía para liberar a la isla del dominio soviético y comunista. ¿A qué atribuye el no haber asumido hace 3 años esa posición, que era entonces tan correcta como hoy?

R.—Hace 3 años asumimos la misma postura que hoy hemos asumido. Es conveniente recordar que el M.R.R. fue la primera organización revolu-



...Cuba será libre, gustas a quien lo gusta y pinto a quien lo pinta

ción que se alzó contra el tirano Castro para lograr el derrocamiento por rebelión interna, cuando muchos ya estaban convencidos de que Fidel era comunista pero decían "que aún no era el momento de decirlo al pueblo".

Es conveniente recordar que las primeras armas para la rebelión interna fueron llevadas a Cuba por el M.R.R.

Es conveniente recordar que Francisco, Coordinador del M.R.R. en Cuba, no sólo fue el genial organizador de la Revolución, sino que llegó a ser el Coordinador Nacional de todo el movimiento.

Es conveniente recordar que la formación de BAHIA DE CHINOST debía haber sido sólo el fruto de oro que cerraba toda una etapa de resistencia



Tamargo

Artimo



...al caído Castro hay totalitarismo, tomaremos los rifles de nuevo

PARA PI
NO HAY

MI IDEARIO ES EL DE CRISTO, BOLIVAR Y MARTI

activa y de movimientos guerrilleros.

Es conveniente recordar la larga lista de más de 150 mártires del chupetaje del M. R. R., que indica claramente la primera finalidad que concedíamos en ese momento a la rebelión de las fuerzas internas.

Es conveniente recordar que antes de los campeonatos de la Batalla existieron los campeonatos de infiltración creados especialmente para ayudar a esta rebelión interna.

P.—En ciertos círculos internacionales se asegura que Rusia está abandonando a Castro, que ha negociado secretamente con Norteamérica tal abandono, y que ello se expresa visiblemente en la retirada gradual de las tropas soviéticas de la isla. Se añade que es esta seguridad la que ha hecho que Norteamérica "tolere" este requedamiento de las actividades armadas en el Caribe. ¿Comparte Ud. este criterio?

R.—Sinceramente, no creo en pactos internacionales que no me consten y mucho menos creo en la lealtad de Rusia para cumplir sus pactos: Polonia, Checoslovaquia y Hungría son testigos históricos de la falacia.

Con respecto a que "toleren" nuestras actividades, no lo sé, pero no hemos podido "tolerancia" para ellas. No es en la batalla, es en la "tolerancia" para morir por mi Patria.

P.—Confiamos en Ud. las posibilidades de liberación de su Patria a las conveniencias de la OEA Internacional de los Estados Unidos?

R.—Los intereses de mi Patria están por encima de los intereses de cualquier otra nación.

El cubano que así no lo crea no merece llamarse cubano.

No creo que los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica pretendan de los cubanos una monstruosidad. Ellos pueden tener muchos defectos pero respetan la dignidad del hombre.

No es la primera vez que decimos públicamente que esta guerra de liberación de nuestra Cuba esclava tiene que ser llevada adelante "gustete a quien le guste y pueste a quien le parezca", porque si es verdad que poderosas naciones tienen deberes internacionales que cumplir, es verdad que nosotros los cubanos tenemos otros deberes ineludibles con nuestra Patria esclava.

P.—Si la acción armada dentro de Cuba —guerra de guerrillas en las montañas y guerra de terror en las ciudades— produjera, como se espera, una ola de levantamientos populares tanto entre los estudiantes y obreros como entre los cuerpos militares de la dictadura, ¿creo Ud. que las naciones democráticas del Hemisferio vendrían en nuestra ayuda? ¿No teme que se repita un Budapest?

R.—A pesar de que estoy convencido de que en un momento determinado vendrían en nuestra ayuda, no podemos basar nuestra guerra en el hecho de esa ayuda colectiva. Tenemos que trazar una estrategia de lucha totalmente cubana, desde el principio hasta el final.

Muchas naciones latinoamericanas ya nos están ayudando en la medida de sus fuerzas, y gracias a ellas podemos hacer lo que estamos haciendo.

Con respecto al temor de un Budapest cubano no podemos olvidar que Cuba no tiene fronteras con Rusia.

P.—Algunos comentaristas extranjeros y algunos gobiernos juzgan la situación de la Isla y tratan con Castro, como si pensarán que allí ha muerto toda esperanza de liberación. ¿Puede decirnos algo sobre la lucha interna contra el Comunismo?

R.—Pensar que en Cuba se muere toda esperanza de liberación sólo demuestra un desconocimiento total de la condición e idiosincrasia del Pueblo Cubano. La historia de Cuba es una historia de martirio inocente en busca de la verdadera libertad.

Muy poco puede decir de la lucha interna que no ofrece la seguridad de la misma, pero bastamos con decir que hoy en día existen guerrillas en 8 de las 9 Provincias de Cuba, que el Tirano cae de ellas y que

no ha podido exterminarlas debido a la colaboración del campesinado; que en las ciudades el movimiento obrero ha comenzado a movilizarse hacia la resistencia pasiva y que dentro de las mismas filas de las milicias los patriotas cubanos se van levantando en células independentistas.

P.—Desde los días de Bahía de Cochinos Ud. parecía confiar de modo ciego en el respaldo material norteamericano a nuestra lucha. Últimamente, sin embargo, se le ha visto cambiar el interés hacia los países latinoamericanos. ¿Por qué?

R.—En realidad, mi primera mirada fue hacia Latinoamérica: me establecí en México donde publiqué mi libro TRACION y recorrí Latinoamérica dando el grito de alarma contra el Comunismo. Después fui a Norteamérica en busca constante de medios para la guerra y aunque confieso ciego nunca he tenido en nada humano, porque todo lo que se hace a ciegas está mal hecho, es cierto que tuve confianza en la ayuda material norteamericana. Motivo porque la estaba viendo. (No cito que para nada sea un secreto la procedencia de las armas que usamos en la liberación). No tuve escrupulos en aceptar armas americanas para contrarrestar las ruinas que por los gigantes recibía Fidel Castro.

LEAR POR LA INDEPENDENCIA DE LA PATRIA QUE PEDIRLE PERMISO A NADIE



...las fronteras del MRR están abiertas para todo el mundo



...en Cuba no puede darse un Budapest



...no me consta que Rusia esté abandonando a Castro

Después de salir de presidio perdí confianza en esa ayuda, porque desde entonces, no sólo no la he visto, sino que ni siquiera he visto la posibilidad de conseguirla.

No sólo mi interés se ha desvanecido, hacia Latinoamérica, sino también mi gratitud hacia estos pueblos que nos han abierto los brazos para brindarnos ayuda cuando todas las puertas se nos estaban cerrando. Gracias a ellos podemos continuar la lucha.

P.—¿Qué opinión le merece la conducta de naciones como Inglaterra y Francia que, de espaldas a principios que dicen sustentar y a consideraciones mismas de orden moral y humano, se vienen dedicando a apuntalar al sangriento régimen de Castro por medio de créditos y todo tipo de operaciones financieras?

R.—Primero, no quiero confundir a los países con los gobiernos. La mayor parte de los

pueblos son inocentes de las atrocidades y traiciones de sus gobiernos.

Del Gobierno Inglés nunca me extrañó esa conducta, porque algo peor hizo en Corea, donde sus soldados morían luchando contra las oleadas de chinos de la Manchuria roja, mientras el Gobierno lo vendía barato a Pekín.

Del Gobierno francés el me ha debido. En la figura del Gral. De Gaulle mi corazón de joven cubano tenía la imagen del De

Gaulle héroe de la 2ª Guerra Mundial, líder de la resistencia de su país en la lucha contra el extranjero invasor.

Me costó trabajo pensar que este mismo hombre diera la espalda a los principios que lo hicieron querido por el mundo libre. Es lástima que una carrera tan brillante no haya terminado en su oratoria.

De todas maneras, algún día Cuba será libre y pueden estar seguros esos Gobiernos que al no cambiar de conducta recti-

UNA PERSONALIDAD CONTROVERSIAL

Del Secretario General del Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria, Manuel Artima, pueden decirse probablemente muchas cosas. Pero nunca que la hayan tratado arrestos, para luchar por la libertad de Cuba.

Combativo y polémico, Artima ocupa hoy en la lucha contra Castro una posición singular en la que se recogen por igual denuestos furiosos y procelismo casi fanático. Su temprana lucha contra la dictadura de Batista y su acción en la Sierra Maestra en la Columna 1 que comandaba Fidel Castro le hicieron una figura de relieve en la Revolución. Su ruptura con Castro y su denuncia de la traición verdediva a la gran gesta del pueblo cubano, lo colocaron en el blanco mismo de todos los ataques y vilipendios. En la Primavera de 1960 Artima marchó al extranjero. Escribió en México un libro denunciando la apostacía de Castro. Contribuyó a fundar, junto a otros eminentes líderes democráticos el entonces llamado Frente Revolucionario (luego Consejo) y desarrolló una intensa actividad de orden propagandístico y político por toda el Continente que culminó en la fracasada invasión de Bahía de Cochinos. Aquel episodio es uno de los puntos más

críticos de la carrera cívica de Manuel Artima. Su participación en él —heroica por lo demás en lo personal— contribuyó a arrojar sobre su figura la sombra de nuevas atropellos y sospechas. Pero lo convirtió a la vez en un líder de primer rango, que la madurez de la prisión y la actividad conspirativa y revolucionaria posterior no han podido más que acrecentar.

Manuel Artima constituye hoy, por virtud del ataque de sus fuerzas a Puerto Pilón, un punto principal de la actualidad cubana. Su movimiento se ha forjado como uno de los más disciplinados, numerosos y eficientes en esta lucha heroica del pueblo de Cuba por su libertad. Por lo tanto, todo lo que él haga y diga es de apasionante interés para el pueblo orfelo en el destierro. Un pueblo que desea conocer de cerca —y con mucha razón— el pensamiento y la acción de los hombres que probablemente lo habrán de dirigir en el futuro.

Es por eso que Manuel Artima viene a estas páginas cubanas de BOHEMIA —que eran, son, y seguirán siendo la tribuna cívica ideal del pueblo de Cuba.

Artima tiene la palabra...

A. T.

Los cubanos tenemos que lanzarnos a la lucha sin esperar por acuerdos o ayudas internacionales que pueden venir o no venir.



El camino está en la América Latina

birán entonces en pago en la misma moneda histórica que ellos han entregado a nuestro pueblo mártir.

P.—A Ud. y a su Partido se les ha acusado de fascistas de "empolladura" de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia, y de "pantalla" de los peores intereses políticos y económicos de nuestro país. ¿Qué tiene que decir a ello?

R.—Yo no tengo que decir nada. Que lo digan mi conducta y mi historia. Los que van a seguir diciendo eso son los Comunistas y los "fontos diles" de Occidente.

Creo que es conveniente recordar que el M.R.R. fue la única Organización de esta etapa de lucha cubana que antes de invertir sus primeros fondos en armas los invirtió en imprimir su ideario, precisamente porque queríamos que todos supieran a dónde íbamos, cómo íbamos y por qué íbamos. Este ideario circuló por todo el continente y el exilio. Ahí está nuestra ideología completa, como está también en el testamento político que escribí al partir hacia Bahía de Cochinos, como está en mi libro "MARCHAS DE GUERRA Y CANTOS DE FRENIDO" escrito mientras esperaba la muerte, como está claramente definida en el reciente folleto que contiene mi conferencia completa ante los miembros de la A.R.E.C.

El querer llevar a Cuba a un Estado de Independencia, Libertad, Justicia, respeto a la dignidad de la persona humana; el querer que la Constitución de 1940 tenga vigencia mientras no sea revocada por el mismo pueblo que la aprobó; al oponerme a todos los extranjerismos demagógicos y a todos las impremeditaciones totalitarias.

"Todo eso es un fascismo, es un error, es una ilusión. Pero como el fascismo es el totalitarismo implantado por una oligarquía y como, de una u otra manera, el totalitarismo no puede ser fascista.

Con respecto a las demás acusaciones de obscuro o de pantalla de intereses turbios, yo voy a que se me diga el nombre de una sola figura de nuestras cuadros dirigentes revolucionarios que tenga una vinculación a este respecto; yo voy a que se analicen las figuras de nuestros mártires; yo voy a que se analice nuestra historia.

P.—Puede sintetizar en breves palabras las bases ideológicas del M.R.R.?

R.—Sí. Nosotros soñamos una Independencia con Libertad, una Libertad con cultura, una cultura con pan, un pan por trabajo honrado, un trabajo honrado con respeto a la dignidad de la persona humana; y todo eso en un régimen democrático de proyección latinoamericana con una moral Cristiana.

P.—¿Sería su grupo partidario del mantenimiento de algunas leyes de la Revolución, si se prueba que éstas responden a alguna necesidad, o cree que se debe borrar todo el período fidelista de un plumazo, comenzando de nuevo?

R.—Cuando se derroque al régimen fidelista, las necesidades cubanas van a ser muy distintas a las que tenía nuestra Patria cuando el Tirano ocupó el poder. Creo que las leyes que él hizo, que podían responder a necesidades reales de Cuba, estaban mal concebidas y peor orientadas.

Creo que sin alterar en su base la Constitución de 1940, que significa para Cuba un vuelco al estado de Derecho, se pueden hacer las leyes que hagan frente a las necesidades que encontraremos en Cuba.

P.—¿Está Ud. contra los negros?

R.—No; como tampoco estoy contra los blancos, para para mí significan la misma cosa. Lo que nos interesa no es el color de la piel sino el color del alma y de los ideales.

Quisiera ser por este que nuestro Movimiento es el que más hermanos negros tiene en sus filas, incluyendo las más altas jerarquías civiles y militares.

P.—Favorces Ud. como se ha dicho, el establecimiento en Cuba de un estado semi-con-



No estoy contra los negros ni contra los blancos

feccional, con predominio franco de las fuerzas más conservadoras de la Iglesia Católica?

R.—Ni de las más conservadoras, ni de las más liberales; eso se llamaría "clericalismo" y está expresamente condenado aún por las Encíclicas Papales.

Yo específicamente soy Católico y jamás negaré mi fe, porque yo tengo vocación de APOSTATA.

Ahora bien, el Movimiento está repleto de hombres procedentes de todas las religiones y creencias.

Si reafirmamos con la Constitución de 1940, nuestra creencia en Dios y la necesidad de una moral cristiana.

Si creemos que todo niño tiene el derecho de recibir preparación sobre la Religión que adopte.

P.—¿Qué hará el M.R.R. una vez liberada Cuba, con el Ejército Rebelde y con las Milicias?

R.—Los que vuelvan sus armas contra el Tirano seguirán en las Fuerzas Armadas con el mismo rango que tenían. Los que no, serán licenciados o incorporados a la vida civil si no han cometido ningún delito común, pues en este caso, tendrían que responder ante los tribunales civiles normales que según la Constitución de 1940 volverán a tener vigencia en Cuba.

Los cubanos que tienen que tener con los Comunistas extranjeros y los miembros de cuerpos represivos.

P.—¿Mantendrá Ud. en Cuba la pena de muerte?

R.—No soy partidario de la pena de muerte, pero sí de la, como será aplicada la Constitución de 1940, ésta sólo la reco-

rrer en los delitos de alta traición. Ha) que acabar con los "Tribunales Revolucionarios" para volver a un estado de derecho.

P.—¿Ud. que ha pertenecido a los nacionales de Ca'm. una vez liberada del Comunismo, estarían mejor servidos si se situase a la Nación en una posición de neutralidad internacional?

R.—Siempre seremos vanguarda agrícola de Occidente contra el Comunismo. Jamás podremos ser neutrales en una lucha donde se está jugando el destino de la civilización.

P.—El Ingeniero Ray y Ud. parecen perfitarse, al borde casi de un quinquenio de lucha contra Castro como las dos figuras políticas de nuestro futuro. ¿Podría decirnos qué lo separa de él?

R.—Si partimos de la base de que estamos luchando por una Democracia, cualquier diferencia ideológica entre otro grupo de cubanos y nosotros será solventada en el futuro por el pueblo de Cuba en urnas libres. No creo que sea el momento histórico de hablar de diferencias. Si lo que se implanta en Cuba una vez derrotado Fidel Castro es un totalitarismo o una Dictadura, sea de Izquierda o de Derecha, NOSOTROS USANDO LOS FUSELES.

P.—¿Por qué no encabezaba Ud. la Brigada 2508 y por qué no se ha podido aglutinar alrededor de ella todo el exilio siendo como es el cuerpo mayor de veteranos de nuestra guerra?

R.—Una gran parte de nuestros hermanos de la Brigada 2508 están ya luchando en nuestras filas. La Brigada no pudo aglutinar el exilio alrededor de ella porque fue creada como cuerpo Militar sin proyecciones políticas y recién llegada de las prisiones Comunistas se fue a los Campamentos del Alibey Norteamericano a continuar el training. Este fue el motivo de que yo me separara de sus filas. No quisiera que dijeran que yo pensaba proyectar políticamente a la Brigada al tratar de unir al exilio alrededor de ella. Pensé además que yo lo era más útil a mi Patria tratando de llevar la guerra a Cuba que recibiendo un training que no sabía si iba a tener en práctica algún día. El tiempo me ha dado la razón.

P.—¿Quiénes son Ud. o está haciendo, con los "hastatistas"? ¿Cree que aún hay un de nominar de algunos, que agitan en bloques cerrados a personas de muy distintas historias e intereses, en real y lo bueno bien a Cuba?

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

43 SECRET

ROUTING			
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: DC/MH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, VR

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WAVE INVESTIGATING RUMOR. WILL ADVISE RESULTS UPON

RECEIPT.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: RE RUMOR THAT AMBIDY BOUGHT HIS MISTRESS AN
\$5,000 HOUSE IN NORTH MIAMI.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 4 June 1964 at 0930 hours


1. AMBIDY-1 was advised that he should call the Panama Hilton upon his arrival in Panama and ask for Mr. Boysen or Mr. James.
2. Latest report indicates that the ADELAIDA will arrive at [] at 0400 4 June. A-1 has obtained his re-entry visa. A-1 was again asked to give us the tapes on his Venezuelan conference. A-1 promised to have them done today.
3. A-1 was asked to please make sure that someone sees Mr. Barnes concerning the petroleum arrangements. It was mentioned to A-1 that Mr. Barnes has been waiting for over a week to see someone in A-1's organization. Mr. Barnes has been kind enough to offer his services and we feel it is unfair to keep this gentleman waiting. A-1 plans to send Sixto Mesa and Mr. King today. A-1 will notify us of what transpired at the meeting.
4. A-1 intends calling later in the day because he has some other matters he would like to discuss with us.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/80/HH

Above conversation conducted

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AMBIDY-1 - 201
Conversations
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SECRET

3 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 May 1964 at 1330 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called the office again to say that he would be meeting Al Burt at 1600. A-1 inquired if it would do any harm in seeing Mr. Summ of the State Department since the latter mentioned to AMJAVA-4 that he had not seen A-1 in over a year. A-1 felt that a courtesy visit was called for. We advised A-1 that we could see no harm in visiting him.


2. A-1 reported that one of his pilots, Ginebra, had received an offer to fly planes in the Congo. A-1 did not know if Ginebra would accept the offer.

3. We told A-1 that we had received a report that in a finca in Nicaragua called Marianita he had met several U. S. Air Force officers and asked if there were any truth to the report. A-1 stated that one of their houses is located in Marianita but he had not met any U. S. officers there.

4. A-1 gleefully reported he contemplates making quite a lot of changes in Miami. A-1 did not elaborate but it appears that most of the propaganda section will be leaving Miami.

5. A-1 was requested to obtain a position report of the DOLORES by 1 June.

W
Above conversation conducted
in overheard frequently
A-1's: 1st try code



SECRET

6. We asked A-1 if he had any ideas of where AMBANG-1 is at present. A-1 is of the opinion that AMBANG-1 is probably hiding in some small island off Puerto Rico.

7. A-1 inquired if he could sue the Newsweek magazine. We advised him that he could sue but the likelihood of him winning the case was slight. A-1 was referring to the article which stated he intended to draw the United States into an open conflict with Castro. We asked if there were any truth to the matter. A-1 laughed and said, "Of course not."

8. A-1 was advised that we consider 7 June a firm date for the Consejo meeting. The reason we are pinning him down to a specific date was because of the necessary preparations that have to be made prior to any meeting. A-1 said he would be there on that date.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Ginebra - 201
State Dept
Nicaragua
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in presence of frequently
operational code.

SECRET



SECRET

3 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer**

DATE : 2 June 1964 at 1300 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 expects to get his residency permit today from Immigration in Miami.
2. Concerning A-1's request that we choose frequencies for the 511 radios it was our opinion this task could be done by Felix Rodriguez. In the special commo training given to Felix, a course was specially geared to choosing the correct frequencies and the proper crystals. A-1 mentioned the original request had stemmed from Felix. A-1 was informed that the reports we have gotten about Felix reflect that he likes to give the tedious jobs to someone else and this is the case here.
3. A-1 and AMJAVA-4 will be leaving for Nicaragua on 5 June.
4. A-1 asked if the Consejo meeting could be postponed until 9 June. A-1 was reminded when we originally asked him to pick a day for the meeting we considered it a definite commitment. A-1 acquiesced and said he would be there on 7 June.
5. The tentative date for the departure of the ADKLAIDA for the operation is 7 June.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged, frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/BA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
Felix Rodriguez - 201

SECRET

SECRET

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Under Deputy Chief, WH/BA

SUBJECT : ~~AMUCALD~~ Haynes Johnson, Author of
"Day of Pigs"

Subject had the chance to attempt to get in touch
with AMBIDDY-1 in Miami. He asked for an interview,
indicated willingness to go to Central America and "spread
any information from Central America."

Henry D. Eckstater
WH/BA/SO/HE


cc: COS, JMWAVE

NDH/bh

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - Publicity File
1 - AMBIDDY-1 201✓

SECRET



SECRET

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 May 1964 at 1230

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated that AMJAVA-4 will be meeting with Carl in Houston this afternoon.
2. A-1 wants to meet with the Consejo on 7 June at 0830 in Panama City.
3. A-1 again reminded we would like to have the tapes on what transpired in Venezuela. Martin reiterated that in order to protect his interest we must have current intelligence concerning his organization.
4. It is the opinion of the Consejo that a frank, off-the-record talk with Al Burt of the Miami press would do no harm. We consider Burt to be a responsible newspaperman and he may be in a position to help A-1 put the Pilon raid in its proper perspective. If A-1 thinks this is a good idea he should speak openly to Burt about the Pilon raid omitting the embroidery that has accompanied his recent press statements. A-1 was reminded this interview, if given, should not mention or allude to KUBARK support. Since Burt is an ambitious journalist he may probably ask A-1 for a scoop on his next raid; again we see no harm in this. A-1 said he would ask Burt if he wanted to go on a future raid. We mentioned that we doubted he would accept the offer.
5. According to A-1, AMYUM-19 is still in New York and is expected in Miami shortly.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed private code

SECRET



SECRET

2

6. A-1 was informed that the ADELAIDA is scheduled to leave drydock on 31 May.

7. A-1 reported he has talked to Miguel Angel Quevedo of Bohemia Libre and representatives of Life magazine concerning the release of pictures to be taken by his own combat photographer. A-1 added, however, he had made no firm commitments.

8. A-1 was asked if his next operation had been given a name yet. He said the next one was to be called "Simon Bolivar." We told him that we already learned the code name and warned him against loose talk and the damages that could ensue.

9. A-1 was asked to contact Manolin Hernandez and inquire why the DC-3 cannot be in Panama before 2 June 1964. A-1 was advised that Petrosky can furnish a crew to pick up the plane if necessary but cannot since he has no contact with anyone in Costa Rica. A-1 stated he would call Hernandez in Costa Rica.

10. A-1 was informed that three men aboard the ADELAIDA have signed off and should be returning to Miami on 29 May 64 aboard KLM.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 - 201-
Conversations
Press
DC-3

Above conversion conducted
in prearranged frequency,
changed privacy code

SECRET

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 28 May 1964 at 1830 hours


1. AMBIDY-1 called to say that he had just arrived in the United States and would only be staying a short period and then return to Central America for the next operation phase. He stated he wanted to discuss some matters with "Enrique" in Panama within the coming week. I advised him to let us know exactly when and where and we would be there.

2. A-1 inquired if AMJAVA-4 had requested rubber boats from us at the last meeting A-4 attended in Washington. A-1 was informed that we had discussed the matter but could not recall A-4 placing any order with the Consejo for rafts. A-1 asked if some rafts could be obtained in time for the coming operation. A-1 did not know the exact amount needed but would consult with A-4 and call Martin later in the evening. The rubber rafts could be sent to same address as were the village radios. A-1 mentioned they had the silent motors.

3. A-1 was asked to inquire what had gone wrong in Santo Domingo. A-1 believes that the reason the JOANNE could not be put into drydock was because there was another ship in the military yard undergoing repairs. A-1 was advised that was not the information we had received and could he please check further into the matter. A-1 will have Rafael GARCIA confront President Reid and obtain the true story.

Above conversation conducted
in promargued frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

2

4. A-1 wanted five metascopes for the next operation. Since those aboard the MV. SANTA MARIA will not arrive in time, Dick will get more and give them to Mike GEIDEL who in turn will deliver them to ANYUM-19.

5. According to A-1 Maritima Ban now is officially registered in Nicaragua.

6. A-1 asked Enrique to convey to Mr. Archer his gratitude for the letter Mr. Archer had sent him.

7. A-1 is very pleased concerning the possibilities of extending his operational bases to Venezuela. A-1 was asked to send us a tape of what had transpired and the government officials with whom he had met.


8. The conversation ended with A-1 promising to call later tonight (28 May) as to where he and A-4 wanted to meet with Carl.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
Logistics
Special Equipment

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

SECRET



C- 4-1 201

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
		SECRET	FILED	INDEXED
TO	Deputy Chief, WH/SA		FILED	INDEXED
INFO			FILED	INDEXED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		FILED	INDEXED
SUBJECT	RYBAT/TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/ANWORLD		FILED	INDEXED
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
ACTION REQUIRED: None				
REFERENCE: None				
<p>Transmitted herewith are five ANOT reports on ANWORLD activities which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.</p>				
<p>Andrew K. NEUTSMAN</p>				
<p>Attachments: ANOT Reports EE-1291, ED-858, ED-859, ED-868, ED-891, One Copy Each Herewith</p>				
<p>Distribution: 3 - DC/WH/SA, w/atta/h/v</p>				
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		201-267437		
GROUP 2 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		DATE TYPED		
GROUP 3 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		DATE DISPATCHED		
GROUP 4 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		JUN 2 1964		
GROUP 5 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		19-124-87/8		
SECRET				

SECRET

RYBAT

16 May 64

Report # DD-069.

TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED] AMYUWA

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Activities.

SOURCE: [REDACTED] Friend of
 AMBIDY-1 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], who is living
 with [REDACTED] as his mistress. Information acquired from [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED], very close friend of [REDACTED], MISTRESS,
 A-1 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] sister of MISTRESS.

Source states that Marta [REDACTED] is one of the persons who knows
 more about [REDACTED] intimate or personal affairs, and that
 Marta [REDACTED] has friendly relations with [REDACTED], sister of
 [REDACTED] who is now living with [REDACTED] as his mistress.

According to source, Marta [REDACTED] informed her that on the night
 of 12 May 64 [REDACTED] made a phone call to [REDACTED] (PL-4-[REDACTED])
 right from her house (Marta [REDACTED] house), and [REDACTED] said that
 everything was normal.

The next day, 13 May 64, day of the raid against Cabo Cruz sugar
 mill, [REDACTED] returned to Marta [REDACTED] house and told Marta that [REDACTED] A-1
 had been woken at 5 AM by someone who gave him the news about the [REDACTED]'s
 attack against Cabo Cruz sugar mill in Oriente province. When [REDACTED] A-1
 got the news he almost had a stroke. He was hysterical, shouting and
 hitting the walls with his hands. [REDACTED] MISTRESS was trying to calm
 him down, but [REDACTED] A-1 was shouting and screaming that he had been
 betrayed.

A-1 [REDACTED] said: "I cannot take this betrayal! These people think
 I am an idiot but I am going to show them the opposite! They can't do
 that to me!"


That same morning, 13 May 64, [REDACTED] A-1 left for New York. He said
 he was going there in connection with the betrayal of which he had been
 the victim. A-1

When [REDACTED] travels, he frequently travels under the name of
 Manuel MARTINEZ.

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT



DATE : 2 June 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

9 В В С В Т

INDEX

NO INDEX

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 10-124-27/3

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~CONF: DC/WH/SA~~

INFO : COP, VR

201

Imbiddy - 1

SIG CEN
DEFERRED

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

30

WAVE

INFO

CITE: **25079**

WHAT TYPIC YOBITE ANSWERD

REF: WAVE 7218 (IN 95616) PARA 10

SINCE RUMOR SPREADING COULD STA INVESTIGATE.

END OF MESSAGE

*AMBIDEXY-1 has reportedly bought his mistress an \$85,000 house in north Miami.

John
JENCKE E. CHIEVER
DC/VE/BA

Z. D. HECKSH
WM/MA/50/HE

MAILING OFFICE

INTERNATIONAL TRADING OFFICES

1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

**AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER**

Case No.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Anyum 19
CONTACT RPT #60
UFGA 16215
1 JUNE 64

5. GUERTLER again reminded A-19 that it was no longer sufficient to merely deny ODYKE involvement in the project but was necessary to take positive steps to implicate other Latin American governments and create the impression of increasing difficulties with ODYKE. It was left to A-19's discretion on how to do this, but when talking about his problems with AMWORLD-2, Sopo and Male it was suggested that he do this in strictest confidence as just for the inner circle of ANYUM. This will guarantee the story proper dissemination.

Files:
Ambiddy-1 ✓
Sopo
MoLo
MeSA

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: DC/AM/SA 3

INFO : DDP, VR

IST	SS	SB
ICS	TECS	AR
IOB	ETCS	LC
CI	SI	ET
	SPC	FS

Ambiddy 1-20

-201

SECRET 012228Z

1 JUN 64 IN 95616

DIR CITE WAVE 7218

RE: TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD AMRAZZ-1

1. ON 27 MAY 64 AMRAZZ-1 SAID AMBIDDY-1 HAD REPORTEDLY BOUGHT HIS MISTRESS, OFELIA PADRON, AN \$85,000 HOUSE IN NORTH MIAMI. PADRON, ACCORDING AMRAZZ-1, HAS BEEN MISTRESS VARIOUS PERSONS DURING AND AFTER BATISTA REGIME.
2. AMRAZZ-1 ALSO SAID TONY BUSTILLO, FORMER "THIRD CHIEF POLICE HABANA" EARLY IN CASTRO'S REGIME, HAD TOLD HIM HE HAD HEARD THAT AMBIDDY-1'S FOLLOWERS WERE AUTHORIZED ATTACK ANY OF AMBANG-1'S OR GUTIERREZ' MEN IF ENCOUNTERED ON HIGH SEAS.
3. ON 28 MAY AMRAZZ-1 ADVISED HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY "PIANO" BORREGO WHO, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, IS MEMBER AMBIDDY-1'S GROUP BUT FRIENDLY TO SFNE, THAT AMBIDDY-1 PLANNED FAKE HIT-AND-RUN RAID EITHER 29 OR 30 MAY. BORREGO DID NOT REVEAL SOURCES.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

1 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 1 June 1964 at 1600 hours

- 1.
1. AMBIDY-1 would like to know from Jim what frequencies he would recommend for the 511's. A-1 alleges that the crystals for the sets will cost about \$2,000.
2. Since Mr. Summ is leaving tomorrow he will be unable to meet with A-1. A-1 feels that he has fulfilled any obligation by calling Mr. Summ. However, perhaps AMJAVA-4 or AMYUM-19 may visit Mr. Summ in the near future.
3. A-1 expects to receive his visa card today and then re-entry bluebook tomorrow from Immigration.
4. A-1 and A-4 are expected to leave Miami on 4 June for Nicaragua. A-1 will come alone to the meeting in Panama.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/BA/SC/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Communications
in State Department

✓
This conversation conducted
in rearranged frequency
in 1964

RECEIVED
JUN 11 1964
STATE DEPT
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	8
3	16

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CARACHI

SUBJECT: DE/WH/SA 3

INFO: DDP, C/WH, VR

SS SB
1286 AR
273 CA
58 UN
VS

Venezuela
Authenticity 1-20

SECRET 10121000

1 JUN 195478

AR ☐ 887

REBAT-TYPIC YOSITE AMWORLD

REF CANA 8014 (1293463)

AMFLORA-1, WHO ACCOMPANIED CIUPAS-1 TO AIRPORT 20 MAY TO SEE
AMBIDY-1 OFF, STATES AMBIDY-1 TOLD HIM HE PLANS RETURN ☐
WITHIN 15 OR 20 DAYS. AMFLORA-1 DOES NOT KNOW REASON FOR RETURN
VISIT.

SECRET

Who is amflora?

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		1. RI FILE NO.			
		2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE OCC. SYMBOL NO.		3. DATE	
		4. SOURCE CATE. ORTH		5. DATE OF INFO.	
		6. EVALUATION			
7. ANALYST		8. DATE PROCESSED		9. DISSEMINATED IN	
				10. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE			12. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
13.					

AMBIDDY-1
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO RE AUTONOMOUS PROGRAM.
ENCL. 2,3

019-124-027/03
UFGA-16215 EOI
01 JUN 64
PI

PLZR 2008777

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2 008 777

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.



FORM 807 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

27 May 1964

AMOROLD MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY's Reaction to Advice to
Delay Return to U.S.

1. AMJAVA/4 reported that ANYUM-19 conveyed to AMBIDDY-1 my advice that he not return to FBPRIME right away, but permit the dust to settle. According to AMJAVA/4 this advice led AMBIDDY-1 to conclude that ODACID did not want him back in FBPRIME. In order to test this theory, AMBIDDY-1 decided to make a beeline for the U.S. Embassy in Managua to pick up his immigration visa.


2. (Headquarters has learned that the visa was promptly granted and we presume AMBIDDY-1's concern that he had been exiled a second time has as a result been assuaged.) I asked AMJAVA/4 to tell AMBIDDY-1 that we would be honored to welcome him as a potential fellow-citizen. Also, our relationship was based upon complete mutual trust. Our job was to protect his rear in FBPRIME. What we were concerned about was that AMBIDDY-1, should he return at this time, would undoubtedly be talked to by ODACID, ODENVY and the press. All this it would be best to sidestep.

3. AMJAVA/4 was asked to convey to AMBIDDY-1 that we will tell him when the coast is clear. If this notwithstanding he should return to FBPRIME, the decision would, of course, be his. "It is his right to come back at any time, but I think my advice is good."

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/BA/SO/WH

File: AMBIDDY-1 301 ✓

SECRET



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

Antime 201

ACTION: DC/MH/SA 3 (MR HECKSHER, WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1830
27 MAY BP)

INFO : DDP, C/MH, VR

MOB	IST	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
DOB	ELTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BP	HE
		SEC	NS

SECRET 272005Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO ROUTINE WAVE CITE 8810

RYBA ~~SECRET~~ TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: A. 3615 (*in 89401*)

27 MAY 64 192631

B. 8801 (NOT SENT PACY WAVE) (*in 90576*)

AMBIDDY-1 ETD 27 MAY PAA 516. DELAYED FLIGHT SCHEDULED DEPART

CARA 1610 HOURS.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

26 May 1964

AMWORLD MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY'S PERSONNEL POLICY

1. AMJAVA/4 offered the following analysis of AMBIDDY-1's personnel policy as a significant factor of his relationship with others.
2. AMBIDDY-1 is a leader and a very proud leader who does not like to fail in the presence of his associates.
3. AMJAVA/4 was glad that the Miami incident (13 May press conference) happened. "AMBIDDY-1 was really angry with himself."
4. From the start AMJAVA/4 has tried to convince AMBIDDY-1 that Jose MOLE ROSALES is not qualified for intelligence - so far in vain. "To let MOLE fail in doing the job is the way to convince AMBIDDY-1"
5. ANYUM-19 cannot handle MOLE or Edgar SOTO, because AMBIDDY-1 won't let him. "We shall have to wait until they fall down on the job."
6. AMJAVA/4 claims to have a closer relationship with AMBIDDY-1 than does ANYUM-19. He thinks he understands AMBIDDY-1 better than does ANYUM-19, that he (AMJAVA/4) knows how to get things from AMBIDDY-1. ANYUM-19 makes the mistake of using the direct approach where it would be better to go about it in a roundabout way. "There are some things which you BECKHOFF tell GUERIKER, then GUERIKER tells ANYUM-19 who tells AMBIDDY-1, which it would be better to tell AMBIDDY-1 direct." AMJAVA/4 related that AMBIDDY-1 took umbrage at ANYUM-19 for conveying to him BECKHOFF's views about the Miami press conference. AMBIDDY-1 was furious when GUERIKER passed intelligence about the alleged presence of 30 cal. machine guns positioned near Pilon, because he considered this an implied attack of the soundness of the Pilon plan which AMBIDDY-1 himself had drawn up.
7. Headquarters reps pointed out that during the

SECRET

critical period following the Miami press conference, ANYUM-19 was the only available, cleared channel to AMBOLD and time, in view of GRACID's unfavorable reaction, was of the essence. AMJAVA/4 was asked to convey this explanation to AMBIDDY-1 and to stress that we consider ANYUM-19 his senior rep in FAPRI-2.

8. AMJAVA/4 stated that there had been many betrayals and consequently AMBIDDY-1 was always careful. At times he might even think that ANYUM-19 was not loyal which, AMJAVA/4 added, "Of course is not true." As AMBIDDY-1 analyzes his own performance, he is satisfied that he is performing well. He has been in the resistance business since Batista's days and many intimate friends have betrayed him. At the present moment, he does not have 100% confidence in anyone. Everything he is told, he analyzes. As an example, AMJAVA/4 briefs Chavez (the Mexican) on a projected operation. AMBIDDY-1 will question AMJAVA/4 closely in order to make sure that the instructions did not deviate from the plan as conceived by him.

9. Among matters which should be taken up with AMBIDDY-1 direct, no matter how ticklish, was e.g. the case of ...MOLE. AMJAVA/4 and ANYUM-19 know that KURANK have a poor opinion of him. Then why beat around the bush? AMJAVA/4 at least had not witnessed any mention of this by BECKHOFF in AMBIDDY-1's presence. Instead ANYUM-19 had reported GUERINER's statement that he considered MOLE a poor choice for the intelligence job to AMBIDDY-1 and the latter had jumped to the conclusion that it was ANYUM-19 putting words into GUERINER's mouth.

10. BECKHOFF commented as follows: ANYUM-19 will have to tell GUERINER or myself if in a given instance a personal démarche is indicated. There are certain things which, with AMBIDDY-1 out of the country, simply cannot be put on the shelf. We have no choice but to tell GUERINER to tell ANYUM-19 who, however, should feel free to counsel us not to use him as a channel. Headquarters rep conceded that AMBIDDY-1 could rightly resent anything which smacks of a junior officer (i.e. GUERINER) giving orders to him via ANYUM-19, an impression we would do our best to eradicate.

SECRET

11. BECKHOFF stressed that we were anxious not to give AMBIDDY-1 the impression that there exists any special relationship between us and ANYUM-19, AMJAVA/4. Our relationship was with AMBIDDY-1 who is the leader of the movement. AMJAVA/4 replied that he had told AMBIDDY-1 this and that BECKHOFF had made this point very clear at their first meeting in Puerto Rico (see AMWORLD Meeting memo, 3-6 September 1963 Subject: Briefing of AMJAVA/4.) BECKHOFF added that he had told ANYUM-19 and wished to repeat this in the presence of AMJAVA/4 that anything discussed while AMBIDDY-1 was not present, could be told him. Nothing was "off-the-record" in the sense of to be withheld from AMBIDDY-1.

12. According to AMJAVA/4, AMBIDDY-1 knows full well that KUBARK considers him the Chief. If we decided to conspire against AMBIDDY-1 in league with AMJAVA/4 and ANYUM-19, this could only be done within ANYUM, the political movement, since AMJAVA/4 and ANYUM-19 form parts of that organization. Our support, however, is to AMBIDDY-1 and not ANYUM. AMBIDDY-1 knows that.

Henry J. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HR

File: Policy
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
WAVE

SECRET

CUBA

"Something Is Moving"

This is Radio Free Cuba, the anti-Communist voice of Cuba broadcasting on the 40-meter band. Worker, militiaman, rebel soldier, radio ham—help supply the drops! Chase tanks so that the fatherland, today blundered by Russian imperialism, becomes the home of Communism in America. This is Radio Free Cuba transmitting from a point in Cuban territory.

In Cuban exile communities from Miami to Caracas, the word was out: "Algo se mueve"—Something is moving. First came the faint, crackling anti-Castro broadcast last week from inside Cuba. Then 24 hours later came word of the biggest raid in months on Castro's fortress. The raiders identified themselves as members of the Movement for Revolutionary Recuperation, led by Manuel Artime, who headed the abortive Bay of Pigs landing.

At 10:30 p.m., said an M.R.R. spokesman in Miami, Artime and a "strong force of commandos" had gone ashore at Puerto Pilon, 145 miles from Guantánamo on Cuba's southern coast. Linking up with a second force of guerrillas from the nearby Sierra Maestra mountains, the exiles had captured the town and held it for three hours against Castro's militia, during that time declaring it a "free territory of Cuba." They then blew up the Cubo Cruz sugar mill and disappeared. Puerto Pilon, the exiles noted with satisfaction, was only a few miles from the spot where Castro himself originally landed in 1956, and the Sierra Maestra was his sanctuary in the early stages of the revolution.

Within hours, Radio Havana was on the air railing about the attack. Castro



EXILE ARTIME

Trips to some isolated farms.

denied that the exiles had sent in a landing party. The mill, he claimed, was bombarded from the sea "by a pirate vessel of the Rex type, which the CIA operates from bases located in Florida, Puerto Rico and Central America." Nevertheless, he admitted damage to shore installations and cried that "70,000 sacks of sugar" had been destroyed. Naturally, he blamed "a new criminal, vandalistic act by the United States Government." Two days later, Castro's internal radio reported two more landings—one by Artime on the southern coast, and the other by Underground Leader Manolo Ray somewhere in the north. But exile groups in Miami would neither confirm nor deny the new raids.

Recruits & Munitions. In Washington, the State Department blandly denied all. "These attacks," said a spokesman, "are neither supported nor condoned by the Government." Perhaps not, but Miami was alive last week with exile activity. Once again, Cubans were turning up at the old clapboard house on 23rd Street that served as a recruiting center for the Bay of Pigs operation, getting physical exams, then mysteriously dropping out of sight. Small groups of Cubans were training at isolated farms outside Miami. At Key Largo, a 28-ft. launch loaded with exile munitions caught fire, was popping while firemen were trying to douse the blaze.

No one believes that a second frontal invasion is in the offing. The exiles agree that it would amount to suicide. What does seem to be in the works is an attempt at infiltration, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Right now, three main groups are operating:

► The M.R.R., headed by Artime, reportedly has the strong backing of Nicaragua's Tachito Somoza and other anti-Castroites in Central America. Artime, say exile sources, operates from camps stretching from Costa Rica north to Honduras. A U.S. hunter in the northeastern jungles of Costa Rica recently stumbled onto a camp with three large buildings and a landing strip that was in constant use by light aircraft. "Cubans," said his guide, Artime does not have the kind of support inside Cuba to operate a major underground, is gearing his efforts to sabotage teams inside Cuba and commando raids against 17 coastal targets.

► The Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (Jure), led by Ray, a onetime Castro leader and a popular man inside Cuba. Ray got his moral—and reportedly considerable material—support from Venezuela's former President Rómulo Betancourt and Puerto Rico's Muñoz Marín, is said to operate training camps in both countries. He has widely publicized May 20 as his deadline for returning to Cuba to revitalize the island's anti-Castro underground. Last week Ray resigned his job as a con-

sultant to the Puerto Rican Planning Board, and dropped out of sight. He is tough, shrewd—and a man of his word. "We are not worried," he says. "Castro is the man who must worry."

► A coalition of Alphas 66, the Revolutionary Movement of the People, the Second National Front of Escambray and one or two smaller outfits, led by Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, a longtime guerrilla leader who fought against Batista. Menoyo plans to infiltrate a small force into Cuba—probably into the central Escambray Mountains—and start up a guerrilla network. Two weeks ago, Menoyo left Miami. The exiles say he is in Cuba.

Turn of the Screw. If the U.S. is not directly involved, some U.S. influence and support seem apparent. Washing-



EXILE ARTIME

Calfers at a clapboard house.

ton reportedly gave Artime the green light last July. Recruiting personnel and collecting arms would also be difficult without at least tacit U.S. approval. And then there is the U.S. economic embargo. The British and French deals for buses, trucks and locomotives notwithstanding, Castro remains virtually cut off from free-world trade. As another turn of the screw, Washington last week tightened controls on U.S. exports of food and drugs to Cuba. Both had been exempted from the general U.S. trade embargo. Now exporters will need Government approval for shipments.

Brazil last week finally took the action everyone had expected since the revolution that overthrew leftist President João Goulart. Cuban agents, said the Brazilian government, had been engaging in "offensive" propaganda "incompatible with democratic and Christian principles. Such interference in the internal affairs of Brazil can no longer be tolerated." Diplomatic relations with Cuba were therefore formally and officially severed.

Artime - 201

FBIS 39

PANAMA CITY RADIO MIA NETWORK IN SPANISH 1100 22 MAY 64 P

(TEXT) FIVE CUBAN EXILES, INCLUDING MANUEL ARTIME, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION, LAST NIGHT MADE CONNECTIONS AT TOCUMEN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR VENEZUELA. THE GROUP ARRIVED FROM SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, IN THE AFTERNOON AND LEFT AT 2015 HOURS ON PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS FLIGHT 513 FOR CARACAS, VIA MARACAIBO. BESIDES ARTIME, THE GROUP CONSISTED OF CESAR BARO, JESUS SANSI, NILO MESSER, AND RAFAEL QUINTO QUINTERO. THE GROUP REMAINED AT THE AIRPORT WAITING FOR THE PLANE TO TAKE OFF.

22 MAY 1206P FG/RH

SECRET

FROM :

INFO : 22P, C/WH, VR

MOB	INT	SS	SD
	IOB	PEB	AR
DOB	ETB	LCB	CA
CI	SY	BP	HE
		SG	NS

DIR INFO WAVE CITE 4906

RYBATYPIC AMWORLD YOBITE

REF: DIR 22836 *

ARTINE ISSUED 9-1 (IMMIGRANT) VISA ON 19 MAY 64 AT

GAVE ADDRESS AS 1270 N.E. 65TH STREET, MIAMI.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: RE REF LEAVES UNCLEAR WHETHER OR NOT AMBIDDY-1 ISSUED IMMIGRATION VISA. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

Artine - 206

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SECRET 220145Z

220145Z 88431

PRIORITY INFO DIR WAVE CITE 6791

RYBAT TYPIC YOB:TE ANWORLD

MANUEL ARTINE DEPARTED AFTERNOON 21 MAY VIA LACBA FOR

AND PROBABLY SOURCE: HUNAP-8. EVAL: C-2.

DISSEM: NONE.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CRG: T.D. Hochster/bh

UNIT: WH/SA/BO/HH

EXT: 4215

DATE: 21 May 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX

☒ NO INDEX

SEE FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

134

ROUTING

1	4
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3	6

TO: ☐ JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: *Do WH/SA 3*

INFO: DDP, C/WH, VR

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21 MAY 64 46Z

SIG-GEN

DEFERRED

☒ ROUTINE

TO: MANA

INFO: WAVE

CITE: 22836

DECLASSIFIED

TYPIC YOBITE ANWORLD

REF: USARMA CX-28

REF LEAVES UNCLAR WHETHER OR NOT AMBIDOT-1 WAS ISSUED
IMMIGRATION VISA. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Please add C/WH to distribution.

W. Wood
BERNARD FITZGERALD
C/WH

Sam J. Cheever
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DOCUMENT
DATE: 19 MAY 1964
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA,
ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN LEADER

Artime-201

19 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


**SUBJECT: Tad Szulc
Telephonic Conversation**

1. Tad Szulc called the undersigned at home shortly before 2300 on 18 May 1964 from Miami, Florida. I began the conversation by telling Szulc that I had discussed the matter of a contact in the Miami area and that it was our opinion that we could best collaborate with him from Washington inasmuch as it was only here that the full story is known. Szulc accepted this with the comment that he would naturally go along with our judgment in this matter. The essence of our general conversation follows:

a. Szulc Meets with RAY in Caribbean.

Toward the end of our conversation Szulc interjected the statement, "Oh, I guess I had better tell you because you will read it in the paper in the morning, that I have just come from a meeting with RAY." Szulc gave the impression of being very satisfied with his trip and convinced that RAY was fully prepared for his venture. In answering a question that I had raised on 16 May, Szulc informed me that he was convinced that there was no serious dissension within the ranks of the JUNE. It is my opinion that this is true, but that there are small frictions which are particularly inherent in Cuban organizations. I commented to Szulc that if he had just seen RAY, then in all likelihood RAY would not be in Cuba by the 20th. Szulc assured me that he would be in Cuba by the 20th. (Note: On 17 May I spoke with Regilio CISENOS, who informed me that he would have an important message for me in two or three days. I have a promise from RAY and CISENOS.

SECRET



that we will be the first to know of RAY's arrival in Cuba. Szulc reiterated his basic theme that RAY's effort is the last hope to free Cuba. I told Szulc that I certainly felt that RAY's contribution is tremendously important. In this connection I observed that RAY's drawing power was obviously increasing for I had only recently received a query from rather conservative elements asking if it would be proper for them to speak with RAY's representatives, specifically Rogelio CISNEROS. I told Szulc that in keeping with our policy, I had said that RAY and his group appeared to represent a patriotic and dedicated group interested in the liberation of their country and in the restoration of a democratic government. I told the person calling me that it might be wise to speak to RAY's group now when the opportunity presents itself rather than to face the possibility of having to stand in line later. Szulc indicated that he knew of which group I was speaking and he undoubtedly would as Rogelio CISNEROS probably told him of the contact recently made by members of the Cattlemen's Association of Cuba.

b. Defection of Samuel RODILES.

Szulc then asked me if I had heard of the defection of Samuel RODILES. I told him that I had not and that in all likelihood if such a thing had happened, I should know about it.

c. Blas ROCA Breaks with Castro.

Szulc then told me that he had heard via Mexico that Blas ROCA had a falling out with Castro. I again had to tell Szulc that I did not know of any such development, but that I seriously questioned it as this made no sense at all and that Blas ROCA will not openly break with Fidel Castro unless ordered to do so by the Soviet Union. I told Szulc that Blas ROCA is too much of a fox to ever even consider such forthright action.

SECRET

d. Alert in Cuba.

Szule then informed me that the NEW YORK TIMES had heard via Richard Eder to the effect that the tightest and most general alert in the history of Cuba appeared to be in the making. Eder and all other correspondents have been restricted to Havana. When Eder attempted to make a trip to Pinar del Rio, he was denied this privilege. While discussing these matters with the NEW YORK TIMES by telephone, Eder was cut off and they have not heard from him since. This was presumably yesterday, 18 May.

e. Szule Asks about General Situation.

Szule was quite eager to hear something of the general situation in Cuba at this time. I told him that I believed the alert in Cuba was a result of the attack on the sugar mill some days ago and the mounting psychological pressure of RAY's publicized intent to return to Cuba. Szule then added that in his opinion RAY's publicity was a good thing, particularly given that it was played in a basically moderate key. I agreed with Szule on this. I then told Szule that I had heard only a few hours earlier that there was a widespread rumor in Miami to the effect that a U-2 had been shot down over Cuba but that as far as I knew, this was not true. Szule then naturally asked me: "You would know if this had happened, wouldn't you? You would have heard this from the Defense Department." I answered that it certainly wouldn't be very long before we would know of such a thing, and therefore I did not believe there was any truth to this rumor.

2. On 18 May I discussed with Henry Hecksner the possibility of his releasing certain information regarding AMVORL which I might subsequently provide to Szule. In light of this, Henry gave me some indication of the type of thing which he would like to see picked up by the press, the essence of which is an attempt to create a better press

SECRET

image for AKTIME. In talking with Skulc, the subject of AKTIME arose from time to time. Skulc mentioned that it had come to his attention that AKTIME was in New York "with some babe or another" and nowhere near the scene of the strike. Skulc was also extremely critical of the press releases made by AKTIME. I took this occasion to say that I had discussed the matter of AKTIME with people who are much more familiar with his activities than I, given that they are in another geographical area, and that it was my impression that AKTIME is not being given as much credit for his efforts as perhaps he should be and that it may well be that he has fairly solid plans which cannot be actually initiated until such a time as he has welded together the nucleus of a new organization under fire. Once experienced in their present activity, it could well be that AKTIME could follow the RAY concept of developing resistance within. I told Skulc that I believed that the activities of AKTIME and Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo could not but help RAY's program. Skulc's basic reaction to favorable statements regarding AKTIME may be best described as a snort.

20
Alfonso Rodriguez
WH/SA/SO/AR

SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in Washington, 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Relations with [REDACTED]

1. AMJAVA-4 remarked that AMBIDDY-1 had not mentioned to anyone that BECKHOFF had talked with him about this affair. (See AMWORLD Meeting Memo 15-16 Feb 1964, Subject: [REDACTED])

2. BECKHOFF re-affirmed that the matter had been raised in compliance with his wishes that we let him know about any derogatory information on Subject. He had been told "in slow English" that we in fact had information from several sources which testify to Subject's former intimate relations with Fulgencio Batista. BECKHOFF had drawn AMBIDDY-1's attention to the following alternatives:

a. Rumors are true. AMBIDDY-1's decision is obvious.


b. Rumors cannot be confirmed. How serious is the damage they cause to AMBIDDY-1's public position.

3. AMBIDDY-1 had listened carefully, merely commenting that all this was "very interesting." He had not been pressed to make a decision. Specifically, BECKHOFF had told him that Subject was reputed to have been the mistress of other prominent Cubans, besides Batista, and that AMBIDDY-1 could conceivably be blackmailed by JURE and the press, to mention only a few sources of threat presumed knowledgeable.

4. AMBIDDY-1 had not been told that his affair with Subject was liable to jeopardize AMWORLD. After all, he was an intelligent man who did not have to be told the obvious, viz. that a press scandal would be serious indeed. DAYHOLD, whom BECKHOFF had consulted, had taken the position that AMBIDDY-1 should reach the necessary conclusions himself. Our position was that AMBIDDY-1 could not run a political movement unless he could handle his personal affairs. The blackmail potential in this affair was serious as far as KUBARK is concerned.

5. AMJAVA-4 believes that the problem in relations between AMBIDDY-1 and ANYUM-19 stems from the fact that the latter has discussed Subject with AMBIDDY-1. ANYUM-19's and

SECRET



SECRET

-2-

AMJAVA-4's plans call for a threat to quit AMWORLD if AMBIDDY-1 makes known his decision to marry Subject. In the same breath, AMJAVA-4 stated that he had not made his views known to AMBIDDY-1 "because then our position would be the way it is now with ANYUM-19. You cannot put AMBIDDY-1 to the wall. He must be led to believe that it was he who made up his mind."

6. In forecasting his and ANYUM-19's strategy, AMJAVA-4 stated the following:

"ANYUM is not just AMBIDDY-1. It is all of us. He is working for ANYUM and in that regard is answerable to all of us, because he is part of ANYUM. When we talk about the Adelaida problem, we talk about a problem arising within the organization. AMBIDDY-1 knows that he will have KUBARK's support which is meant for him not for ANYUM. But in ANYUM we have to decide. Even the people in jail inside Cuba want to know if it is true that AMBIDDY-1 has a mistress and believe that we are condoning this. AMBIDDY-1 is not only answerable to use but to the people in jail. We, in turn, are responsible for our imprisoned comrades. As part of ANYUM I have to decide if I will fight or not. AMBIDDY-1 is clear on that."

7. In stating our position, we made clear to AMJAVA-4 that marriage is not a deciding factor in determining our course of action. An ensuing scandal might force our hand.

Henry D. Ecksher
WM/BA/DO/RE

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
201

cc: CDR, JMWAVE

SECRET

SECRET

AMFOLD Meeting in Washington, 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: Delivery of RAINOLD's Letter

1. ANJAVA-4 was handed a message, in AMBIDY-1's code, conveying RAINOLD's congratulations upon the Pilon raid.


2. The original message was read to ANJAVA-4.

Henry D. Hockner
WE/BA/BO/HH

File:
MEMO II
AMBIDY-1 301 ✓

Attachment:
Letter

SECRET



RYBAT
SECRET

Report # DD-837, CE, 30 Apr 64 (cont.)

WADW to divorce her husband.

[] is about 26 years old and she is from Yaguajay, Las Villas province. She was a protégée of Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldívar since she was 14 years old. She married Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia and has two children, 5 and 6 years old. According to source, her youngest child is by BATISTA.

[] was also the mistress of Marcos PEREZ Jiménez, former President of Venezuela.

In addition to being a very attractive woman, [] is also very intelligent.

According to source, on various occasions (did not specify dates) [] has talked to BATISTA on the phone from Miami.

SOURCE 3:

P-96 had a conversation with Nazim ELIAS Thumas and told ELIAS that some days ago a Cuban exile lady who was from the City of Santa Clara, Las Villas province, had expressed herself in very bad terms and had criticized AMGibby while she was in the "Optica López" optical store. That the lady had said A-1 had abandoned his fiancée, who is a good girl, to live with another woman who had been married to Roger ROJAS Lavernia.

After hearing this, ELIAS told P-96 it was true that A-1 was living with the ex-wife of ROJAS Lavernia.

By the way in which ELIAS answered P-96, it can be understood that ELIAS knows said lady perfectly.

During the conversation, ELIAS told P-96 that when he had arrived in the U.S. Naval Base at San Juan, Puerto Rico, from []

[], base authorities were [] from him the authorization to return to [] away this authorization and therefore he cannot to return to []

SOURCE 4:

Source reports that, before CASTRO seized power, [] used to live in Cuba at Milán St. corner of Villoldo, Reparto Apolo, City of Havana. That "big parties" were given in that house in which people posed for pornographic pictures. Source assures that she saw pictures of these parties in Cuba and was shocked by their immorality.

-2-
SECRET
RYBAT **DESENSITIZED**

SECRET **RYBAT**
DESENSITIZED

Report # PD-837, CE, 30 Apr 64 (cont.)

According to source, [] had a poor origin and her marriage to ROJAS Lavernia enabled her to enjoy parties, good food, clothes, etc.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-11-83 BY 1043

DESENSITIZED

SECRET **RYBAT**

SECRET

11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Mike GEIDEL and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 8 May 1964 at 1030 hours

1. The undersigned reminded Mike GEIDEL that it is essential that AMBIDDY-1 meet with "RODEMEYER" when the former returns to Miami.

2. Mike stated that YERGO (MRR Dominican Republic delegate) had received a telephone call from President Reid or some other high official in the Dominican Republic which stated that President Reid would like to meet with AMBIDDY-1 on 12 May in the Dominican Republic. YERGO was also informed that they could have anything they wanted in the Dominican Republic. ~~YERGO was also informed that they could have anything they wanted in the Dominican Republic.~~

3. Martin next brought up the subject of the MID. It was GEIDEL's impression that this organization might be nothing more than a provocation. This opinion is also shared by JMWAVE. Mike commented that AMYUM-19 has met with members of this organization who for the most part are unwilling to return to Cuba. A-19 would like to test their mettle before negotiating with them any further. A-19 intends to give this organization some sabotage materials and see what happens.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Dominican Republic
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Other Exile
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



YOUR SPEEDY SUCCESS FULLY
JUSTIFIABLE TRUST IN YOUR OUTSTANDING ABILITY TO ORGANIZE A
POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND TO PROVIDE IT WITH INSPIRING LEADERSHIP. THE
EFFORTS OF YOUR SUCCESSORS CONSIDERING THE OBSTACLES YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE
TO OVERCOME AND THE STRENGTH OF YOUR OPPOSITION IS SUCH AS TO REQUIRE
NO MAGNIFICATION OR REMOVAL. GOOD WORK. CORDIALLY YOURS, BEN A.

END OF MESSAGE

TRANSLATION: S. DEAR DON MARCEL: YOUR SPEEDY SUCCESS FULLY
JUSTIFIABLE TRUST IN YOUR OUTSTANDING ABILITY TO ORGANIZE A
POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND TO PROVIDE IT WITH INSPIRING LEADERSHIP. THE
EFFORTS OF YOUR SUCCESSORS CONSIDERING THE OBSTACLES YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE
TO OVERCOME AND THE STRENGTH OF YOUR OPPOSITION IS SUCH AS TO REQUIRE
NO MAGNIFICATION OR REMOVAL. GOOD WORK. CORDIALLY YOURS, BEN A.

Artimo - 201

Acting Chief, Contact Division
ATIS : Support Branch

19 May 1964
CMA(S) 24406

Chief, Miami Field Office

Recent Travels of Manuel Artimo

45) 903,073

WH-1828

Records of the US Immigration Service show that Manuel Artimo has made numerous trips in and out of Miami between 3 and 13 May 64. IAMS records show the following:

a. On 30 April Artimo was issued an I-512 type visa good for travel to Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. He departed from Miami on 3 May 64 for Managua, Nicaragua on Latin Flight number 419. He returned to the US on 11 May 64. No flight information available on return trip.

b. An I-512 was issued in his name on 3 May 64 good for travel to Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. Artimo left Miami on 11 May and returned on 12 May 64.


c. Another I-512 was issued in his name on 11 May, and he left Miami on 13 May on Pan American flight number 503 for Managua. His IAMS file does not presently show evidence that he has returned to Miami from this trip. A reliable IAMS official has orally confirmed to us this date that Artimo has not in fact returned from his latest trip abroad.

JOHN F. SLATTERY

WMA/AMM:ab

Copy to JMWAVE

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET

15 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Carl E. Jenkins

DATE : 1800 hours, 12 May 1964

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to report that he had just arrived in Miami and was on his way to a meeting with Al Rodriguez at the Holiday Inn.


2. I told him that some of our friends had notified some activity that indicated mother and baby might be up to something tonight. AMBIDDY-1 said he didn't know anything about it but would check and let us know. I asked him to try to confirm it so we could help him if he wished us to.

Carl E. Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Op ZENON VIERA II

SECRET



11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 11 May 1964 at 0930

1. AMBIDY-1 telephoned from the Miami airport to say that he would be leaving in two hours for the Dominican Republic to meet with President Reid on the morning of 12 May 1964.

2. A-1 expects to meet with PETER C. KNITTEL and Tom Murphy at the Miami Airport this morning before A-1 departs for Dominican Republic.


3. A-1 was advised that Mr. Alfredo RODENMEYER would like to meet with him at the Holiday Inn at Coral Gables upon A-1's return tomorrow. A-1 stated he would be at the Holiday Inn after 1800 on 12 May 1964. A-1 was assured this meeting had nothing to do with our operations and not to worry.

4. A-1 has given the commo plans to A-10 who will give them to Mike GUERTLER (P) sometime this afternoon.

5. Due to AMJAVA-4's late arrival in Nicaragua the entire schedule for the operation has been pushed back one day since the ship left one day late. A-1 also mentioned there have been some minor changes in the land operation.

6. Manolin Hernandez is now in Panama dealing with Mike Petrosky concerning the DC-3. A-4 apparently had a narrow escape on a Nicaraguan plane and A-1 appears determined to have his own plane in the air.

SECRET



7. According to Maagdenberg, the Dutch engineer, the ship is in fairly good condition and should require no more than five days in drydock. A-1 casually mentioned that the Dutchman had to be dissuaded from going on the operation itself.

8. A-1 was reminded we must have a firm statement from him as to when the operation is to take place if we are to be of assistance to his organization during the critical period. A-1 stated he had promised to break the heads of the commo people aboard the ship if they fail to advise him as to when the Swift departs from the mothership.

9. A-1 would probably leave for Nicaragua on Wednesday to be at the base in time for the operation.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
JOANNE
Dominican Republic
Operation ZENON II
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
by prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT

KYBAT/TYPIC/ANWORLD

Transmittal of AMOT Reports on ANWORLD Activities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: None

Transmitted herewith are two AMOT reports on ANWORLD activities which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
AMOT Reports
WD-831, WD-837
One copy each, herewith

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED

MAY 11 1964

8 May 64

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UNRA-1584K
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

10-124-27/3

101-267437

RYBAI
SECRET

Report # DD-837.

TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: CE

SUBJECT: AMVUM Activities

- SOURCES: 1. [REDACTED] ^{AMT-173} Information acquired from Salvador ~~Sanchez~~ Gonzalez of 2340 NE 5th Ave., Miami.
2. [REDACTED] ^{AMT-153} Information acquired during a conversation with [REDACTED] (unwitting source), who is a very close friend of Manuel ARTIME Buesa and Adelberto ~~Pineda~~ Cruz. ^{AMT-163}
3. [REDACTED] Information acquired during a conversation with Nazim ELIAS Thumas of 821 SW 23rd Ave., Apt 15, Miami.
4. [REDACTED] Information acquired from Acasia VAZQUEZ Gallo of 1836 NW 15th St., Miami, who lived in Cuba at one block from [REDACTED]

SOURCE 1:

Source reports that a group of 18 men belonging to the action groups broke with AMVUM because they were not in agreement with the manner in which AMB1007-1 uses the money of the organization.

According to these men, A-1 has assigned very good salaries to all his friends in addition to paying their rent and giving very good gifts to them. A specific example is AMUAYA-4 to whom A-1 gave \$1,000 when he married.

According to source, A-1 bought a boat for a certain sum of money but said that he had paid a much higher price. This immorality has created great unrest among AMVUM members.

Source also reports that, at present, there are about 20 prisoners in the [REDACTED] bases and that there are problems with KURARK on account of this (source did not give details).

Source claims that A-1 has already distributed all the political appointments for Cuba, including Councilmen's positions, among his friends and unconditional supporters.

SOURCE 2:

Source learned in a conversation with Silvia GARCIA Acosta that, at present, A-1 is having an affair with [REDACTED] and that some days ago A-1 gave [REDACTED] a house as a gift. That A-1 and [REDACTED] are now living in this house, which is a "dream." (Phone number PL-4-7912.)

[REDACTED] was married to prerevolutionary army Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia, and A-1 paid all the expenses for [REDACTED]

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DECLASSIFIED

FOUCH S-177 VIOLATION
TO

SECRET

litine

30 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 1630 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 commenced by saying that he has obtained the charter for Libernic which Somoza had to sign. The original copy has been lost; however, A-1 has a photostatic copy with General Somoza's signature.

2. The undersigned requested of A-1 that he make quite clear to President Reid that AMWORLD is not receiving aid from the United States. A-1 was warned about making innuendos or ambiguous statements concerning American aid.

3. A-1 stated he would inform this office as soon as arrangements to go to the Dominican Republic were completed. A-1 was advised that we will be in Puerto Rico on Sunday 2 May.

Above conversation conducted
in presence of frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SODHH

File:
ambiddy-1 - 201
Conversations
SANTA MARIA
Dominican Republic

SECRET

SECRET

Autenti

30 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer
and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 1100

1. AMBIDDY-1 was reminded that he should make a quick trip to the [] and to arrange for drydocking and refueling facilities. A-1 was advised to use a more subtle approach than used on Colonel Lopez of Honduras. A-1's main objective should be to get "his foot in the door" in the Dominican Republic. A-1 should pursue the soft sell rather than the hard sell. Since he sounded a bit reluctant to forego the next operational phase in order to repair the ADELAIDA, A-1 was reassured that the overhauling of the ADELAIDA would take place after the operation rather than before. A-1 will take AMJ/VA-4 with him to the Dominican Republic. Should President [] ask for the name of the shipping company who will act as the agent for [] A-1 should say it is the []

2. A-1 was asked if he had obtained his U. S. visa. A-1 replied he has all the documents ready and will request it next time he goes to Nicaragua.

3. A-1 has no objection to ANYUM-19's attending the next meeting in Puerto Rico. The undersigned informed A-1 that we are preparing the intelligence data on the [] targets he requested, and they will be presented to him at our meeting.

Above conversation transcribed
in plaintext frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

-2-

4. A-1 commented if it would be possible for Kelly to arrange fueling facilities at Bluff with Texaco Oil rather than Esso. The person in charge of the Esso company in Bluff apparently is not in sympathy with MRR movement; therefore, A-1 is reluctant to deal with Esso. A-1 inquired if the person in charge of Esso could be replaced. A-1 was informed that although Kelly enjoys a great deal of influence with Esso we doubt that he has that much influence. As it stands now the LCM obtains supplies there and it is then transferred to the ADELAIDA because A-1 is reluctant to take the ADELAIDA near the Esso installation.

5. In conclusion A-1 was complimented on the manner his organization behaved during the operation.


6. Should A-1 obtain any definite information as to when he will be going to the Dominican Republic he should call our office in order that we may make our own traveling arrangements.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Dominican Republic
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
POL

Above conversation
in prearranged frequency,
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

Actual

29 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 0800

1. The undersigned telephoned AMBIDDY-1 at his home in an attempt to reach him before his return to Miami became too well-known and he became engrossed in other matters.

2. A-1 was advised that one of the most urgent matters now pending was his trip to the [redacted] to resolve the problem of drydock facilities for the ADELAIDA.


3. It was obvious from the sound of A-1's voice that he was still half asleep and further conversation at this time would be useless. A-1 was requested to call Martin at the office later in the day.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 -201
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

SECRET



File 201 - L

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
		SECRET	PROCESSED	ACTION
TO	Chief, Special Affairs Staff		INDEXED FOR RELEASE	FILE
INFO			NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY FOR HQS	
SUBJECT	RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD Recent Declarations by Manuel ARTINE Buesa		HEADQUARTERS DESK	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
ACTION REQUIRED: None			REPLY	
REFERENCE: None			MICROFILM	
<p>Transmitted herewith is an AMOT report concerning the Referendum and exile reactions to Manuel ARTINE's speech before A.R.E.C., which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.</p> <p>END OF DISPATCH</p>				
<p>Attachment: AMOT Report DD-778 One copy herewith</p>				
<p>Distribution: 3 - C/RAS, v/att/h/v</p>				
GROUP Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		201-267437		
		DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED	
CROSS REFERENCE TO		24 APR 64		
		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		
CLASSIFICATION		NESA-15602		
		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER		
SECRET		19-124-21/3		

SECRET

9 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/External Operations Branch

SUBJECT : AMWORLD- []

1. Subject, who is Manuel Artime's aged mother, has last been reported as hiding out in Iglesia Cristo de Limpian in Havana city.
2. Artime has been without news from her for the last two months. His link to her used to be the Spanish Commercial Attache in Havana.
3. We have prevailed Artime to study ways and means of contacting her in order to ascertain her state of health, her husband's whereabouts and any personal needs she may have.
4. Can you come up with any ideas?


Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

HDE/bh

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH - Artime 201 ✓

SECRET



SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P. R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: Reality of Autonomy

1. On 4 May 1964 HQS representatives raised with ANYUM-19 the question if AMBIDDY-1 in his own mind accepts the premise of independence from KUBARK control in his management of AMWORLD affairs. ANYUM-19 replied that AMBIDDY-1 had not always done so, but had now become convinced that he was in de facto control of AMWORLD. Commenting upon that fact, AMBIDDY-1 had recently remarked that he now thought he could, if he so decided, fire /sic/ both AMJAVA-4 and ANYUM-19 without KUBARK attempting to gainay him.

2. The arrival of James ZABOTH on the scene had at first re-kindled AMBIDDY-1's suspicions that KUBARK may after all try to clamp tight controls upon his operations. However, ZABOTH's general approach had disarmed those suspicions and convinced AMBIDDY-1 that he is in fact master of his destiny. ANYUM-19 reminded that AMBIDDY-1 had in the beginning suspected him and AMJAVA-4 as being KUBARK plants. ANYUM-19 added he wanted to be quite candid in telling us that he would not himself have accepted a position in AMWORLD had he entertained the slightest doubts as to the sincerity of KUBARK's promise of autonomy.

3. We re-emphasized our adherence to the principles of autonomy, witness our desire to disengage from extensive involvement in AMWORLD logistics, our non-interference in personnel matters (except where overriding ODVOK security interests are involved) and our future handling of subsidy payments.

4. Comment: We found no reason for disbelieving ANYUM-19's acceptance of autonomy as the principle guiding our role in AMWORLD. As an aside, ANYUM-19 observed that AMBIDDY-1 should not be expected to subordinate himself to PRPRIME controls of any kind once PRPRIME had been liberated and we allowed that this was likely to be the case.

Henry D. Backster
WH/SA/EO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Policy

SECRET

CRIG: H.D. Hecsher/bh
UNIT: WH/FA/SD/HH
DT: 4215
DATE: 7 May 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX

☐ NO INDEX

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

INT	SS	SB
IOS	PERG	CA
BOB	BPTS	LC
CI	SI	BY
7 May 64 10:47Z		
DESIG: CEN		
ROUTINE		

TO: JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA-3

INFO: DDR, VR

*AmBiddy-1 201
Publicity*

TO: WAVE

INFO

CITE DIR 19632

DECLASSIFIED

TYPIC TOBITE AMWORLD

PLEASE ARRANGE FOR MEETING BETWEEN "MR. BODENEYER" AND AMBIDDY-1 DURING LATTER'S FORTHCOMING MIAMI STAY, PREFERABLY IN WAVE SAFEHOUSE USED FOR TNG SESSIONS. IT MOST IMPORTANT MEETING TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME. (FYI: PROPOSE DERRING AMBIDDY-1 ON CONTROVERSIAL EVENTS SURROUNDING COL. FRANK EGAN AS SURFACED IN RECENT BOOK ON BAY OF PIGS.) ADVISE TIME OF MEETING.

END OF MESSAGE

Bruce B. Cheever
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

DELEGATING OFFICER

WH/SA/EO/AR

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

APPROVED
IN DRAFT

KDC
H. D. HECESHER
WH/SA/EO/HH

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

7-7
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

2-1 20
ANYWORLD Meeting in [REDACTED], 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: Cackling Over Unlaid Eggs

1. ANYUM-19 confided to us that AMBIDDY-1 had, prior to the launching of Operation ZENON, prepared a "three and one half page" news release which laid exaggerated claim to damages inflicted during the raid on Santa Cruz del Sur. Only the last sentence stated, more or less as an afterthought, that this should be considered just a minor MRR operation. ANYUM-19 has told AMBIDDY-1 that in his opinion any future announcements should be held down to one or two brief paragraphs.

2. We pointed out to ANYUM-19 that AMBIDDY-1 was evidently paying no more than lip service to our recommendation that he under--rather than over--play his successes. During the Washington meeting (19-21 March 1964) we had criticized a statement made by AMBIDDY-1 during a Miami press conference to wit: "We do not have enough boats. In one night we can make two trips but not more, but we are doing it. We will fill the country with enough arms to free the country from communism." We took the position that if we were in AMBIDDY-1's shoes we simply wouldn't let on about military matters since this plays into Castro's hands, giving him gratuitous access to military intelligence. AMBIDDY-1 countered by asking us how he could raise the morale of the people without saying anything and without talking about successful ops inside.

3. We mentioned to AMBIDDY-1 that any vital information not publicized makes the task of Castro's espionage service that more difficult. Besides, things had now come to a pass where little credence was placed in claims of success and promises held out by Cuban exile leaders. What really counted was the demonstrable substance of success inside which speaks for itself. AMBIDDY-1 would be much more effective by preserving a posture of inscrutability. We counselled AMBIDDY-1 to resist a natural tendency to

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-2-

inflate the significance of his initial successes and to present them in their proper perspective. He should refer to those successes as mere appetizers, with the main dish to follow later. This approach rather than the claim of a big victory would arouse the kind of interest, and in Castro's case, the kind of premonition which carries psychological impact.

4. We doubt whether AMBIDDY-1 at this stage is prepared to heed our counsel to be conservative in his claims to victory. In the unhealthy climate of competition, engendered by the spectacle of numerous exile organizations vying to be the first, AMBIDDY-1 may be unable to resist the temptation to broadcast his victories and to exaggerate the damage they have inflicted. He will have to learn the hard way.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/BA/BO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

File:
Publicity

SECRET



AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P. R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: The Nature of the American Commitment

1. Alluding to certain charges levelled against CIA in a recent publication on the Bay of Pigs affair, whose substance was that the Cuban military leadership had been served with erroneous intel estimates by their CIA advisors, I voiced to AMTUM-19 the hope that the U. S. team servicing AMWORLD would never be subjected to similar censure (without implying justification for charges made in the instance of the Bay of Pigs). I reiterated that it was our strong desire to be absolutely forthright with our Cuban counterparts, especially in stressing that our target intelligence had by its very nature to be of limited usefulness, especially when it came to predicting the extent and nature of Cuban defense measures. As an example, certain radar sites had struck us as highly vulnerable to external raids, but that this estimate might not necessarily be borne out if put to the test of an actual operation.

2. In the general content of facts fulfilled, I once more pointed out to AMTUM-19 that the American commitment to AMWORLD was a tenuous one and that I would never be able to give an estimate of U. S. Government intentions vis-a-vis AMWORLD other than what can be deduced from the events of the preceding day. As an example, official American reaction to the widening repercussions of a limited AMWORLD success in aiding Cuba was simply unpredictable. AMTUM-19 hastened to assure us that AMBIDDY-1 was indeed fully cognizant of the circumstances I had outlined and that this sense of urgency in commencing operations was partly a reflection of a sense of insecurity engendered by the official American posture in respect to Cuba.


Henry D. Hechsher
CH/BA/SC/HE

cc: COS, JMWAVE

File:
Policy
Operations

A-1 ✓

SECRET



C. Bare 7m 4/17/64

DISPATCH		PROCESSING	
SECRET		ACTION	
TO	Chief, Special Affairs Staff	NO	BASED FOR INDEXING
INFO			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN ASSIGN INDEXING
SUBJECT	KAPOK/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD AMWORLD Contact Reports		ABSTRACT
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			NO INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI			
REFERENCE: UFGA-15147 of 8 April 1964			
Transmitted herewith are the Contact Reports of Warren K. GUNTHER for the period 5 - 14 April 1964.			
END OF DISPATCH			
Attachments: Contact Reports (4) One Copy Each Herewith			
Distribution: 3 - C/S&A, w/atts/h/v			
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification		201-267437	
CROSS REFERENCE TO:		DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
SECRET		18 APR 1964	APR 17 1964
15435		10-124-87/3	

CONTACT REPORT # 14

OPERATION: AMWORLD

DATE TYPED: 6 Apr. 64

CONTACT: ANTON-19

TIME AND PLACE: 0930-1100 Hrs. 4 Apr. 64, S/N 260

NEXT MEETING: Unscheduled

SUMMARY

1. A-19 was asked to provide the Case Officer with a sample of recent ANYUM radio programs. (Comment: P/W requested this. A Station contact is considering producing a "Monitor"-type program, originating in Miami, and broadcast over WRUL. All exile groups would be represented and it would provide a means for special broadcasts such as announcements of any successful AMWORLD ops, etc.)

2. Reports from Nacin Elias frequently mention an action group known as "M.L.B", one of whose leaders uses the war name "el Diablo". A report from Nacin dated 16 March included an appeal for help in infiltrating "el Diablo" and some others who are in danger. A-19 has heard that six men of the M.I.B. have just come out. One of the men is said to be "el Diablo". (Comment: Confirmed by BARR 1883) After they have been processed and debriefed A-19 will have them debriefed by AMFAST-64 and Alonso. A-19 believes that this group is the source of most of the documents furnished by Nacin and are either the only worthwhile contacts of Nacin or are completely controlled by the GOC. The latter theory is probably the correct one.

3. A-19 thinks that the captain of the Adelaide will eventually be replaced by Munne if he does not quit first. He is still not exercising the kind of leadership necessary for military ops. This, of course, will necessitate finding a new captain for the Delores. Of the three crewmen who recently left the Adelaide, two were having difficulties with the rest of the crew and one, Jose Cabanas, left after his brother had been fired by AMBIDDY-1.

4. Guertler asked A-19 if AMWORLD-2 had received a security briefing recently reminding him not to discuss AMWORLD business. A-19 wanted to know if A-2 was still talking too much. The undersigned replied that quite a bit of information pertaining to AMWORLD was coming across his desk and that it appeared to come from AMWORLD-2. When sufficient details are available it will be called to the attention of the Consejo and AMBIDDY-1, but in the meantime A-19 can remind A-2 to keep quiet about AMWORLD business.

5. Infiltration candidate Pablo Roberto FERNANDEZ Perez, PDCM

Guantanamo, Oriente Province 7 June 1916 may be identical with the subject of an AMOT report listing him as candidate for councilman of Guantanamo City Hall on the PSP slate during the Grau regime and stating that his son is private secretary to Carlos Olivares, Undersecretary of Foreign Relations Ministry of the GOC. A-19 was so informed and was asked to have an investigation made, taking into consideration both the CI and operational leads aspects of the matter.

6. [redacted] Guertler asked what her function was with AMWORLD. A-19 admitted that he was surprised to see her name on the payroll. She is working with [redacted] in intelligence. She has all the lesbian contacts in the city and knows everything that goes on. Nothing can be done about it because she is another "woman of confidence" of AMBIDDY-1.

7. The Case Officer brought up the matter of telephone security, the possibility that A-19's private line and his home phone could be tapped, and suggested the use of pay phones for operational calls, especially to the Consejo. In order to make use of direct dialing A-19 could call the Consejo giving his number and await the return call. (The Consejo might want to bring this up with A-1) According to A-19 [redacted] group is monitoring all calls to AMYUM headquarters but he does not think his private line (the one used by GUERTLER) is monitored. In reply to the Case Officer's question A-19 said that A-1 does his business calls from his home, i.e. the house of his mistress. The Case Officer commented that this fact was known to another group (unspecified) and let the matter drop.

8. The reason for the blown AMYUM safe house: While the AMYUMS were on the roof stringing the antenna one of them drove his car onto the lawn of the neighbor so that it would be in the shade of the neighbor's tree. Naturally the neighbor came out to see what was going on. He did see. As A-19 said, when he learned of the incident he had to laugh (albeit somewhat hysterically). The only alternative would be to kill the idiot. Guertler agreed. We can only hope that the next safe house will be very isolated.

Warren K. Guertler

CONTACT REPORT # 55

OPERATION: AMWORLD

DATE TYPED: 7 Apr 64

CONTACT: AMYUN-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1630 Hrs., 6 Apr 64, S/H

SUMMARY

1. Attached are two recent reports covering the activities of Jose Elias aka Nacin. The Habana contact, [redacted] has informed AMYUN that if he can be picked up he will be able to come to the WAVE area for about 15 days for debriefing and training. The Razon Mondejar Cid, aka "el diablo" mentioned as having been released by the G-2 and waiting for exfiltration is currently in the WAVE area, having escaped with four others. According to A-19 they have been interviewed by ODURGE and were told to have no contact with any other PBRUMEN groups because they could receive special training and be sent back to work against AMTHUG. The AMYUN have been debriefing the five for several days with the same idea in mind. GUERTLER will get the reports when the debriefings are over. A-19 has not gotten the preliminary reports but says Alonso is impressed with Mondejar. As for the exfiltration of Nievares AMYUN has no intention of attempting it but A-19 is considering offering the opportunity to do so to Aldo Vera (see below).

2. Aldo VERA Serafin (201-326634) This subject is a former member of the DTI, recently considered for use in an attempt to defect a GOC official in Madrid. The AMYUNS consider him a good action type and sought him out with the intention of infiltrating him and his group into Habana province. He is presently receiving special training for the job. Vera's file generally substantiates A-19's evaluation of the man. However, local traces do contain unsubstantiated accusations that he is a G-2 and that he maintains contacts with alleged G-2 agents and informers. An ODEIVY report in 1963 said that Vera was engaged in transmitting and receiving messages by radio with Cuba. The Case Officer informed A-19 that while he had nothing definite to offer by way of proof he had some doubts about Vera and cited the above. A-19 says that Vera does have radio contact with friends in Habana (voice) and that he offered his radio facilities to AMYUN. Assuming that Vera himself is clean, A-19 was cautioned to have all internal contacts checked out and to obtain a complete report on Vera's plans before making any commitments. The undersigned continues to have some reservations but Verawas requested by AMSHAG-1, and A-19 likes him so far. Guertler will pursue the matter further at a later meeting.

3. AMILILAC-2 has been told by ODURGE that as long as AMYUN requests permission for him to leave the country he will be blackballed. (see previous reports for reason for blackballing). According to A-19 ODURGE suggested that if he was to be used he could be taken out as a crewman on the Adelaide. A-19 wanted to know if it was RUBARK that was keeping him on the list. Guertler pleaded ignorance

and remarked that it could be for any number of reasons completely unrelated to his past relations with KUBARK.

8. 16 PRQ Is were turned over for traces. The various group leaders are continuing to recruit for their groups. The Case Officer suggested that they might employ their time more profitably by working with what they already have and leave the recruiting to AMYUM-23. A-19 agreed that the system had to be changed in fact. It was changed in theory some time ago. Guertler suggested that it would be a lot easier on all concerned to look for people with the qualifications to fill existing slots instead of the present procedure of looking for jobs to give all the volunteers that present themselves. After having screened at least a thousand volunteers we still keep getting PRQs on potential cooks or people for whom no specific job exists but who are considered "very good boys". A-19 agreed. Probably nothing will change.

WARREN K. GUERTLER

Miami, Fla. 25 March 64

From: [REDACTED]

Re: Report #9

To: ANYUM-19

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED BY OUR AGENT MACIN SINCE LAST REPORT
DATED MARCH 16 64.

Report of MR. MARIO CASAS WHO WORKS WITH SP-1 IN THE RAILWAY SECTOR
OF ORIENTE.

He informs that in Guantanamo, Oriente the railway sector has organized a cell. It is composed of: Pablo Eduardo, Coordinator; Jose Sanchez, Vice (coordinator); Luis, Organization and Romualdo, Military Coordinator, promising to advise later on who the Treasurer is.

He also advises that railway equipment continues in the same state: breakages, accidents and stoppages at the Sugar Centrals for lack of sugar cane and transport equipment. They continue to move equipment and troops at night in large scale. The opinion is that this movement is merely a bluff.

REPORT OF [REDACTED] OF HAVANA, KNOWN BY BEFUY.

Advices he is anxious to have news and instructions from us; states that altho' true that he has made a pact with us, he will not be able to continue under present conditions. Insists it is necessary he be given plans of concrete jobs and instructions he can give the men who are anxious to fight over there; that as long as this does not happen, he feels he is only on the border of activities and while we may be satisfied, he would not like to land anyone (in Cuba) specially under the present circumstances where repression throughout the islands tremendous.

He insists we be sincere with him and give him replies to these various points: What has the National Direction in Exile of the MRR resolved concerning the "NIE" and its integrated organizations. "What plans will they carry out (his group) in the internal fight for the liberation of Cuba? Secondly: "We urgently need a more effective communication; hoping that you already have the necessary means.- On our part, we are already in contact and making arrangements with embassies for the correspondence with Miami.- We'll advise you the results." - Thirdly: "It is necessary that you urgently answer me if we can make contact with the American boats stationed in front of Havana, in order to exfil "DIABLO" and other compatriots who are in much danger". We have the necessary ship to transport them. The boat will give 3 flashes at one minute intervals each with a lapse of 10 to 15 minutes." "I ask you to try and do what you can to help these brothers in misfortune." Fourth - "On the 13th (March) one of our men, "Michael Adam" left for Lebanon via Mexico with correspondence for the address in Miami". - Fifth - Dr. Conen's contact has not proved as effective as we had hoped; we have not only twice and nothing else has happened."

Miami, 5 April 1964

FROM:

TO : AMYUM-19

REPORT DATED 27 MARCH 1964 RECEIVED FROM OUR AGENT "NACIN"

In a letter dated 27 March 1964 Agent "Nacin" says to SUSPEND THE PRODUCTION OF PASSES FOR THE GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE, of three colors and with different specifications which were ordered according to samples or patterns he had sent, because the Castro Regime announced that as of 5 April they would be changed. That as soon as he can obtain the new models he will send them so that 50 copies of each color can be made.

Bernardo NIEVARES, more known as "BENNY", in a report dated 18 March 1964, says that Ramon MONDEJAR Cid, known as "EL DIABLO" has been set free, together with four other men who were arrested with him, and now all five have been relieved of all activity for security reasons and are waiting in Havana to leave the country.

He adds that if there is a delay in complying with the promise of getting them out of Cuba, he will have to do it himself.

He also reports that Michel ADAM was able to leave Cuba through the Lebanese Embassy, where he took refuge, and is now at the following address: "HORAT YAR'CHI NIGDALYA, Zagartha, Lebanon".

Regarding Intelligence Reports, he says that he could do much more in that respect, but he has to avoid contacting men whom he cannot brief on our situation, and the state of desperation which exists among them in Cuba. From what Nacin sees from Benny's messages, he says that he does not have other orientations to give him, and that he has to continue in the same conditions as he has been until now. He says that the person who brought that message refused to establish contacts, and requested to

**OTHER INFORMATION OF BERNARDO NIEVARES, OF HAVANA, KNOWN BY "BERRY",
ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE**

Proclaims having knowledge that in the place known as "La Puntilla", at the mouth of the river Almendares, there exists large quantities of anti-air batteries, among them "4 barrels", and other major types.

They have also observed large quantities of anti-air artillery in the "Cubanacan" development, along the coast, in front of Villanueva University. This same type has also been observed along the coast of Baracoa, Barlevento development, where they have "4 barrels" and other pieces of major size.

At the Hotel Nacional of Havana, they changed the "4 barrel" anti-air to long range anti-air cannons.

Between the towns of Bahia Honda and Cebanas, there is a Tank Camp where it is calculated there are about 300 tanks of various sizes.

He professes to have knowledge that on the road which goes from La Botonda of Guanabo to the road to Guanabacoa, there is a Russian Camp where there is a large amount of "rockets".- It is believed they are long range by their size; since they did not see this size at the last military parade they had in Havana.

On the 23th of Jan 64, 25 trailers with this type of cargo were seen on this road; this took place around dawn.

He states: "below I list the various acts of sabotage committed by "HIR" in Havana province:

At the "Josefita" central in Nueva Paz, Havana province, a piece of steel was put into the sugarcane grinder causing great damage.

In the zone of Nueva Paz, Palos and San Nicolas de Bari, in Havana Province, they caused 10 roves, causing large losses; all this in the month of January. In the month of February they produced 18 fires at the Municipal terminals of San Nicolas, Alquizar, Quivicap and Guines, also in Havana province; and lastly, between the 2nd and 3rd of March the "HIR" carried out 9 fires between San Nicolas de Bari and Nueva Paz, destroying more than 300,000 arrobas of sugar cane according to the proper local red authorities.

rapidly answer him because he has to be in Havana early next Saturday and so avoiding things to become complicated.

"Benny" also includes two INTELLIGENCE reports dated 20 March 1964 in which he says:

"The Air Force Captain, Remigio GONZALEZ Espinosa, is being actively sought by the G-2. The charges are that he took apart the controls of five "MIG-21's" on 2 March 1964, one day before practices, in the town of Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province, provoking the crashing of a "MIG-21" in which the pilot, Captain DOMINGUEZ Blas, and a woman photographer of the "FAR" lost the lives."

The other report says:

"Soldier Armando GUEVARA L., was declared a REBEL because he did not agree with the Government, was captured by the G-2 in Guaimaro, Oriente Province, at the beginning of March 1964 and was executed the 14th of the same month."

CONCLUSIONS: This acting officer says that, according with what was reported by Bernardo NIEVARES, known as "BENNY", in his reports to Nacin, regarding the news that the G-2 set 5 men free: Ramon MONDEJAR Cid, known more as "El Diablo", together with 4 other men, it is to be noted that actually, Ramon MONDEJAR Cid and the other four men, Pablo Gilberto VARGAS Diaz; Ramon NIEVES Guirao, known as "RAMON I"; Jose ARAGON MILIAN, known as "CARRAGUAO" and Rodolfo LICOR Montesinos arrived to this city on 2 April 1964 by clandestinely by boat, after they succeeded to arrive 20 miles away from Cuban coasts, where they were picked up by the U.S. Coast-guard and taken to Key West, Fla., where they underwent interrogations by the American Immigration Authorities and now are free in this city of Miami, Fla.

That all have been located by the undersigned and interrogated separately.

As soon as the job is finished, the results of these interrogations will be passed on to the Superior Offices for information.

That the undersigned took note and suspended all production of the passes for the Naval Base which were previously received, waiting to receive the new passes offered in this report.

CONTACT REPORT #56

OPERATION : AMWORLD

DATE TYPED: 10 Apr. 64

CONTACT: AMBIDY-1, AMJAVA-4, AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1030-2400 Hrs., 9 Apr. S/H

SUMMARY

1. The Case Officer confirmed that A-1 had definitely decided not to attempt Operation Genesis and will mount Operation Zenon instead. The undersigned agreed that this was a wise decision since the latest reports indicated increasing hostile naval activity in the area, making chances for survival extremely slight, and reminded A-1 of his recent speech in which he stated that AMWORLD propaganda was in support of military operations and not the reverse, hinting that AMBANG would sacrifice his men for the sake of publicity for himself. A military operation, even if it failed completely would not be as harmful as an obvious publicity stunt that cost lives and equipment. A-1 appeared to accept the necessity for postponing Genesis but was obviously disappointed at not being able to land his sharpshooter to take a shot at the guest of honor during the military review.
2. A-1 and A-4 were given the sequence of Q signs to be transmitted during the test run of the signal plan to be used during the op. The Case Officer reminded A-1 to tell his people that the transmissions will come from one of his bases, and to make certain that the captain of the Adelaide has his copy of the key. The writer suggested that A-1 merely inform that ship to monitor the frequency and to report to A-1 what signals were received and what action would have been taken.
3. Guertler asked that the Consejo be informed of the Q signs to be used by the Adelaide and the intermediate craft and the base. A-4 said that it would be sent up by radio.
4. The writer suggested that the hourly position reports be started right away to be certain that all would function smoothly during the operation. Since around-the-clock monitoring of the ships' transmissions will interfere with Disneyland communications with other bases a second radio will be required. One of the agent radios will be taken to the base.
5. A-18 has not located a site for the WAVE transmitter. [] has several prospects and A-18 will inspect them and inform the Case Officer soonest. In the meantime, Guertler suggested using the AMYUM office since amidst all the confusion it would probably not attract attention. A-4 was also reminded to furnish us with the signal plan for the WAVE [] link. (The plans to communicate with [] were abandoned. Commo will be with Disneyland)
6. The complete operational plan for Zenon was turned over to the Case Officer on 10 Apr. The essentials were cabled to headquarters.

The remainder will follow by Dispatch.

7. Guertler suggested Curacao as a suitable place for drydocking Adelaida for needed repairs after the operation. A-1 demurred, stating that it would be needed for an infiltration op on 3 May. A-19 was told that it was of the utmost importance that the AKL Dolores be provided with a top quality captain and engineer, regardless of cost or nationality, that the equipment was very sensitive and was irreplaceable. A-19 stated that it would be a problem, especially the engineer, but that he would do so. Guertler offered no suggestions where to look, merely commenting that not that AMWORLD had made many commercial contacts he should be able to obtain assistance in locating a good man for the job.

8. The complete crew for the Dolores has not been signed yet. Some of the crew from the Adelaida can fill in while she is in drydock.

9. A-19 was told that the Consejo was negotiating for Standard Oil of New Jersey to provide AMWORLD with its fuel on a regular basis and that the company wanted a letter from some prominent Nicaraguan official stating that this was acceptable to the GON.

10. The Case Officer asked A-19 if AMWORLD-2 had closed his account for certain. A-19 replied yes. The writer then told him that that was good because the \$25,000 used to open the account would be refunded to A-2 and that instead of returning it to the Consejo they could keep it and we would deduct the amount from the next month's budget (they have spent most of it already). Shocked looks around the table. They have already spent most of it. It was included in the unexpended assets reported three months ago and was deducted succeeding month's deposit. Henry said we could spend it. The writer professed surprise since this money was not allocated to the project but was only to be used to keep the account open. This led to a series of complaints about PBPRIME business methods, the fact that Ramsay Scarlet has recently billed them for \$30,000 for something incurred in November, and was that any way to run a business. The writer commented that they just didn't understand anglo-saxon psychology and called it an evening, wishing them the best of luck on their operation.

Warren K. Guertler

This will be discussed with A-1 later, after the operation.

CONTACT REPORT # 57

OPERATION: AMWORLD

DATE TYPED: 14 Apr. 64

CONTACT: AMYUN-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1630, 13 Apr. 64, S/H

SUMMARY

1. 22 PRQ Is turned over for traces.
2. As per UFGW-3513 A-19 was reminded that in the future it was absolutely necessary that the AMWORLD monthly accounting be received on time, otherwise our payments may be delayed.
3. Payroll changes: Guertler discussed the payroll changes noted in UFGW-3490. The two crewmen mentioned were terminated for being AWOL but were carried for two months before being told that they would not be given another chance. The two examples cited for pay increases are explained by the fact that while the two men were still in the WAVE area they received no family allotment. They are not at the camps and so are being paid more. A-19 was reminded that the insurance forms must be submitted in order for an AMWORLDER to be covered and that if a person is terminated all coverage ceases and will not be resumed automatically if the person is re-hired. A-19 says he understands this perfectly and will keep us up to date on all hirings and firings.
4. A-19 was reminded that some of the PRQ Is submitted for traces are unnecessarily vague, citing the case of one submitted from Puerto Rico on Oscar RODRIGUEZ Fernandez. The subjects record of employment lists "Secret Police" without indicating when or for what government.
5. The Case Officer told A-19 that the Consejo had learned that [redacted] may wish to contact AMBIDDY-1 and that they might prove useful and should be given a hearing. A-19 replied that BLANCO had been trying to see him for two weeks but that he had been stalling because he did not know what he could do with him at this stage of the project. The Case Officer recommended that he should be given a chance since he might prove useful in the future. A-19 said that he would get in touch with him.

6. Guertler asked A-19 if he knew the circumstances surrounding the case of Blas COMAS Castro, captain of a JURE boat reported to be in trouble after having received a letter from AMBIDDY-1 thanking him for signing up for AMWORLD. A-19 said that he would check, but as far as he knew the man must have filled out a form, and that it was not a frameup.

7. Ramon MONDEJAR Cid and the other members of the M.I.D. recently arrived from Habana have been completely debriefed by the AMYUM intelligence section. Very little was revealed by them during their processing at the Refugee Center, but they have been very cooperative with the AMYUMS. They have been kept isolated from the rest of the PBRUMEN community with the intention of training them and sending them back. A-19 would like to use Aldo VERA Serafin's group to reinfiltrate this group and pick up the Habana coordinator, Bernardo NIEVARES. Now that Nacin is not available, having been kicked out of YOACRE (at KUBARK request, according to A-19) the AMYUMS have no way to contact NIEVARES. A-19 mentioned using his embassy contacts to do this, but the writer strongly urged him to keep this group completely compartmented from any other groups. So far MONDEJAR has made a very favorable impression on his interviewers but very little is known about the coordinator, Benny NIEVARES. Guertler suggested that A-19 should have these people questioned about what they know of NIEVARES, the circumstances surrounding their recruitment. This group was sent with the specific mission of contacting AMBIDDY-1 and asking for material help. From what is known of this organization it seems quite likely to be a provocation, and as A-19 admits, these people are either unusually competent or completely controlled. A-19 wants to put them to the test by providing them with sub material and asking them to hit a specific target before discussing the matter of further financial or material aid.

Warren K. Guertler

SECRET

9 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDY-1, 9 April 1964,
1315 hours

1. The following was relayed to AMBIDY-1: "We are glad you have second thoughts about Playa Giron. We have received more information about military, especially maritime, build-up in that sector which would make any landing attempt virtually suicidal." AMBIDY-1 stated he would confer with AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 and give us his final decision as to whether or not this operation would be run. AMBIDY-1 commented that one life meant more to him than the entire operation. However, A-1 again reminded this office of the impact an attack on Playa Giron on the 17th of April would have on the morale of the Cuban people. The undersigned replied that there are two sides to the coin; should their operation fail, this would play into the hands of Castro, and it was the opinion of this office that the alternate plan would also do much to raise the morale of the Cuban people.

2. In conclusion it was reaffirmed to A-1 that the final decision is his. He replied that after his meeting with AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 he will let us know the final decision.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WE/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 201
Conversations
Op Genesis

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
charged privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

AMHIDDY-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMHIDDY-1 and Martin

DATE : 9 April 1964, at 2000 hours


1. AMHIDDY-1 stated he had been unable to obtain the address of the Tampa barge and he was leaving this matter to AMXUM-19.
2. Concerning the DC-3, A-1 stated that Mamel Hernandez had talked to Petroaky. Petroaky did send a letter to Talaria instead of Carrillo as A-1 had informed this office before. A-1 will get a complete story from Hernandez upon arrival in Costa Rica. A-1 was advised to move the DC-3 to Panama under some pretext before Talaria notifies Carrillo of the cancellation of the charter. The logic behind this is should Carrillo decide to cause some trouble it would be difficult for the DC-3 to leave Costa Rica.
3. In conclusion the undersigned conveyed to A-1 our wishes for a successful operation.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WM/SA/NO/HH

File: Logistics
C-47

✓
Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 9 April 1964

1. A-1 will obtain the address of the Tampa barge today and call our office. A-1 is departing for Nicaragua on 10 April via Lanica at 0730.
2. Mammel Hernandez has gone to Panama and should have returned to Costa Rica by now. A-1 will report on Hernandez' findings upon his arrival in Costa Rica.
3. A-1 told not to forget the budget before his departure. The quarterly charter payment to Talaria for the C-47 is due this month.
4. Petrosky will send a letter to Carrillo stating he would like to charter a C-47. Carrillo will then write back saying that he has a C-47 to sub-let. A-1 hopes that this exchange between Carrillo and Petrosky will culminate in the C-47 being based in Panama.
5. The undersigned asked A-1 if he had his Q signals to be used for the operation. A-1 stated he does have them.
6. A-1 was requested to send the list of those expelled.
7. A-1 should make certain that the [redacted]
[redacted]
8. After signing the [redacted]
[redacted]
9. A-1 was advised that someone should now be working on the registration of the DOLORES.
10. We would appreciate A-1 following up on his visa while in [redacted]
11. The following was passed to A-1 concerning the village radios: Will arrive in [redacted] at 1425 hours on 10 April, Pan Am flight no [redacted] Air Bill number is Pan Am 026-4-674334. Consists of 27 packages, weighing 2,014. Has been prepaid \$603.00. Consignee: Consolidated Electrical Equipment Co. It is identified as transceivers and batteries. No. 20753 appears on each case along with the address.

Above conversation conducted
in rearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

12. The batteries shipped by Pan American to [] for use with village radios are dry-charged and "electrolyte" must be added to batteries before they are used. Specifically, "electrolyte" is sulfuric acid and distilled water mixed to a specific gravity of 1.275. "Electrolyte" is available from any filling station or automobile garage. You will need 20 gallons of "electrolyte". This liquid could not be shipped on commercial aircraft.


13. Radios do not have consular invoice which is normal. A-1 stated he could handle the situation.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WM/SC/SC/HH

*Ambeddy-1 201 ✓
Conversations
log
C-47*

Above conversation conducted
in presence frequently
changed privacy code.

SECRET



C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba
SUBJECT Political Philosophy of Manuel Artime Buesa
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR. 9 April 1964
NO. PAGES 2
REFERENCE:

DATE OF INFO. 18 March 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (6 April 1964)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A Cuban exile observer who was present during the speech.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a résumé of the political philosophy of Manuel Artime Buesa, leader of the Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria (MRR, Movement for Revolutionary Recovery) as prepared by Source. It is based on statements made by Artime in his speech on 18 March 1964 to the Asociación para Recuperación Económica de Cuba (AREC, Association for Economic Recovery of Cuba), on his first publication entitled Comunismo por qué? (Communism for what?), which was written nine months before Castro came to power, and on Artime's book Traición (Betrayal).

1. Artime does not believe in political extremes -- neither the left nor the right. He believes that extremes always end by touching one another. If any extreme gains power in Cuba, and in the case of the extreme right by imposing a dictatorship, he will continue to fight with weapons in hand. Artime does not believe in the classification of men by race, by political ranks in former governments, or by money. He confesses to being an opportunist in the sense that he is taking maximum advantage of each opportunity, but not in the sense of changing his beliefs in accord with opportunities.
2. The main theme of Comunismo por qué? was that more than a change in government a change in the conscience of men is needed. It outlined the duties of the padrón (landowner) toward the workers so that the latter may live in dignity and honor. The padron should feel that the problems of his workers are also his problems. The worker, in turn, has certain obligations to the padron. If this quid pro quo is not adhered to, a (Christian) government has the right to intervene for the common good. In his letter of resignation to Fidel Castro accusing the latter of being a

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	DEF	OSD	FBI	2
REPCINCLANT	CINCPAC	TREASURY	USIA	I&NS					

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#")

SA/EOB	3	SA/BI	1	SA/PAC	1	LX-1090
SA/Intol	1	SA/WAVE	1	SA/MADR	1	NO PROJECT
SA/R	3	SA/BO/HH	(1)			CSDB-3/660,494
SA/CI	2			CI/OPS/WH	2	
SA/MOB	1					
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DODS 1, WH (1), WH/BA 12 (1), WE 1 (1)						
Liaison & WH/SA/BO/HH						COORDINATING REL. INT. HWT

Communist and traitor. Arttime mentioned that he resigned because Castro had not been honest with the businessmen by not telling them their property would be confiscated.

3. The following excerpts from Arttime's book Traicion clearly outline Arttime's ideology:

- a. "We believe the state should foment and stimulate private economy, both national and foreign. We have to have an effective democracy in Latin America because the word democracy in that area has been prostituted too often. Many countries call themselves democratic but in reality are nothing but militarist and demagogic, and many simply go through the motions of elections. Many are simply totalitarian governments which are living off the blood and toil of the people. The corrupt politicians, the strong men, the totalitarians have been the strongest allies of Communism. Our fight is not against one man, it is not a war of personal hatred--it is a war against the doctrine of hatred, be it called Castro or what have you--it is a war against a doctrine; we are as much opposed to Khrushchev as we are against Tito. We are as much opposed to the totalitarian left as we are opposed to the fascist right."
- b. "We don't care if they call us extremist. They will continue to call us rightist or leftist, fascist, philocommunist. I recall the words of Don Quixote when he was passing on the outskirts of a small town and Sancho said to Don Quixote, 'Sir, the dogs are barking at us,' Don Quixote replied, 'Let them, Sancho, if they are barking it is because we are moving. And we will continue to move.'"
- c. "They say we are very ambitious. Our ambition is that in the coming days when Cuba is liberated people will pronounce our name with respect in our country."
- d. "Our men in Cuba are not only fighting for the independence of our country but also for the independence of the American hemisphere, for the survival of Christian principles in America, for the Western world." Arttime maintains that the situation today is much the way Lenin would have hoped for. Britain and France have recognized Red China; the U.S. is at odds with these two governments--this is exactly what Lenin would have wanted. Arttime has supported his statements, by quoting Lenin, "Within 30 years we will embark on a peace offensive, of coexistence, and we will split the free nations and smash the impotent bourgeois."
- e. "The battle-ground for Latin America lies 20 miles from our shores. Should the Western world lose this battle, the sleeping giant (Latin America) will wake up on the side of the Communist camp. Then it would be preferable to be dead because the free world will have ceased to be."
- f. "We are all guilty for having turned over Cuba to the hands of men who could not govern her properly. We have knocked on doors and will continue to do so because our cause is honorable. We cannot afford to wait for miracles. We must prepare for a long fight and not expect the aid of such organizations as the OAS and the UN. It is up to the Cubans to liberate Cuba. If we are not going to wage a war of principles, I will not join that struggle."

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

8 April 1964


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 8 April 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 informed he had sent man to Tampa to obtain exact location of Tampa barge; he hopes to have the address later today.
2. A-1 is leaving for Central America on Friday, 10 April. Does not expect to return until latter end of April.
3. A-1 was asked to make certain his financial request to the Consejo is in our office by 15 April. Two papers should be in our possession by the aforementioned date: the form for last month's expenditures plus request to Consejo for \$225,000. If these papers are not in our hands by the specified date it will result in unavoidable delay which will make them unable to meet their bill by the beginning of the following month. A-1 assured the undersigned the deadline would be met.
4. A-1 was advised that during the operational phase ANYUM-19 must be available to either Mike or the Consejo at all times. We will not accept any excuse should we wish to contact A-19 and are unable to do so. A-1 stated that A-19 will be on call.
5. ADELAIDA to depart from Disneyland on its first operation on 11 April at 1500 hours (local time, which according to A-1 is one hour less than Washington time).
6. A-1 requested the Consejo supply him with more detailed maps of the city of Playa Giron for Rafael Alvarez. A-1 was told we would check into the matter. Today ANYUM-19 is to give

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2

Mike GEIDEL (A) complete schedule for first operation, e.g.
ETD, course of ship, ETA, etc.

7. The undersigned advised A-1 we would like to talk to
him by telephone tomorrow after we talk to Carl concerning
final aspects of the operation.

Raul J. Hernandez

File:


Finance

Sabotage

Conversations

AMSIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

SECRET



SECRET

8 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1


DATE : 8 April 1964, 1500 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 was questioned regarding the present status of the Norwegian engineer, his whereabouts, their plans for his use, etc. A-1 said he didn't know the answer, would have to check with AMJAVA-4, and would call us tomorrow with all the details.
2. A-1 was told that the technicians who are to receive training aboard the Dolores should be ready to leave for New York by 15 April. As the van will be shipped directly, it will only be possible to train the technicians on the Dolores. We will be able to train up to ten technicians, and A-1 should send as many as he wants to. We will let AMYUM-19 know on Tuesday, 14 April, exactly when and where they should report for training.
3. A-1 was advised that we have the information he requested and he will have it by tomorrow night. A-1 was very pleased to hear this.
4. A-1 said he will call this office tomorrow morning for sure.

B. Hernandez
Bobbie Hernandez
WH/BA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Training
Commo

SECRET



總編輯 吳國光

SECRET

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
CAN BE USED FOR YOUR INFORMATION

ENCLOSURE

EMOCI

ACTION REQUIRED - EXPERIENCES

DISPATCH

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT : Telephone Conversation between AMHIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 7 April 1964


1. It was brought to the attention of AMHIDDY-1 that the MRR is the only Cuban exile organization that has not properly registered with the United States Government. A-1 will attend to the registration.
2. A-1 requested to check his P.O. box.
3. A-1 reported receiving information this morning that ADELAIDA en route to Disneyland.
4. Concerning his visa, he stated he had received an F5 510 form. According to A-1 these forms have to be filled and submitted to the American Embassy in [redacted] A-1 was asked if AMJAVA-4 now has the U. S. re-entry permit. A-4 does presently has the alien resident alien card, but not the re-entry blue book.
5. A-1 was informed that all village radios will be shipped to Bluefields and none would be sent to Miami for him to hand carry. It is hoped that these village radios will arrive in time for the operation. Should this not be the case they have PRC-10s which could serve the same purpose as the village radios.
6. Mr. Mountain is expected to call Sixto Mesa advising the survey has been completed. Mr. Mountain will request Mesa that his three DMH engineers return to the States. A-1 was asked to make sure that Mr. Mountain's message reaches the engineers.
7. The soil sample sent from Nicaragua is still ^{not} in the possession of AMHOLD.
8. A-1 was requested to notify his propaganda personnel not to make any mention of Brazil and their radio broadcasts. A-1 agreed.

Above conversation conducted
in accordance frequently
checked by [redacted]

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/BA/50/HH

cc: AMHIDDY-1 (201)
Conversations

SECRET



SECRET

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 7 April, 1010 hours


1. AMBIDDY-1 confirmed what AMJAVA-4 had related to this office earlier, that is, he wanted one large, two medium and two small village radios. This would suffice for one mothership, two Swifts and two rubber boats to rehearse.
2. A-1 stated the Libernic representative would not be needed [redacted] since all the arrangements have been made. [redacted] has found the charter very acceptable.
3. A-1 was asked flatly if the Adelaida is ready to begin operations. He replied that it is ready.
4. A-1 was advised that we would like to schedule the dry-run for 10 April, if this would be acceptable to him. A-1 agreed with this date.

Also conversation conducted
to prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Dolores

✓
SECRET



SECRET

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 6 April, 2000 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 began the conversation by announcing that he had dismissed seventeen frogmen from AMWORLD and "the next ax to fall" will be on the mothership ADELAIDA.

2. At this time A-1 was informed that the people who had trained Munne were very satisfied with his performance and Munne is now considered capable of being captain of ADELAIDA.

3. A-1 expects to leave for []
[] on 9 or 10 April.


4. A-1 would like to have the dry run of the operation scheduled between 9-11 April. The operations will commence on 12 April.

5. A-1 was told the idea of using the DMJM engineers has been cancelled. A-1 sounded very pleased and stated they were too elaborate for his operation. However, A-1 would like that the survey conducted by the American engineers be submitted to him. A-1 was advised that since he paid \$31,000 for this survey it will be submitted to him by the American engineers. A-1 was also advised that we are conducting a survey of our own which will be sent to him. Our project centers around using the Tampa barge as a floating dock. A-1 commented that AMJAVA-4 had had the same idea. A-1 was asked to send us the exact address of the Tampa barge.

6. A-1 has obtained his visa papers []

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

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7. A-1 would like to have several of the village radios sent to him in Miami in order to hand carry them [redacted] A-1 was informed we would have to check into the matter.

8. Upon arriving in Miami, A-1 accidentally met [redacted] The latter stated he is going to Egypt, Italy and West Germany. On his return he will stop in Washington to speak to President Johnson and Attorney General Kennedy concerning "his plan."

9. Regarding [redacted], A-1 mentioned he had no trouble obtaining the contract for the Dolores from the General. A-1 will get the document on his next trip [redacted]

10. A-1 was asked if there were any difficulties [redacted] A-1 stated there was "a little trouble," but nothing of major importance. [redacted] had spoken to A-1 during his last visit and the former had stated that there would be some grumbling on the part of the [redacted] but this was intended only to placate the opposition. [redacted] is scheduled to be operated on for an ulcer on 7 April. Should there be any need to deal with the [redacted] Government, A-1 will deal directly with [redacted]. A-1 expects to see the [redacted] on his next tour through Central America. (There was no indication during this portion of the conversation that AMWORLD would be asked to leave [redacted]) A-1 was asked if he still stood by his original guess on [redacted] age, that is, 73. Martin informed A-1 that reports we had received indicated him to be in his 50's. A-1 stated if he is 50 he looks like 73. A-1 asked if we wanted to know his exact age. A-1 was told not to go to any trouble to obtain it; we would just like to know for our own information.

11. Reports received by A-1 indicate Adelaida should presently be at Disneyland.


Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH"

File:
AMBIDY-1 n201 ✓
Conversations
[redacted]

DMJM
Munne

Above conversation conducted
in rearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



DISPATCH**SECRET****PROCESSING****TO**
Chief, Special Affairs Staff**INFO****FROM**
Chief of Station, JMWAVE**SUBJECT**
RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

Speeches of Manuel Artine Buesa

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

Reference : None

Transmitted herewith are three AMOT reports concerning recent public appearances of Manuel ARTINE Buesa which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

END OF DISPATCH**Attachments: H/W**

AMOT Report DD-742 - 1 cy

AMOT Report DD-745 - 1 cy

AMOT Report DD-764 - 1 cy

Distribution:

3 - SAB, w/att/h/w

CS COPY

AMOT	FI
REF	REF
ABSTRACT	INDEX

201-267437

19-124-27/3

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
SECRET	

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
3 APR 64	
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFGA-18133	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
19-124-27/3	

1 att.

S E C R E T

Report # DD-742.

20 Mar 64

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Appearance of Manuel ARTIME Buesa at the A.R.E.C. Session on 18 Mar 64 in the Everglades Hotel, Miami.

At exactly 1550 hours, 18 Mar 64, Manuel ARTIME Buesa appeared before A.R.E.C. members. ARTIME spoke for one hour and twenty minutes, finishing his speech at 1710 hours. During that time he answered questions from the audience.

ARTIME dedicated the first hour of his speech to "presenting his credentials" (that is how he called what he was going to say). During that hour he gave a recount of his actions, beginning with the letter of resignation which he sent to Fidel CASTRO in Cuba, and then reading excerpts from things published in exile by the M.R.R. and from his "Political Testament" which he claimed to have written in the Guatemala training base in the 24 hours preceding the departure for the Bay of Pigs invasion, etc., etc., up to the present time. He finished that part of his speech by declaring that he respected the Constitution of 1940, that he was fighting against a system not against one man, and that he would continue to fight after the fall of Fidel CASTRO but if another dictatorship were established in Cuba—either a rightist or a leftist dictatorship—or if it was simply an attempt to exchange Fidel for another person, no matter who it might be.

Then he said that many persons said he was an extreme rightist and others said he was an extreme leftist, that others said he was an ambitious individual, and others said he was an opportunist. That all he could answer to those who said he was an extremist was that he did not like extremes, either of the right or left, because these extremes always ended by touching each other. That to those who said he was an ambitious individual he replied that yes, he was ambitious, but that his ambition was for his name to be spoken with respect some day in his country. That he had the ambition that at least, after his death, it would be said: He was a worthy man. That, in short, what he had was a great ambition for History. That to those who said he was an opportunist he could say: "If opportunism is making use of every moment and every opportunity to do something for the country, I am an opportunist. If opportunism is

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Att. 145GA: 15173

201-267437

S E C R E T

Report # DD-742, C-4, 20 Mar 64 (cont.)

changing ideas in accordance with this or that situation, then I am not an opportunist because I do not change my ideas. I have upheld the same ideas since I appeared in the public light, and they are here in my Political Testament and in other declarations and documents which I have made and written. For those reasons I cannot be an opportunist." He also said that he had knocked, was knocking and would continue to knock on all doors to get assistance for the liberation of Cuba. That he classified men into two categories only, worthy men and unworthy men, and there were no other differences. That to him all men were equal, be they black or white, rich or poor, members of one regime or of another. That he has known and knows many worthy men from all regimes, etc., etc., etc.

Questions and Answers:

Following are some of the most outstanding questions and answers:

Question: A man who said he was named Filiberto RIVERO and that he worked for a TV station at Los Angeles, California, asked the following question. "Mr. ARTIME, I am going to ask you a strong question which therefore requires a previous explanation. Some time ago one of your representatives in Los Angeles told me you would be going to that city and I was going to ask you this question, but you did not go. Now that I have the opportunity I am going to ask this question to you. The question is this: In Los Angeles and other places there are rumors that in certain U.S. circles, which are described as extreme liberals, they have the plan of using some Cubans--like you, for example--to keep the rest of the Cubans entertained making them think they will go to war when the fact is that their plan is very different. The plan consists of not having that war and thus be able to show, in a few years, how peaceful coexistence is possible. My question is this: Have you ever considered that you might be the Cuban who has been chosen for this and that you might still not be aware of it?"

Answer: I don't know whether such a plan exists or not, what I can guarantee to you is that I would not be the Cuban chosen for that. I am precisely supported by the group which is opposed to those liberals, by the group of Latin American men who fear just that, not by the U.S.

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S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

Report # DD-742, C-4, 20 Mar 64 (cont.)

but by the countries of those Latin Americans. I am a Latin American product, not another kind of product. I am receiving help from Latin America and that is why I cannot be chosen for that plan. Maybe others are being selected for that. (Ovation.)

Question: A lady in the audience, not a member of A.R.E.C., who said she was a teacher from Las Villas province, Cuba, asked the next question. She began by saying in brief words the help which she had given to insurgents in Las Villas province, etc., etc., and that she had had to leave Cuba because three of her boys had been executed. Then she asked ARTIME: "Why isn't help given to those insurgents?"

Answer: ARTIME said that he did not understand Americans. Then he said that last week, precisely last week, help had been sent to those insurgents. That unfortunately it was not all that it should be, but it was something. He explained that it is necessary to use small and fast boats and for that reason heavy cargoes cannot be taken, and that it is only possible to make two trips in one night to the Cuban coast and for that reason the help cannot be more effective. That at any rate, they were infiltrating arms, shoes, boots, food and technicians in the handling of armament. He clarified that the function of the technicians was to teach the handling of weapons to the peasants and also to unite them. ARTIME then told the same lady that the person for whom she was asking was precisely where he could help those over there, and for that reason was not in that room. (He was referring to a person for whom the lady had inquired when he accompanied her from the seat to the microphone, as the lady spoke very softly and the audience asked her to go to the microphone to ask her question so all could hear her.)

Question: Another member of the audience asked the following questions: "Mr. ARTIME, we understand--through announcements that have been published--that Mr. RAY or JURE will go to Cuba in the coming months, and there are rumors about another organization doing the same thing. Are you thinking in some action of that type to counteract the effects of these possible actions, in favor of your movement?"

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S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

Report # DD-742, C-4, 20 Mar 64 (cont.)

Answer: ARTIME gave the following answer: "If they go to Cuba, may God be with them. But I hope it won't be a demagogic action in which men will die to give prestige to others. Let me tell you that we don't make public what we do or plan to do. Some people want publicity for their actions, but we put the liberation of Cuba before publicity."

Comments: In the reporting agent's opinion, nothing new was said in this public appearance. The "presentation of credentials" was already too well known to the audience. The only thing which called attention was his clear position of opposing any maneuver to try to impose a "Fidelismo without Fidel" which the majority of the audience interpreted as meaning Manuel RAY Rivero. Even though ARTIME did not name RAY, his implications were quite clear the same as the look on his face when he was asked something in connection with JURE.

S E C R E T

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SECRET

Report GID-745.

23 Mar 64

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted] *CONFIDENTIAL*

SUBJECT: Manuel ARTIE Buesa's appearance before A.R.E.C. on Wednesday, 18 March 1964.

SOURCE: Report from our collaborator [redacted] through direct observation.

Following is a literal transcription of the report from our collaborator [redacted]

"At 3:30 PM, 18 Mar 64, the A.R.E.C. Recording Secretary, Ignacio CANCEJO, read the minutes of the preceding A.R.E.C. session in the conference room of the Everglades Hotel, Miami. The minutes were unanimously accepted by the A.R.E.C. members present.

"Abel MESTRE, A.R.E.C. President, announced that the agenda included Dr. Manuel ARTIE as guest speaker at 4 PM. Then the stand was taken by Gerardo ARISCAN who gave a detailed report on the experiences of the newspaperman John CORP (I am not sure of his patronymic because I only heard it spoken), from Life magazine, on his trips around the world.

"At 3:50 PM Abel MESTRE announced that Dr. ARTIE had just arrived and the audience gave him a standing ovation. It is estimated that there were about 500 persons in the audience.

"According to Francisco PRIETO, who is one of the most active members of A.R.E.C., this was the A.R.E.C. gathering ever attended by the largest number of persons because the normal audience is from 220 to 240 persons.

"There were from 40 to 45 members of the M.R.R. in the audience, and they could be perfectly identified as such because they had the emblem of that organization in the buttonhole of their lapels.

"ARTIE began his speech by making a recount of his activities since 1959, which he called his 'credentials to A.R.E.C.' He mentioned his letter of resignation to CASTRO six months after the establishment of the CASTRO Government, where he said to CASTRO among other things that he should not deceive the industrialists, merchants and live classes of the nation because when industry, commerce and all private possessions passed to the hands of the State that would be Communism. Later he read some paragraphs from the book which he published in exile prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion.

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Report # 22-743, C-27, 23 Mar 54 (cont.)

"ARTIME said that he is an ambitious man because, since he is on Cuban soil, he wants there to be talk everywhere about ARTIME and the liberation of Cuba.

"That some persons accuse him of being a rightist, others of being a leftist, and others of being an opportunist. That persons who work in favor of collective interests always have detractors. As there who accuse him of being an opportunist, he says that if using some opportunity in benefit of the freedom of Cuba is being an opportunist, then he is the first opportunist.

"ARTIME said that previous Cuban rulers had had their mistakes. That when the Constitution of 1940 had been written it had also had its mistakes, but as it functioned rarely we don't know what those mistakes are. For that reason, until the Cuban people give themselves another Constitution our sole goal upon our arrival at Free Cuba should be to enforce the Constitution of 1940.

"He spoke of the Cuban Case in the international field, in the sense that he does not understand the attitude of the U.S. or of the rest of the Latin American countries which are allowing their fields to be taken by Castro-Communist guerrillas. ARTIME mentioned that he has not the slightest hope the O.A.S. will do something in benefit of Cuba.

"A lady from the audience who said she was a teacher from Encarnación, Las Villas province, asked ARTIME why help was not given to her young students who were fighting in Las Villas province without shoes, food or ammunition. She also mentioned that some days ago five of her young boys were executed, including a minor.

"When ARTIME went down among the audience to accompany this lady to the microphone, she whispered a name to ARTIME but the audience could not catch the name. ARTIME replied: 'You have mentioned a name who is not now in this room because he is helping in the liberation of Cuba. He is one of my greatest helpers.' However, ARTIME did not mention the name either.

"ARTIME then said that help is being given to the freedom fighters in Cuba, but that he has very few boats and the boats which go to the

-3-

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DESENSITIZED

S E C R E T

Report 100-745, 8-27, 28 Mar 54 (cont.)

Cuban coast have to be light boats and cannot carry large supplies. That not only rifles are needed, but also shoes, food and other things which they (M.R.R.) are now gradually supplying.

"One of the A.R.E.C. guests in the audience, an unidentified man, asked ARTIME whether it might not be possible that the U.S. Government were using him as an instrument leading to a policy of peaceful coexistence with the USSR, and that he were just someone used to keep people entertained with the Cuban case, naturally, without this being known to ARTIME himself. ARTIME immediately replied that that might be possible because he did not know U.S. policy plans in that respect, but that naturally, if this were confirmed it was certain he would not lend himself to that maneuver.

"ARTIME continued making general considerations about the Cuban military night, and he described Cuba as the 7th country of the world in the aspect of military power. He continued with a comparison between the man who wage war against CASTRO and the Cuban Government, and the story of the giant Goliath represented by CASTRO and the boy David represented by the elements engaging in war activities against CASTRO.

"ARTIME closed by saying that war is the only way of uniting all Cubans and he mentioned that that union had already been achieved at the Bay of Pigs where the blood of Cubans from all ideologies and social classes was mixed.

"ARTIME was questioned about the information appearing in different news media about JUNE ~~arriving in Cuba~~ being in Cuba fighting before the 26th of May, and he replied: 'May God be with them, but we shall never accept any Government of the extreme right, and much less of the extreme left, and in that case we shall continue fighting with the rifle in our hand.' When he finished saying this the audience gave him a standing ovation.

"The event ended with disguised precipitation because there were rumors in the conference room that Pedro Luis DIAZ Lina would arrive to ask questions to ARTIME about his past with CASTRO with the intention of ridiculing ARTIME. (Incidentally, ARNEC gatherings usually end at 6 PM and this one ended at 5 PM.) And in effect, DIAZ Lina arrived at 5:30 PM but the event was already over. Even ARNEC President MESTON was

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Report 022-745, 0-27, 03 11 01 (cont.)

already out in the street.

"As a personal comment, I don't think DMZ lines would have come out too well because it was noticeable that the U.S.A. elements present were willing to protect their chief in any eventuality."

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S E C R E T

Report # DD-764.

31 Mar 64

TO: ~~██████████~~

FROM: ~~██████████~~

SUBJECT: Opinions about Manuel ARTIME Buesa's TV appearance on Sunday, 29 Mar 64.

1. Marcos RODRIGUEZ Menéndez, M.D.C. Executive:

ARTIME showed true leadership qualities. It was a blessing for lawyers when he referred to the 1940 Constitution. He was very good when he said that he was for unity and called all Cubans to war without making any differences among them for their tendencies.

2. José Antonio VALLE (mat. unk.), Miami News distribution manager, attorney, mine owner in Oriente province:

ARTIME is a fake and an egotist, but he is a genius in politics. He scored a win when he said that he did not have time to answer on a political basis because they were at war. RAY and ARTIME are fighting for their future in Cuba. They must be left alone until the Cuban problem is solved because I don't know which of the two is worse.

3. Angel HERNANDEZ Rojo, member of the D.R.E.:

ARTIME is a "yes man" who does not have his own opinion about what he wants and he ^{is} unconditionally subjected to the "dollar" without caring for anything else. The D.R.E. has something pending with ARTIME because on one occasion, prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, he took over a base which the D.R.E. had in Puerto Rico.

4. Jaime MARZOL Morales, president of "Triunfo" sugar mill, resides at 3670 SW 25th St., Miami:

ARTIME was very good. The people liked him as they think he will lead them to war and that is what everyone wants. His statements about the 1940 Constitution were very good. FROM ~~██████████~~

5. Luis ORTEGA Sierra, newspaperman:

ARTIME is the man chosen by the C.I.A. to create an internal problem in Cuba and open the doors for an invasion. ~~██████████~~ 13 ~~██████████~~

ACTION TAKEN

REASON NO ACTION TAKEN

DESENSITIZED

S E C R E T



SECRET

31 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 March 1964 at 1630 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 began by reminding this office he has not received the check books which will be necessary to draw money from the [redacted]

2. A-1 has received various identification carnets from inside Cuba which will be forwarded to this office via AMYUM-19.


3. A-1 informed us he had received a check of \$10,000 from Cooper Macdonald. A-1 requested guidance concerning the check. A-1 was advised to forward a check with a covering letter to the Atlantic-Chesapeake explaining that Maritima Ban is forwarding this amount on behalf of Mr. Quiros as partial payment for the LCM's. A-1 was reminded there are still \$27,000 pending on this bill.

4. A-1 will depart on 0400, 31 March for Nicaragua accompanied by AMJAVA-4. A-1 expects to return on 5 April for their meeting with James D. ZABOTH (P).

5. A-1 was asked to send a letter to Chester, Blackburn, and Roder, Inc. requesting purchase and shipment of a 17 ton bulldozer and two vans equipped for office and dispensary use, and also to request shipment of the Little Giant. After a brief discussion it was decided to ship the heavy equipment to the following address: [redacted]

A-1 felt this address would be sufficient. However, Maritima Ban should send the letter to Chester requesting these

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heavy items. It was stressed to A-1 the importance of assuring the letter is sent to the attention of Mr. Chester.

6. When the balance of the money (\$27,000) is sent to A-1 for the Atlantic-Chesapeake we will also send the \$132,000 for construction equipment. The money should be sent to A-1 by 20 April.

7. According to A-1, A-4's travel papers have been returned to him. A-1 also mentioned that he will request his visa on this coming trip to [redacted]

8. Manuel Hernandez to leave for [redacted] as soon as A-1 arrives [redacted]

9. AMWORLD-2 has been told by A-1 to close the [redacted] bank account. A-1 was asked to have AMWORLD-2 advise ANYUM-19 when account has been closed in order that the information can be relayed to Mike GUERTLER (P).

10. A-1 stated that the tactical radios can be shipped to [redacted] A-1 to confirm this address while in [redacted] and advise us. A-1 told there are 24 tactical radios in all.

11. A-1 commented that the budget was mailed today (30 March) instead of last Thursday as he had previously stated.

12. A-1 inadvertently forgot to ascertain the Tampa barge address. A-19 is to call this office with said information.

13. A-1 requested our opinion concerning the two coming operations. A-1 was informed that the opinion of this office is, "The plan is bold and imaginative and the decision is up to you"

14. A-1 was advised that we have received a report which states that [redacted] is planning a trip to Switzerland in mid-April. A-1 mentioned that he has received reports that [redacted] would leave on the first of April but did not know the destination. A-1 was reminded again not to mention to [redacted] the preventive propaganda we had discussed but rather to use the meat packing story.

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15. A-1 was cautioned not to place all his trust in [redacted]

16. A-1 was asked for his opinion about transporting the rest of the infiltration people now in Miami [redacted] by means of an off-shore transfer. This would be done in a manner similar to the transfer of sabotage equipment. A-1 advised we would need at least two weeks prior notice. A-1 sounded enthusiastic about the idea and he said he would consider it.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SQ/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
Finance
Commercial

✓

Can
Edwards
Geo.
John

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30 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 28 March 1964, 1430 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 commented that the meeting between Carl Jenkins, AMJAVA-4 and AMBIDY-1 went off very satisfactorily. The first operations were discussed and according to A-1, Carl was very pleased. A-1 did not go into specific details but stated he had shown Carl blueprints of the first operation. At the meeting A-4 presented another plan which calls for the assassination of Castro or some high official at Playa Giron on 17 April, the anniversary of the Bay of Pigs.

2. A-1 plans to leave for [] early part of next week. From [] A-1 intends to visit []. A-1 was asked to check in with us before his departure.

3. A-1 was advised the Libernic representative is standing by in case he is needed. Should A-1 desire the presence of the representative in [] he should contact us.

4. A-1 was reminded we have not as yet received the budget for last month. A-1 commented he had asked his secretary to mail it a few days ago. A-1 was asked to check again to make sure it has been mailed. A-1 was advised the money has been deposited and should be in his account by the end of the month.

5. A-1 was asked to give us the address of the Tampa barge. A-1 said he would have it for Monday.

6. It was suggested to A-1 not to preach the subject of the naval base propaganda with [] but rather to tell [] that if any inquiries are made concerning A-1's operation [] that these materials are for [] meat packing business.

Approved for release by []
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

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-2-

7. A-1 was told we have two dispensary vans for him, one with an X-ray machine, but we need name of consignee for shipment.

8. A-1 was reminded to have AMWORLD-2 close the [] bank account.

9. A-1 was congratulated on his fine report on Col. Lopez of []

10. The conversation ended by wishing A-1 a Happy Easter.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Program []
Logistics

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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27 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer
and AMBIDY-1

DATE : 26 March 1100 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 telephoned to say he had received the report from the American engineers. A-1 was informed the cost would be \$318,000 without a landing field. A-1 commented it was both his and the engineer's opinion that the job could be done rapidly and well. A-1 was requested to forward a copy to us of the engineer's proposal for our perusal. A-1 was advised not to consult with the engineers until we have completely examined their proposal and suggestions. A-1 agreed.

2. A-1 had received an intelligence survey from [] and Manuel GOMEZ on the camps. According to A-1 there are many sound recommendations which A-1 intends to employ. A-1 again inferred that there will be a general house cleaning of personnel.

3. A-1 commented that his representatives (AMYUM-19, GUTIERREZ, NAVARRETE) had gone to New York and could not come to agreement with Mr. Chester and Mr. Zweifach. A-1 would like to purchase supplies in the free port of New Orleans since it would be cheaper than shipping the goods from New York. A-1 also mentioned this was what we had agreed upon at our last meeting. A-1 was informed that as a central point for buying and shipping New York offers many advantages. This does not preclude using other cities in the country or in the world for buying and shipping. However, New York is the best point of control for this activity. The simplest and most efficient way to buy and ship is to determine exactly what is needed and the frequency with which it is to be delivered. Once the list of requirements is drawn up, it should be given to Chester or Zweifach specifying the exact recurring dates of delivery. There is no need for

Above conversation conducted
in presence of frequently
changed privacy code

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A-1's people to waste their time on such things as buying, shipping, getting export licenses, etc. This can all be turned over to professional businessmen, thereby relieving you of all burdens.

4. A-1 then commented that in certain cases Mr. King has been able to purchase some items cheaper than Mr. Zweifelach. A-1 was informed that in some specific instances this may be the case. However, in large quantities of a recurring nature a professional company will in the long run obtain better rates and render better services than an individual. Also A-1 was reminded that the professional service and efficiency of delivery cannot be duplicated by individuals. A-1 was advised that King could best be used as an adviser and/or consultant to the professional companies doing the work.

5. A-1 was requested to make certain that A-18 clarify to GUTIERREZ and NAVARRETE that there may have been some misunderstanding on their part that Chester was receiving instructions from someone else.

6. A-1 was requested to return the insurance applications of all personnel he no longer has in his employ.


7. The conversation ended with the usual abrazos.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
DMJM
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
Commercial

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Above conversation conducted
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		1. RI FILE NO.			
		2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		3. DATE	
		4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		5. DATE OF INFO. 6. EVALUATION	
7. ANALYST	8. DATE FORWARDED	9. DISSEMINATED IN		10. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
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PERTINENT INFORMATION					
13.					

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
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019-300-003
UFG -04843
27 MAR 64

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CIT ?
OCC ?

SUBJ HAS MADE RECENT STATEMENTS CONCERNING
PLANNED INVASION OF CUBA IN MAY 64

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FORM 807 501 PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(7-64)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING

TO	Chief, Special Affairs Staff	FILED	ACTION	INDEXED
INFO		XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE <i>WKR</i>		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	TYPIC/AMWORLD/Operational Evaluation of AMBIDDY-1's Training During Period 6 to 18 January 1964		ABSTRACT	
			ENCLOSURE	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. **INTRODUCTION:** In the period 6 to 18 January 1964, AMBIDDY-1 was given 83 hours of tutorial training, in JMWAVE safe-house facilities, on existing operational doctrine and management techniques applicable to a major clandestine effort against PBRUMEN. A copy of the training schedule which was used in this tutorial training is attached. At the completion of the training course, the various training instructors submitted an evaluation on AMBIDDY-1. These evaluations are outlined in the following paragraph.

2. **EVALUATIONS:** The below-listed evaluations were prepared by the instructors who participated primarily in Phase I of AMBIDDY-1's tutorial training. The Phase I instruction concentrated on imparting to AMBIDDY-1 current operational doctrine relative to unconventional warfare techniques. The evaluations are as follows:

a. **Small Unit Operations and Training:** AMBIDDY-1 responded most enthusiastically to all aspects of the training on small unit techniques. He made detailed notes on the material covered, and these notes included copies of training charts and diagrams. AMBIDDY-1 displayed particularly intensive interest in that portion of the training dealing with the principles of survival and the issuance of individual equipment. In the course of the training, AMBIDDY-1 was given several practical tactical problems to solve. AMBIDDY-1's solutions to these problems were logical and reflected a grasp of the techniques to which he had been exposed during the training sessions. Thomas L. DARGUZIS was the primary instructor in this phase of the training, and he assessed AMBIDDY-1 as being an intelligent, alert, highly-motivated individual who has a realistic appraisal of his own limitations and capabilities.

b. **Clandestine Activity:** AMBIDDY-1 received extensive training in FI tradecraft subjects, including the nature and elements of clandestine activity, security, cover, compartmentation, (continued) 206-362437

Attachment: herewith
Training Schedule

Distribution:
3 - C/BAS w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO C-1 19-124-27/2

DATE TYPED
26 March 64

DATE DISPATCHED
MAR 27 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFCA-14923

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-267437

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

organization of a basic net, communications and reporting techniques. In the course of this training, AMBIDDY-1 expressed a particular interest in the subjects of security, cover and compartmentation. Charles F. MASENGILL was the primary instructor for this bloc of training, and he reports that AMBIDDY-1 was a keen student who appreciated the opportunity to learn as much as possible about clandestine operations. MASENGILL believes that AMBIDDY-1 at the completion of his training was probably weakest on the topic of how to report intelligence information.

c. Resistance Activity and Guerrilla Warfare: AMBIDDY-1 received training on the principles and concepts inherent in organizing an infiltration team. In addition, he was trained relative to the principles of organizing a resistance net. Additionally, he was trained in caching, demolition and sabotage techniques. AMBIDDY-1 also received instruction in the principles and concepts of guerrilla warfare. AMBIDDY-1 was also given an opportunity to familiarize himself, through actual range firing, with those weapons which are normally used by anti-AMTHUG-1 forces. Alton T. PIRNACK was the principal instructor for this bloc of training. PIRNACK reports that AMBIDDY-1 was responsive to the subject material which was presented to him. AMBIDDY-1 did not hesitate to ask questions nor to seek clarification of points which he did not clearly understand. AMBIDDY-1 did indicate that he was a neophyte in the subject of PM operations, and, as a result, he was most appreciative of the training which he was receiving on these subjects. It was evident during this bloc of training that caching was an entirely new facet of clandestine operations for AMBIDDY-1.

3. COMMENT: Phase II of AMBIDDY-1's training concentrated on exposing AMBIDDY-1 to those management techniques and principles which are applicable to a major clandestine operation against a target like PERUMEN. This part of the training was carried out exclusively by Andrew K. REUTEMAN and Stanley R. ZAMKA. In this phase of the training, AMBIDDY-1 constantly expressed a great deal of enthusiasm for the subject material which was being presented. Throughout the training, AMBIDDY-1 gave every indication that he was absorbing the major portion of the training. At the same time, it was clear that he was overwhelmed by the material and the implications of what this training meant in terms of his conduct in future operations. After the management phase of AMBIDDY-1's training was completed, REUTEMAN and ZAMKA reviewed the 83 hours training program in its totality with AMBIDDY-1. In addition, the program was reviewed with all of the instructors who participated in the training. As a result of this review, a consensus was reached that, while AMBIDDY-1 is an intelligent and responsive student, the training which he received does not qualify him for the position of senior officer in a major clandestine undertaking against PERUMEN. The training did, however, alert AMBIDDY-1 to a number of problems and pitfalls which he should avoid in his activities. This training also provided certain guide posts for AMBIDDY-1, but these guide posts were laid out in such a concentrated dose that they cannot be considered as an adequate substitute for experience or training in depth over an extended period of time.

END OF DISPATCH

SECRETH/W Attachment to
UPRA-14923**ORIENTATION PROGRAM****AMBIDY-1****PROGRAM PERIOD: 6 - 18 January 1964****TOTAL HOURS : 83**

PERIOD	SUBJECT	INSTRUCTOR	INTERPRETER
6 January 1930-2130	Orientation and Review of Schedule	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None
7 January 1300-1800	Nature and Elements of Clandestine Activities	MASENGILL	None
8 January 0900-1400	Security (Personal, Physical, Organizational and Operational), Cover	MASENGILL	None
1700-2200	The Infiltration Team Principles and Concepts, Organization of a Resistance Net	PIRNACK	DISCOMBARD
9 January 0900-1200	Compartmentation and Clandestine Communications	MASENGILL	None
1300-1500	Organization of Basic Net for Clandestine Activity	MASENGILL	None
10 January 0900-1200	Caching and Sabotage Techniques	PIRNACK	DISCOMBARD

GROUP 1
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PAGE TWO

1300-1500	PM Techniques, Reconnaissance, Raid and Ambush	PIRNACK	DECONBARD
1700-2200	Introduction to Clandestine Maritime Operations	FAITELSON	PACHANKIS
<u>11 January</u> 1000-1500	Maritime Operational Planning Techniques	FAITELSON	PACHANKIS
<u>13 January</u> 0900-1200	Introduction to Clandestine UDT Operations	TATTERSFIELD	YASUINAS
1300-1500	UDT Operational Planning Techniques	TATTERSFIELD	YASUINAS
1700-2200	Small Unit Operations, Training and Application in Clandestine Environment	DARGUZIS	DECONBARD
<u>14 January</u> 1300-1800	Weapons Familiarization and Range Firing	PIRNACK	DECONBARD
2000-2200	Review of Training	REUTEMAN and ZANKA	None
<u>15 January</u> 1000-1200	Management Controls Regarding Agent Selection and Team Composition	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
1400-1700	Management Review of Team Training and Evaluation	ZANKA	None
2000-2300	Operational Planning and Use of Operational Plan as Control Device	REUTEMAN and ZANKA	None

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PAGE THREE

<u>16 January</u> 1000-1200 1400-1800 1900-2300	Mission Briefings - A Management Control Commando Raids Analysis of an Infiltration (Operation Case History)	REUTEMAN ZAMKA	DECOMBARD None
<u>17 January</u> 1000-1200 1400-1700 1930-2030 2030-2230	Management of Maritime Assets Analysis of a Commando Raid (Case History) After Action Reports - Management Self-Critique Cache Operations	REUTEMAN ZAMKA REUTEMAN REUTEMAN	DECOMBARD None DECOMBARD DECOMBARD
<u>18 January</u> 1400-1700 1900-1200 1900-2300	Analysis of a UDT Operation (Case History) Photo Seminar Discussion and Review	ZAMKA REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None None

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C. J. Hernandez
Active

24 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 1300 hours on 24 March 1964

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned our office to say that the ADELAIDA is leaving today for the free port of Colon to pick up provisions and to leave three men who are sick. One has a tumor in the neck, the second has a dislocated shoulder, and the third is suffering from stab wounds. A-1 was unable to hospitalize them in [] because [] felt that this would attract undue attention.

2. A-1 commented that the provisions which they have to buy will be taken from the March budget.

3. A-1 has received a report from AMJAVA-4 indicating that there is a need for a general house cleaning as far as personnel is concerned in many of the camps.


4. A-1 inquired if there was any objection to ADELAIDA leaving for Panama. Martin stated that off hand he could see no objection; however, A-1 should call later in the day for confirmation.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
ADELAIDA

SECRET



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24 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 24 March 1964 at 1540 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 called as promised to ascertain if there were objections to the ADELAIDA going to the free port of Colon in Panama. A-1 was advised there were no objections. However, the following should be communicated to the ADELAIDA:

a. To stay away from the Folk River pier (this pier is heavily watched as a pier used for the smuggling of arms).

b. ADELAIDA will be boarded by the U. S. Canal Zone Customs and the ship's papers should be in order.

2. The ETA to Colon is 25 March.


3. A-1 finally has received the letter from the Philippino.

Above conversation conducted
in presence frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WR/SA/SC/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
ADELAIDA

SECRET



SECRET

23 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Richard Beal
and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 23 March at 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to say that AMJAVA-4, who arrived in Miami last night, told him that Alegrett is arriving at 1700 hours today at Miami on ~~American~~ Airlines.

2. Alegrett is bringing with him "movies" which he took of the Puerto Cabezas base (Carlay). While at Carlay taking these pictures, Alegrett stated that he was on official business.

3. AMBIDDY-1 was concerned that U. S. Customs may take the pictures away from Alegrett when he entered the country. AMBIDDY-1 was told not to worry about the pictures, for after all Carlay is an official Nicaraguan National Guard base. AMBIDDY-1 said that he would try to get an opportunity to see the pictures.

Richard B. Beal
Richard B. Beal
WH/SA/SC/HH

File:
Security
Alegrett - 201
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

SECRET

SECRET

23 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and
G. Thornton

DATE : 23 March 1964 at 1000 hours

AMBIDDY-1 called to say that AMJAVA-4 had arrived in
Miami on 22 March. Immigration officials have taken his
papers and said they would review them at 0830 today.
This office told AMBIDDY-1 to call back if AMJAVA-4 ran
into any difficulties in the return of his papers.

Gwen Thornton

Gwen Thornton
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
AMJAVA-4 - 201
Conversations

SECRET



DISPATCH**DESENSITIZED**

PROCESSING

TO

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT

Operational/TYPIC/AMBANG/AMWORLD

Interviews with AMBANG-1 and AMBIDDY-1 in Puerto Rico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

REFERENCE: UFG-4764 Para. 3

1. The following information, not disseminated, was reported initially to Gordon R. HAWLOTT by AMING-2 on 8 February 1964 following his return from a month's visit to Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. AMING-2 reported that he had met separately with AMBIDDY-1 and AMBANG-1 in the apartment of a friend in San Juan, the meetings occurring during the last week of January. While HAWLOTT feels that AMING-2 is usually quite reliable and objective on general political reporting, his own participation in exile politics and political ambitions could conceivably influence his objectivity. In an effort to check the accuracy of AMING-2's remarks, the CG again discussed the interviews with AMING-2 on 18 March at which time AMING-2 repeated his account of the interview without any change in text, so that the CG is inclined to accept AMING-2's account as generally accurate.

2. During the last week of January AMBANG-1 told Source at a private meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico that he would like to enlist Source's assistance as an advisor on medical affairs and as a propaganda worker. Source, per PRRUMEN custom, requested that AMBANG-1 explain to Source what resources he had for the liberation of PRRUMEN and asked AMBANG-1 to offer proof why he should consider himself a leader. Source claims AMBANG-1 replied that he had boats and weapons sufficient for strong military action into PRRUMEN and would be able to place combat forces in PRRUMEN during March 1964, said combat forces having an ability to hold their own for weeks on the island. AMING-2 observed that he had driven out to Mayaguez where he had seen four separate

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:

3-Headquarters

201-267437

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED

28 Mar 64

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UFGA-14031

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

10-124-27/3

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training installations, one of which was reported to be the property of AMBANG/1. AMBANG/1 replied that he had training installations on the Florida mainland and had training and logistical bases or a base in Venezuela.

3. Source asked AMBANG/1 what backing he had from World Powers for the invasion of PBRUMEN. AMBANG/1 replied that he still had significant White House contacts despite the death of John F. Kennedy. He added that he was in contact with top personnel of ODACID and held regular meetings with a very high ranking officer of KUBARK. He stated he also had been introduced by the KUBARKER to the Chief of Operations at YOACRE and was in regular communication with the ODOATH officer. In general, AMBANG/1 stated, his sources of funds were largely ODYOKE. Source then asked if he was to understand that AMBANG/1 had the approval of ODYOKE for operations into PBRUMEN. AMBANG/1 reportedly replied "I have been given the green light".

4. Around 1 February Source met in San Juan with AMBIDDY/1 for a private talk. AMBIDDY/1 suggested that Source associate himself with AMBIDDY/1's movement in order to help form a post-liberation government. Source replied that he was rather vague as to AMBIDDY/1's plans and backing. AMBIDDY/1 stated that he had been selected by ODYOKE as that PBRUMENER having the necessary leadership and experience for the overthrow of ANTRUG. Source asked if he understood correctly that AMBIDDY/1 was telling him that he had the approval of ODYOKE. If so, why was AMBIDDY/1 drawing support from Venezuela and from Central American Governments. AMBIDDY/1 reportedly replied that he did not actually rely on Venezuela and other Latin American donors for his assistance, since he was receiving all his logistical and financial support from KUBARK. Source stated that he had heard that AMBIDDY/1 was amassing a formidable invasion force in

AMBIDDY/1 replied that he had been given very large sums of money, which proved the reliance which ODYOKE had in him and made obvious the fact that ODYOKE had selected him to bring about the liberation of PBRUMEN. Source asked why it was that ODYOKE and KUBARK would select AMBIDDY/1 before all others as the means of liberating PBRUMEN. AMBIDDY/1 reportedly replied that ODYOKE had selected him because, in the opinion of ODYOKE, he represented the most sane and centrist political concentration among the PBRUMEN exiles and ODYOKE knew that in AMBIDDY/1 it had a leader resolved to maintain order and centrist democratic government in PBRUMEN following the liberation.

5. AMING/3 asked both AMBIDDY/1 and AMBANG/1 during his separate interviews with them whether AMBIDDY/1's presence in Puerto Rico signified that the two leaders had met or planned to meet in an attempt to coordinate their activities. Neither AMBIDDY/1 nor AMBANG/1 denied nor confirmed Source's questions, but gave evasive answers. Source therefore assumes that they had not met, but hoped to meet for talks.

END OF DISPATCH

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
1	SA/SO/SB		ES		
2	SA/SO/AR		AR		
3	Raul		(RLO)		
4					
5					
6	SA/SO/Bolbi				
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: <p><i>File: Ambidex!</i></p> <p><i>- Interesting & quite well done in some areas of his remarks. I especially think that he fielded the ref. to Fore very well - giving credit to himself & organization.</i></p>					
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE
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237

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Whitney Tucker		<i>WT</i>
2			
3	WH/SA/50/NH		<i>W</i>
4			
5	Manuel Artime		
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: Could this be made a "third person" dissem. setting forth ambiguity & per philosophy in condemnation? <i>in one</i> <i>substance</i>			
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NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O-585225

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
SYNOPSIS OF AMBIDY-1'S SPEECH TO AREC

18 March 1964

"You will forgive me if before a gathering the Agrupacion de la Reconstruccion Economical de Cuba I do make profound economic or technical analysis of the reconstruction of Cuba, the reason is very simple, it is because I don't know. Inasmuch as I do not like to talk about things which I know nothing of I prefer not to touch upon the subject. Here at this gathering there are men more capable than I . . . men who will have the difficult task of the reconstruction of Cuba upon their shoulders.

I want to talk about what I know about. But first let me present my credentials. Why the presentation of credentials? When two people speak for the first time the first portion is the presentation and this is the first time I talk with AREC, although I have the pleasure of speaking to some of its members separately and in great lengths. Why this presentation of credentials? Because I know our movement is very controversial. They say we are of the extreme right, they say we are of the extreme left, they say we are opportunist and they say we are ambitious. I do not expect to change anyone's mind by this talk. I believe it is my duty to assert certain principles and to mention our beliefs. Not a criteria of profound economic principles . . . I am not an economist nor an expert on the subject. I believe it useful for our movement to assert before this assembly some of its principles

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in which it professes and will continue to profess and for which we are prepared to give our lives and in some cases already have. I believe it is our duty to mention them here or anywhere else. . .

"First of all I do not believe in extremes . . . neither left ✓ nor right. I believe extremes always end by touching one another.

✓ Secondly I want to state that if any extreme comes to power in Cuba, in the case of the extreme right by imposing a dictatorship; in both cases we shall continue to fight with our weapons in hand.

✦ Thirdly, I do not believe in the classification of men by race, political levels in the government to which they formerly belonged nor by money . . . I know whites whose souls are black and I know blacks whose souls are white. I know wealthy men who are spiritually poor and poor who are spiritually wealthy. I only believe in one classification of men and that is the moral classification--men of honor and men without honor. Men who keep their word and those who do not keep their word. . . In this classification I do believe . . .

Are we opportunist? This depends what your definition of opportunist is. If by opportunist you mean taking maximum advantage of each opportunity, then ladies and gentlemen, we are opportunist. In order to save Cuba we have to take maximum advantage of every opportunity. But if by opportunists you mean the man who changes his beliefs in accord with the opportunities, then we are not opportunist."

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
AMBIDDDY-1 goes on to mention his various publications. He describes his first publication, "Communism por que?" (Communism what for?) which he wrote nine months prior to Castro coming to power. The main theme of this pamphlet, according to A-1, was that more than changing a government what is needed is a change in men's conscience. The pamphlet also outlined the duties of the padron (land owner) to the workers so that the latter may live in dignity and in honor. The patron should feel that the problems of his workers are also his problems. The worker in turn has certain obligations to the patron. If this quid pro quo is not adhered to the (Christian) government has the right to intervene for the common good.

Later on, after Castro was in power, A-1 wrote his letter of resignation accusing Castro of being a communist and traitor. In this letter A-1 mentions he resigned because Castro had not been honest with the businessmen by not telling them their property would be confiscated.

A-1 then went into exile and there he published a book called Traiccion (Betrayal). This book clearly outlined the ideology of the movement.

"We believe the state should foment and simulate private economy both national as well as in foreign. [During the Bay of Pigs I wrote my political thesis.] We have to have an effective democracy in Latin America. [I say effective democracies] because [in Latin America] the word democracy has been prostituted too

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
often. Many countries call themselves democratic but in reality are nothing but militarist, demagogic, and many simply go through the motions of elections. Many are ^{simply} totalitarian governments which are living off the blood and toil of its people. The corrupt politicians, the strong men, the totalitarian have been the strongest allies of communism. Our fight is not against one man, it is not war of personal hatred . . . it is a war against the doctrine of hatred, be it called Castro or what have you . . . it is a war against a doctrine; we are as much opposed to Khrushchev as we are against Tito. We are as much opposed to the totalitarian left as we are opposed to the fascist right.

"They continue to call us extremist. We don't care. They will continue to call us rightist or leftist, fascist, philo-communist. I recall the words of Don Quixote when he was passing on the outskirts of a small town and Sancho said to Don Quixote, 'Sir, the dogs are barking at us.' Don Quixote replied, 'Let them, Sancho, if they are barking it is because we are moving. And we will continue to move.'"

"They say we are very ambitious. Yes, we are very ambitious. We have an ambition which blinds us and we are disposed to give our lives for that ambition. An ambition for what? That in the coming days when Cuba is liberated people will pronounce our name with respect in our country."

"When our men die in Cuba they are not only fighting for the independence of our country . . . they are fighting for the

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
independence of the American Hemisphere, for the survival of Christian principles in America, for the Western world. . . the rest of the Western World." A-1 maintains that the situation today is much the way Lenin would have hoped for. Britain and France have recognized Red China; the U. S. is at odds with these two governments. This, A-1 maintains, is exactly what Lenin would have wanted. A-1 then quotes Lenin, "Within 30 years we will embark on a peace offensive, of coexistence and we will split the free nations and smash the impotent bourgeois."

"The battle ground for Latin America lies 90 miles from our shores in a place called Cuba. Should the Western world lose this battle the sleeping giant (Latin America) will wake up on the side of the communist camps. Then it would be preferable to be dead because the free world will have ceased to be.

"We have knocked on many doors. I have one obsession and that is the liberation of my country and if I have to lose my prestige I will do so. God will know I have not lost it. I do not believe that in order to save my country there are bad doors. The only bad doors are the ones that have been closed to us in order to lock Cuba within them.

"We are all to blame. We are all guilty for having turned over Cuba into the hands of men who could not govern her properly. This is not the time to cry like women for what we were unable to defend as men. I have knocked on doors and will continue to do so because

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my cause is a moral and honorable one and what I ask for is noble. We cannot afford to wait for miracles because only God can create miracles. We must prepare for a long fight and not expect the aid of such organizations as the OAS, UN. It is up to the Cubans to liberate Cuba. We either have to wage a war of principles or not. If we are not going to wage a war of principles I will not join that struggle.

"The present situation of the case of Cuba. The present state of our homeland. Communism is completely established. We lose daily 10 fighters for freedom. In the cities communism is in complete control. It is necessary for an individual to carry five different credentials in order to travel inside of Cuba. Lack of any one of these credentials brings down the repressive measures of the G-2 until the individual can explain the reason for his missing credentials.

"Guerrillas in the mountains; some resistance groups in the cities; a resentment among the militia because the foreigners have privileges which the militia does not. The campesino who will not accept the communist doctrine and guerrillas in Escambray, Camaguey, which are growing stronger daily. This is the situation in Cuba today.

"The status of Cuba outside of Cuba: The U. S. In the most difficult position and the most unexplainable position of the Western World. I can sum it up in one sentence. I do not understand it. We do not want to be saved by the Marines. Let us make this quite

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clear. The Cuban people have always maintained that they are willing to die."

A-1 then alludes to the Alliance for Progress which he refers to as an Alka Seltzer in the Pacific. He maintains he is not against the Alliance for Progress but rather that something should also be done for Cuba.

Question and answer period

Question: I understand that in certain sections of the United States Government there exist ultra liberals who believe that communist Cuba could be used as an experimental ground and in the coming years communist Cuba could be used as a proving ground for the coexistence of the great world powers, that is, Russia and the U. S. The question is Dr. Artime, have you considered deep in your conscience the possibility that the U. S. Government is using you and your movement to occupy the Cubans who wish to liberate their homeland with other activities so that they cannot liberate their country with the force and enthusiasm they desire. The question is have you considered the possibility that you, under your best intentions, are the instrument by which these ultra liberal forces in the U. S. can paralyze the liberating activity of the Cuban people?

Answer: A very good question. If the U. S. were giving me something this might be true but I believe the ones who are receiving aid, possibly other ultra liberals, may be in collusion with the U. S. This is very possible. I can make a mistake. I can make two mistakes but after one has spent two years in jail one cannot be fooled so

easily, more so when one has been condemned to death. It is possible this plan exists but I do not know since I do not have access to these ultra liberals. It is possible they are looking for someone to do it, this is possible. I can guarantee you one thing. I am not doing this because my power comes from men who believe as I do, as you do, and who are located south of the Rio Grande. These men are gambling the lives of the people in their own countries. Because they know if they do not help in overthrowing Fidel Castro in less than two years, their own countries will be victims of communism. I am a product of the desperation of the Latin American countries.

Question: Dr. Artime, how can we unite the Cubans in order to make the cause of those fighting inside felt more deeply?

Answer: Very good question. Very good. A North American friend of mine once said he would rather carry ten cats in a bag than work with two Cubans. I said to him that he was quite right; however, Cubans are not the only ones that are hard to understand. The Latin American is also difficult to understand. Thank God, we are very individualistic and that is why the communists are having such a difficult time. Because we are very individualistic. The war is the only thing which can unite the Cubans. The only thing which can create an unbreakable bond, between rich, poor, Negroes, whites, Catholics, Protestants, Mason, everyone, is sacrifice. I do not believe in theoretical unions.

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
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Question: In Miami they say that JURE, Manuel Ray's organization, will make an attack on 20 May or early in June. Would there be any possibility that your movement also intends to do something in the near future. Also, what is the possibility of having a government in arms.

Answer: That is the \$64,000 question. If they (JURE) decides to go, may God bless them. And please let it not be a demagogic act to give prestige to others. The only thing I ask God is that He accompany them. I say this with all sincerity. Our strategy is mapped out. What we have done cannot be published. We cannot publicize the arms we have sent into Cuba. We cannot publicize the infiltrations we have made to teach the campesinos about guerrilla warfare. These are things we cannot public. Not that we are enemies of publicity but we cannot subordinate the war to publicity, we are subordinating the interests of publicity to the war. In a free election I would admit all political theories but by violence I will not admit any extremism. The war may last three years against Fidel and five against communism. It does not matter. We will use violence to deter any extremism.

Question: About five months ago I arrived here thanks to people with great influence. Students of mine were in the Escambray. I took food and medicines to them. I had 12 girls who helped me gather rosaries and everything in the ways of clothes. There are now 500 students of mine who are now prisoners. Others are being con-

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
stantly harassed and persecuted. Why aren't we helping these people?

Answer: There are many, madam, who are now helping. This week we have sent some aid and arms inside, perhaps not as much as we would like but sent some. We also have to send not just weapons but food, shoes, etc. The guerrillas lack everything. The problem of supplying them is very difficult but we are trying. We do not have sufficient boats. To arrive at the coast we cannot use large ships but small boats and these small boats have a limited capacity. These small boats can only make two trips in one day and no more. It is being done on a small scale but it is being done. The force to liberate Cuba is there inside Cuba and it is up to us to assist them.

Question: Doctor, don't you have any confidence in the OAS. I refer specifically to the recent cache of arms discovered in Venezuela?

Answer: I admire the Venezuelan people, I admire Venezuelan democracy and if a strong measure is taken against Cuba, because of the just screams of the Venezuelan people and if the OAS listens to these screams, I will admire the OAS.

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18 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Talk with AMBIDDY-1

AMBIDDY-1 will be meeting with us in the Washington safehouse on 19-20 March. If you can spare the time, it might be helpful if you could have a heart-to-heart talk with him on his relations with Senora [] which may be blossoming forth into matrimony. There cannot be much doubt now that she is reputed to have been Fulgencio Batista's mistress and that this fact (if fact it be) is widely known. If he marries her, the political repercussions could be calamitous. It would be helpful if you could tell AMBIDDY-1 point blank that if scandal ensues, this could doom the program.


Henry D. Hecksher
WH/HA/SO/HH

DDP/WH/HA/So/HH/HDHecksher:bh (18 Mar 64)

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
1 - [] 201

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17 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 16 March 1964 at 1630

1. AMBIDDY-1 called this office to say that [] and Eladio BAS Trespacios could not sail because they were unable to obtain their re-entry permits. Since these two could not obtain their permits "the people" had told Amado MUNNE Pantaleon that it was not worthwhile for him to go. Martin asked AMBIDDY-1 if any mention had been made concerning TOMAS's skin rash and that he did not see a doctor. AMBIDDY-1 stated that he had not been so informed by ANYUN-19. AMBIDDY-1 was asked if the only reason BAS and TOMAS could not leave was because they could not obtain their re-entry permits. AMBIDDY-1 answered that was the sole reason and that all three wanted to go desperately. AMBIDDY-1 agreed that under any condition MUNNE should go since he is the most important of the three.

2. AMBIDDY-1 would call this office at 1800 in order to receive a more concrete answer to this situation.

3. Martin asked AMBIDDY-1 if the suitcase containing the uniforms had been sent. AMBIDDY-1 does not know. However, he will investigate and if the uniforms have not been sent, AMBIDDY-1 will bring them to the Consejo meeting on 19 March.


Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:

MUNNE
HEX BAS
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1

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16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 and
Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 14 March 1964, 1230 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 would like to have a meeting with the Consejo as soon as possible to talk over many outstanding problems and to discuss thoroughly the new budgetary procedure. Martin informed A-1 that this would be brought to Henry's attention upon his return. A-1 is speaking to the Agrupacion para la Reconstruccion Economica de Cuba on Wednesday, 18 March, so he cannot make it for that date.
2. A-1 advised that [] has accepted the offer to work for AMWORLD and will be returning from Spain shortly.
3. A-1 has not yet heard from the Filipino and requests that we check into this matter.
4. A-1 was asked for his opinions concerning the DMJM people. A-1 is very pleased with the survey and feels that the engineers plans are reasonable and fitting to his project. A-1 estimated, however, that the total figure may be in the \$300,000 category. This is another subject which A-1 would like to discuss in the next meeting.
5. Another topic he wants to discuss is the transfer of the C-47 to []
6. A-1 informed us that "key personnel" are no longer listed on the budget, however, there are individuals which fall into the category of guerrillas and infiltrators who are in Miami and are receiving retainers.
7. A-1 was informed that the propagation charts for the month of April are on their way to him.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
[] 201

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16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 and
Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 16 March 1964, 0930 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 was asked if Thursday, 19 March, would be convenient for him to meet with the Consejo here in Washington. A-1 agreed.

2. A-1 will bring with him to the meeting the bank signature cards.

3. A-1 has received a bill from the Atlantic-Chesapeake Co. for the sum of \$132,097.50. A-1 opined that the bill seemed a little exorbitant for the material they have received. Inasmuch as they have paid \$100,000 already, the total bill comes out to \$232,097.50.

4. A-1 has also received a bill from the Bruan Shipping Co. for the total of \$19,221.12. Included in this bill is the petroleum for October and November.

5. AMJAVA-4, Manuel Gomez, AMWORLD-2 and [] left today for []. From there all but AMWORLD-2 will proceed to [] to locate a suitable site to relocate the arms barge.

6. A-1 now has a new telephone number: PL 4-7912. A-1 added this is just a new phone number, but not a new address. A-1 stated he expects to move from where he is living soon. No further explanation.

7. A-1 was asked to have Pineda apply at the Mexican Consulate for a 30 day tourist visa and to state that the purpose was to visit Mexico.

8. A-1 will check in again later in the day.

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Pineda
Mexico
Finances

Above conversation condensed
in prearranged interview
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

14 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDY-1 and
Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)


DATE : 13 March 1964, 1800 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 began the conversation by saying that the reason he had been late in checking was that he had been at a meeting with the DMJM engineers. A series of items had been discussed on which A-1 would like to have our suggestions. A-1 expressed the desire to meet with the Consejo as soon as possible in order not to give the impression to the DMJM people that he was being masterminded by someone else. Martin explained to A-1 that Henry was currently out of town, but that his request for a meeting would be brought to Henry's attention upon his return. A-1 went on to say that the deadline for the budget to be submitted is close at hand which also adds to the urgency for a meeting.

2. Martin asked A-1 if he had checked his Post Office box. A-1 replied yes. A-1 was then asked to confirm or deny the rumor concerning Santiago Alvarez which alleged that A-1 has given him full autonomy within AMWORLD. A-1 said that he has not had a chance to talk to Santiago Alvarez since his return to Miami, but would do so soon. A-1 stated, however, that when he had approached Santiago Alvarez, the latter was informed he could bring with him "a mechanic or two," but A-1 never authorized Santiago Alvarez to bring his entire group en masse.

3. A-1 advised that the radio link between Miami and Costa Rica has been established. A-1 was told that there would be no need to obtain a HAM radio license to operate. Should his organization be approached by the local authorities concerning the operation of the radio, they are to plead ignorance of the law and stop transmitting. This information was obtained from Jim Smith. A-1 mentioned that he had received the dummy

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-2-

message sent to him in Costa Rica, however he did not receive the accompanying message. A-1 was asked to find out why the private link message did not reach him. Also, it was explained to A-1 who [] is.

4. A-1 was casually asked if there would be any objection to ANYUM-19 attending any of the Consejo meetings. A-1 had no objections.

5. A-1 has some motion pictures and photographs of the bases and will bring them to the next Consejo meeting.

6. A-1 was informed that a letter from Luis Sierra, chief of the guerrillas, was intercepted by his own people in Miami. This letter contained a photograph with Sierra and other members of the guerrilla teams dressed in their new uniforms. A-1 was asked to investigate how this letter had been sent from the base and also how Sierra was able to have the picture developed.

7. This brought up the subject of Manuel Gomez. A-1 said that Gomez will be leaving on Monday, 16 March, for [] to survey AMWORLD installations. A-1 had just a few hours previously spoken to Gomez. In the conversation, Gomez elaborated on the security measures he wishes A-1 to take concerning his own security. A-1 continues to sing the praises of Gomez. A-1 also commented that he has noticed a marked improvement in the security of his personnel since the last time he was in Miami.

8. While in [] A-1 detected being followed by another car. A-1 was able to lose the surveiller. Martin took this opportunity to stress to A-1 the need for increasing his personal security measures such as more body guards and more secrecy concerning his movements.

9. The ADELAIDA arrived in Hollywood o/a 8 March. A-1 was not able to examine the contents of the sabotage equipment due to his preoccupation in [] with the MCRL and []. The ADELAIDA unloaded weapons from the barge and sailed for [].

10. ANJAVA-4, AMWORLD-2 and "the Mexican" will leave together for [] on 16 March.

11. A-1 expressed an interest in moving the C-47 out of []. A-1 would like to discuss the method of transfer with the Consejo.

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-3-

12. A-1 was told that if it can be done in a secure and discreet manner through some contact, we would appreciate having a list of all Cuban nationals in


13. Concerning the budget, A-1 would like to discuss this in person rather than through the mail.

14. A-1 said he would keep in close contact with us on a daily basis.

Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDY-1 201
Conversations
Santiago Alvarez
Luis Sierra
Manuel Gomez

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12 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 12 March 1964, 1000 hours

1. Martin began the conversation by welcoming A-1 home.
2. Martin stated that he had a message from Henry which would have been sent out today had A-1 still been in Costa Rica. There were a few questions that Henry would like answered:

a. Since the Consejo had no previous indications of Calderonista attempts to overthrow the government, we would appreciate any additional information A-1 might have. A-1 began by saying that [] had had meetings with Francisco Calderon. Calderon's brother, Rafael, had been very friendly with [] brother as of late. [] brother had been at GUILLOT ever since the first arrival of the AMWORLD contingent. Rafael Calderon had a meeting in GUILLOT with [] brother of an unknown nature. A-1 considers the Calderonistas the main opposition to the government. Other substantiating reports had reached Figuls, [] [] had placed old Calderonista elements in key positions within the MCRL. A-1 gave Col. Figuls as his source of information. [] had wanted to place these old Calderonista elements within the AMWORLD organization in a supervisory capacity and they also would have the final say within AMWORLD.

b. What did A-1 mean by other reports reaching Cornelio Orlich and are you certain [] not acting in concert with Orlichs. A-1 replied that Cornelio had received other reports through his intelligence section, however, Cornelio had placed very little credence in them. Cornelio visited

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Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

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-2-

[] confronting him with what he had heard. [] told Cornelio that what he really wanted was to establish a contraband business mainly dealing in whisky. [] also visited A-1 and timidly told A-1 that he was in financial straits and the reason why he had wanted to move MCRL people into key positions was to use the MRR vehicles as a cover mechanism for contraband. [] told A-1 that he could obtain the approval of the government to engage in this type of business. It appears to A-1 that [] did present the contraband proposition to Cornelio Orlich and received tacit approval. A-1 informed both Cornelio and [] that since it was their country they could do as they pleased, however, he would not permit his vehicles to be used for this purpose. His main concern was to liberate Cuba and not to engage in the internal affairs of Costa Rica. His only desire is to be left alone so he can work effectively.

c. What is Figueres' role in this? A-1 replied that he had not seen any indications that Figueres had been involved. Although he and [] are close friends, they are political enemies.

d. What were his specific charges against Cabezas?
A-1 stated:

(1) The main charge against Cabezas was his collusion with [] to subordinate AMWORLD to the MCRL.

(2) Cabezas held a meeting with [] brother and Rafael Calderon without authorization or informing A-1.

When A-1 initially confronted Rolando Cabezas, the latter refused to answer any of A-1's questions. At a later meeting Cabezas confessed that the reason why [] had wanted control of the MRR was for the contraband whisky. A-1 feels that this contraband whisky was just an alibi and the main motive had been to overthrow the Costa Rican Government.

e. Will [] accept defeat or will he try again to control our movement? A-1 feels that [] no longer poses a direct menace to his organization. [] has been removed as the intermediary to Cornelio Orlich. [] however, is still in close contact with Cornelio Orlich. A-1 emphasized that [] will not be permitted to enter the camps, mainly GUILLOT, even though it is on his estate.

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Attn: conversation conducted
in presence of frequently
changed privacy code

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-3-

f. Has there been an open break between [] and the Orlichs? A-1 stated that at the beginning of the crisis there had been a break between [] and Cornelio Orlich, however, [] has been able to smoothen the rupture by telling Cornelio Orlich that his main interest in controlling the MRR was for financial gains through the contraband trade.

g. Is Cabezas your main source on [] and Calderon? A-1 commented that Cabezas had been one of his sources, but also Col. Figula plus reports given to A-1 by his own people in the camps. However, his main source was the facts which speak for themselves.

3. Changing the subject, Martin asked A-1 why he could not go to Guatemala. A-1 explained that what he had wanted to say in his message was that at this particular time Guatemala would have to be ruled out because his passport showed an exit from Mercedes Airport in Nicaragua. However, this did not preclude future meetings in Guatemala. A-1 apologized if he had given us the wrong impression in his message.

4. A-1 stated that within the coming week he might want to have a special meeting with the Consejo concerning the latest political developments in Costa Rica.

5. A-1 is forwarding us a tape on Honduras and Costa Rica as soon as possible.

6. A-1 is not satisfied with the developments in Nicaragua and with Iglesias in particular. A-1 implied that the main problem may be the funding mechanism in Nicaragua and misuse of AMWORLD funds. A-1 is sending AMWORLD-2, who is a public accountant, to review the financial situation there.

7. A-1 was asked to service his post office box since there are several letters waiting for him.

8. A-1 expects to meet with the DMJM people, who are now in Miami, along with AMWORLD-2 and AMJAVA-4.

9. It was requested of A-1 that he precede any Consejo messages which require immediate attention with the word "URGENTE" so that members of this office will not needlessly be called at all hours of the night. A-1 agreed.

10. A-1 was reminded that we still have not received AMWORLD-2's report regarding his interview with Eusebio Mujal.

SECRET

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

-4-

11. A-1 promised to call this office again this afternoon.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations:
MCRL
Costa Rica
V. Starke 201
R. Cabezas 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

SECRET

SECRET

ANWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 29 Feb to 1 March 1964

SUBJECT:

Regarding Senora it is finished so far as our side is concerned. We've gathered all the information that is readily available on the lat/, we've turned it over to AMBIDDY-1 and any further action will have to be on his part.

Carl E. Jenkins

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 29 Feb to 1 March 1964

SUBJECT: Galley Proofs of Book, "Bay of Pigs"

1. The two chapters of subject galley proofs were discussed with AMJAVA-4. We called attention particularly to the part referring to "Frank's" discussion of the possible "arrest" of American advisors in case of orders from Washington changing the plan of the invasion. We passed on Mr. Archer's view that A-1 should stick with the story, if it is true, in case reporters should question him about it, but that we felt that the easiest way out of this matter without building up a new controversy would be to take it fairly lightly. In other words, perhaps we could play it as though it had not been considered serious at the time because it was felt that Frank was a bit of a blowhard anyway who tried to involve himself too deeply in everything, plus the fact that we realized he was under considerable strain and probably this was just a brainstorm. A-4 felt that this was a sensible way to handle the matter. He understood it and agreed to discuss the matter with AMBIDDY-1 and felt that this would be acceptable to him.

2. A-4 asked if we had access to the rest of the book. I answered that to my knowledge these were the only two chapters available at the moment. I conjectured that perhaps they were being proofread, re-written, etc., chapter by chapter and that these were the first two which had been considered suitable to go to the printers. We would try to get the remaining chapters so that they could be studied and considered as soon as possible, but I simply had no way of knowing what was their present status and through which channels they would be handled. We would let them know as soon as we knew anything.

Carl E. Jenkins

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
publicity

SECRET

